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Introduction
Electricity is the backbone of modern society. We want electricity to be
available at all times, because without it, lights go out, appliances stop
working, and factories shut down. Unfortunately, the reliability of our elec-
tricity supply is continuously challenged by adverse weather, loop flows,
forecast errors, variable generation and consumption, and unplanned out-
ages of lines, transformers, generation plants and large loads. As the cost
of a major interruption or blackout is very large, network operators do their
utmost to achieve a high reliability level, but a completely reliable electricity
supply comes at an infinite cost.
Traditionally, the energy sector has emphasized reliability rather than
the costs of achieving this reliability. However, considering the large cost
of both electricity provision and electricity interruptions, it is of paramount
importance to determine the correct reliability level.
This doctoral thesis addresses this question by studying the fundamen-
tal trade-off between the value of reliability and its cost. The six chapters
of this thesis focus on different aspects of power system reliability:
1. Optimal transmission reliability.
2. Choosing a reliability criterion.
3. Optimal regulation of reliability.
4. Cooperation in generation reliability.
5. The importance of the value of lost load in reliability management.
6. The effect of reliability management on inequality of reliability.
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Context and motivation
A power system consists of four primary components:
(A) Generation: the process of generating electricity from coal, gas,
oil, nuclear fuel, wind, sun, hydro, etc.
(B) Transmission: the high-voltage network of cables, lines and
transformers that transports electricity from generation plants to the
distribution network.
(C) Distribution: the low-voltage network that carries electricity
from the transmission system to individual consumers.
(D) Retail: the final sale of electricity to end-consumers.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Figure 1: The four primary components of power systems. (Source: Institute for
Energy Research)
For decades all four primary components were integrated within a single
public electric utility that was responsible for generating electricity, trans-
porting it from generation plants to load centers, distributing it and selling
it to individual consumers. From the 1980s, in the wake of a deregulation
movement that had already affected airlines, transportation and the supply
of gas, the vertically integrated and centrally planned electricity system was
gradually replaced by a system that relied on markets and different market
players (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004a). Although the exact design of these
deregulated or liberalized markets differs between countries, they have the
following in common:
• Separation of the four primary components.
• Introduction of competition in generation and retail. The existing
portfolio of generation plants is split in multiple competing companies
and free entry is allowed for companies that meet certain requirements.
2
CONTENTS
• Creation of separate transmission and distribution companies to man-
age the monopoly networks.
• Allowing consumers to choose between competing retailers.
• Establishment of a national regulatory authority that monitors both
the competing companies and the monopoly networks.
• Creation of markets where generators, retailers, large consumers and
the transmission system operator make transactions.
• Some of the new companies are still publicly owned, while others are
private.
This thesis mainly focuses on the transmission system operator (TSO), the
entity responsible for the transmission network. In addition to managing
its own transmission network, the TSO is also responsible for maintaining
a continuous balance between generation and load. This is a difficult task
for three reasons. First, electricity demand varies on a daily, weekly or even
seasonal basis, it is difficult to predict, and it does not (yet) react to the
real-time price of electricity. Second, the increased penetration of renewables
also makes generation variable and uncertain. Third, network components,
generation plants and large loads can unexpectedly fail.
To ensure that generation and load are always balanced, despite the
above problems, a TSO takes many reliability actions. Even if this balance is
evidently a real-time issue, these actions are taken at different time horizons
before real-time operation:
• System expansion: construction, upgrading, replacement, retrofitting
or decommissioning of assets like AC or DC high-voltage transmission
lines, substations, shunt reactors, phase-shifting transformers, etc.
• Asset management: monitoring the health status of network com-
ponents, planning maintenance activities, repairing the components in
case of failure, etc.
• Operational planning: congestion management, system protection,
reserve provision, preventive actions, voltage control, decisions on out-
age executions, etc.
• Real-time operation: corrective actions, activation of reserves, reli-
ability assessment, etc.
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By taking these actions, a TSO prepares its electricity system for a set of
possible operating states and possible contingencies. For example, a combi-
nation of stormy weather, very high wind production and the failure of an
important transmission line. However, a TSO can not prepare its system
for every possible operating state or every possible contingency. For exam-
ple, securing the system against the simultaneous failure of three nuclear
power plants and four transmission lines would require a too high cost of
respectively generation reserves and transmission capacity. This brings up
the question what constitutes an appropriate or even optimal level of relia-
bility. Answering this require us to analyze the trade-off between costs and
benefits of reliability actions.
This trade-off, however, is not at the heart of a TSO’s reliability man-
agement. Currently, TSOs do not explicitly target a certain reliability level.
Instead, their reliability actions aim to meet the N-1 reliability criterion,
which states that an unexpected outage of a single system component (lines,
transformers, generation plants, large loads, etc.) can not result in a loss
of load. That is, when a single system component fails, the transmission
system should still be able to accommodate all flows without load shedding.
This also implies that, following the N-1 reliability criterion, a simultaneous
failure of multiple system components could require load shedding to avoid
a black out.
The straightforward N-1 reliability criterion has led to satisfactory re-
sults in the last decades, but is increasingly challenged by researchers and
decision makers. They argue that the N-1 criterion is not able to efficiently
meet the current challenges of the electricity system, such as uncertain and
variable demand and supply, decentralized decision makers, highly inter-
connected networks, difficulties in building new lines and a general trend
towards a more efficient use of the transmission system. The N-1 reliability
criterion is intuitive and easy to understand, but lacks transparency and
flexibility, and ignores the economic trade-off between costs and benefits.
This trade-off is needed to determine optimal reliability actions and the
optimal reliability level.
The socio-economic cost of having a too high or too low level of reliabil-
ity are substantial. As the cost of reliability actions is paid by end-consumers
4
CONTENTS
of electricity, increasing the reliability level raises their cost, which is already
a considerable part of household expenditures. For example, in the United
Kingdom, households spend between 1.4% (richest 10%) and 4.8% (poorest
10%) of their income on electricity (OFGEM, 2017a). On the other hand,
the cost of interruptions is equally large. A one-day blackout could amount
to about 0.5% of a country’s GDP (Kirschen, 2002) and could, in addition,
lead to societal consequences such as injuries, diseases and deaths.
This dissertation analyzes the question of optimal transmission relia-
bility. To tackle this problem, we need to address several questions: What
is the set of possible operating states and contingencies to consider? What
is the probability of different operating states and contingencies? What is
the cost of interruptions? What are possible reliability actions? What is the
information available to the TSO? What is a TSO allowed to do? How is a
TSO regulated?
Outline and contributions
All six chapters of this thesis deal with the fundamental trade-off between
reliability costs and interruption costs. They combine analytical models
with case studies, small numerical illustrations or larger simulation models.
The target audience are economists and engineers studying power systems,
as well as policy makers and transmission system operators. In a nutshell,
the six chapters of this thesis cover the following topics:
Chapter I: Optimal Electricity Transmission Reliability: Going
Beyond the N-1 Criterion. In the presence of transmission outages,
uncertain demand and variable renewable supply, network operators keep
a reliability margin to avoid interruptions and black-outs. The reliability
margin is presently determined by the N-1 reliability criterion. Our ana-
lytical model defines the optimal reliability margin by balancing congestion
costs and interruption costs. This leads to more efficient use of transmission
capacity and to smaller investment needs than with the N-1 criterion. A
numerical illustration shows the net benefits of the new reliability criterion.
This chapter is joint work with Stef Proost. It has been presented
at YEEES (Leuven, Belgium, 2014), CIES (Cologne University, Germany,
5
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2015), the BAEE meeting (UCL, Belgium, 2015), and the IAEE interna-
tional conference (Bergen, 2016), where it has won a Student Best Paper
Award. An earlier version can be found in:
• Ovaere, M., and Proost, S. (2016). Electricity transmission reliability:
The impact of reliability criteria. KU Leuven Department of Eco-
nomics Discussion Paper Series, 16.21.
Chapter II: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Reliability Criteria:
From Deterministic N-1 to a Probabilistic Approach. This chapter
proposes a classification of reliability criteria for power systems based on
four characteristics: (i) the set of considered system states, (ii) the objective
function, (iii) the allowed real-time actions and (iv) optional non-technical
constraints. Because selecting a reliability criterion involves a trade-off be-
tween multiple objectives, this chapter suggests the use of five performance
indicators to evaluate reliability criteria: (i) expected total cost, (ii) reliabil-
ity level, (iii) inequality between consumers, (iv) data needs and availability
and (v) ease of use. A case study for a five-node test system illustrates
this multi-dimensional analysis of six reliability criteria that range from the
deterministic N-1 criterion to a full probabilistic criterion that aims to mini-
mize expected total cost. This analysis finds that moving from deterministic
to probabilistic reliability criteria decreases expected total cost, but unre-
liability and inequality increase. The largest savings of expected total cost
are due to a trade-off between preventive and corrective actions. A smaller
portion of savings is due to the trade-off between preventive and curtailment
actions. Limits on individual or aggregate unreliability levels decrease un-
reliability and inequality, but increase expected total costs when compared
to a fully probabilistic approach.
This chapter is joint work with with Evelyn Heylen, Stef Proost, Geert
Deconinck and Dirk Van Hertem.
Chapter III: Cost and Quality Regulation of a Monopolist. This
chapter studies the effect of linear cost and quality regulation of a monop-
olist on its cost-reducing effort and its provided quality level. The model
differs from the earlier literature on quality regulation by focusing on the
6
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monopolist’s cost function instead of on the demand curve. As a result, we
analyze the effect of regulation on quality and cost-reducing effort instead
of quality and quantity. The analysis shows that both quality and effort in-
crease with the power of the quality incentive, while the effect of the power
of the cost incentive is ambiguous. Next, introducing uncertainty, the power
of the cost incentive and quality incentive should optimally be equal and be-
low one. Last, we compare our hybrid regulation to pure rate-of-return and
price-cap regulation and analyze case studies in electricity, gas and water.
This chapter has been presented at YEEES (The University of Edin-
burgh, UK, 2016) and the FAEE Student Workshop (MINES ParisTech,
France, 2017).
Chapter IV: Cross-Border Exchange and Sharing of Generation
Reserve Capacity. This chapter develops a stylized model of cross-border
balancing. We distinguish three degrees of cooperation: autarky, reserves
exchange and reserves sharing. The model shows that TSO cooperation
reduces costs. The gains of reserves exchange increase with cost asymme-
try and the additional gains of reserves sharing decrease with correlation of
real-time imbalances. Based on actual market data of reserves procurement
of automatic frequency restoration reserves in Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, we estimate the efficiency gains of ex-
change to be around e60 million per year and of sharing to be around e150
million per year. The model also shows that voluntary cross-border coop-
eration could be hard to achieve, as TSOs do not necessarily have correct
incentives.
This chapter is joint work with M. Baldursson, Ewa Lazarczyk and
Stef Proost. It has been presented at the IAEE international Conference
(Bergen, 2016). Earlier versions can be found in:
• Baldursson, F. M., Lazarczyk, E., Ovaere, M., and Proost, S. (2016).
Cross-border exchange and sharing of generation reserve capacity,
CREE Working paper 14/2016.
• Baldursson, F. M., Lazarczyk, E., Ovaere, M., and Proost, S. (2016).
Multi-TSO system reliability: Cross-border balancing. IEEE Interna-
tional Energy Conference, ENERGYCON 2016.
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Chapter V: How Detailed Value of Lost Load Data Impact Power
System Reliability Decisions: a Trade-off Between Efficiency and
Equity. The value of lost load (VOLL) is an essential parameter for trans-
mission system reliability management. It represents the cost of unserved
energy of electricity interruptions. Various studies have estimated this pa-
rameter for different countries and more recently, for different interruption
characteristics – such as interruption duration, time of interruption and
interrupted consumer. However, most applications only use one uniform
VOLL. Our theoretical analysis shows that using more-detailed VOLL data
leads to better-informed transmission reliability decisions. To illustrate this,
we estimate the efficiency gains of including consumer and time character-
istics in short-term transmission reliability management using VOLL data
from Norway, Great Britain and the United States. Depending on the VOLL
data and the method of demand curtailment, our five-node network indicates
efficiency gains up to 43%. However, increased efficiency leads to decreased
equity. Striking the balance between these opposing objectives is crucial for
social acceptance.
This chapter is joint work with with Evelyn Heylen, Stef Proost, Geert
Deconinck and Dirk Van Hertem. It has been presented at EnergyVille
(Belgium, 2016) and the CIGRE C5 Mirror Meeting (Belgium, 2016). An
earlier version can be found in:
• Ovaere, M., Heylen, E., Proost, S., Deconinck, G., and Van Hertem,
D. (2016). How detailed value of lost load data impact power system
reliability decisions: a trade-off between efficiency and equality. KU
Leuven Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, 16.26.
Chapter VI: An Inequality Indicator of Power System Reliabil-
ity. Power system decisions not only affect the overall reliability level, but
also the reliability level of individual load points and consumers depend-
ing on their location and consumer characteristics. A Gini-based indicator
is proposed that summarizes the inequality of power system reliability be-
tween different entities, such as consumers, nodes or regions. The indicator
expresses the perceived fairness of the reliability level. Because fairness
8
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contributes to social acceptance of power system decisions, the inequality
indicator can help decision makers to assess the effect of power system deci-
sions on inequality of reliability and to take appropriate actions to decrease
this inequality. The use of the inequality indicator is illustrated using two
case studies: (i) the Belgian load-shedding plan for generation adequacy and
(ii) the shift from deterministic to probabilistic short-term power system re-
liability management.
This chapter is joint work with with Evelyn Heylen, Stef Proost, Geert
Deconinck and Dirk Van Hertem.
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Chapter I
Optimal Electricity
Transmission Reliability:
Going Beyond the N-1
Criterion
I.1 Introduction
Reliability of electricity supply is of paramount importance to our society.
Without electricity, lights go out, appliances stop working, and factories shut
down. A transmission system operator (TSO) is entrusted with the task of
safeguarding our supply. Reliability management affects all its decisions,
from long-term system development to short-term operational planning and
system operation.
Despite its importance, the economic literature has not given much at-
tention to electricity transmission reliability (Joskow, 2006).1 Many papers
study economic transmission investment (e.g. Turvey (2006); van der Weijde
and Hobbs (2012); Doucet et al. (2013); Pozo et al. (2013)) and its regula-
tion (e.g. Le´autier (2000); Rosello´n (2007); Rosello´n and Weigt (2011)), but
1Joskow (2006, p.12) states that ”neither reliability transmission investments nor the
interrelationship between reliability criteria and economic parameters are given much at-
tention in the literature on competitive electricity markets.”
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leave reliability issues aside. Considering reliability, however, is important
to better understand transmission capacity investment and the use of this
transmission capacity. For example, many European countries aim for more
transmission investment to better cope with renewable energy integration
and to lower wholesale electricity prices.2 But, because of the costs of trans-
mission investments and the difficulties in building new lines (Cohen et al.,
2016), the question is whether a more efficient use of current transmission
capacity is a better alternative. Addressing this question requires us to think
about electricity transmission reliability.
This paper considers the possibility of transmission line outages, gener-
ation outages, uncertainty of demand, and variable renewable supply. The
paper shows that TSOs use less transmission capacity than is installed,
because of reliability concerns. As a result, the effect of transmission in-
vestment on reliability depends on the TSO’s system operation, which is
managed by its reliability criterion. Currently all TSOs use the N-1 relia-
bility criterion or some variant. This deterministic criterion states that an
unexpected outage of a single system component may not result in a loss
of load. We show that the N-1 reliability criterion is suboptimal since it
only depends on the topology and the use of the network, not on network
conditions and economic parameters. In addition, the model provides in-
sight into the trade-off between reliability and congestion. It shows that
the N-1 criterion requires the TSO to achieve an exogenous reliability level
and minimize congestion costs, while optimally the reliability level and the
congestion cost are determined endogenously (Hogan et al., 2010).
To our knowledge, an analytical economic model of electricity transmis-
sion reliability does not yet exist. Some economic papers have, however, dis-
cussed electricity transmission reliability and reliability criteria. Blumsack
et al. (2007) study the relationship between congestion and reliability, but
limit their focus to a Wheatstone network. They find that in this particular
network topology, investing in a transmission line to increase reliability could
increase congestion. By contrast, we will show in this paper that because of
the TSO’s reliability management, every line investment will both increase
2The European Union wants to bring the electricity interconnection level of all member
countries to 10% by 2020 and is looking into raising the target to 15% by 2030 (European
Commission, 2015).
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reliability and decrease congestion. Also Kirschen and Strbac (2004b) dis-
cuss the effect of investment on congestion and reliability. They observe
that the N-1 reliability criterion treats congestion and reliability differently.
We will show this in a more formal way. The N-1 criterion is also criticized
by Joskow (2006), who finds that little effort has been made to review it and
evaluate its costs and benefits. An exception is the case study of de Nooij
et al. (2010), which compares for the N-1 rule the transmission investment
costs with the benefits of reduced interruption costs. Lastly, Joskow and
Tirole (2007) formulate a model similar to the one of this paper, but they
focus on generation adequacy (Steiner, 1957; Williamson, 1966) instead of
transmission reliability. In their model, the reliability level is the probabil-
ity that demand is lower than installed generation capacity (Chao, 1983;
Kleindorfer and Fernando, 1993), while in this paper the reliability level is
the probability that the electricity flow is lower than available transmission
capacity.
Reliability criteria are also increasingly being studied in the engineering
literature (Grigg et al., 1999; Kirschen and Jayaweera, 2007; He et al., 2010;
Capitanescu et al., 2011b; Heylen et al., 2016b, 2017b). These case studies all
study the short-term effect of alternative reliability criteria, without making
a link to transmission investment. By modeling the network in great detail,
they arrive at estimates of possible short-term efficiency improvements. This
paper intends to complement these studies by focusing on a stylized setup
instead of on simulation results, which allows the clarification of the driving
forces and trade-offs, both in the short and long term.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I.2 introduces the model
that shows the trade-off between congestion cost, transmission investment
cost and reliability. We determine the optimal investment and optimal use
of transmission capacity. Section I.3 analyses the expected interruption cost
function, the optimal price difference between zones and cost recovery in the
optimal solution. Section I.3.4 extends the basic model to multiple states
of the world and a general network. Next, section I.4 analyses the N-1 re-
liability criterion and shows that its reliability margin does not depend on
economic and technical parameters. In section I.5, we illustrate the analy-
sis with a numerical example in a simple and in a more complex network.
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Section I.6 describes the requirements to move beyond the N-1 reliability
criterion. Finally, section I.7 concludes.
I.2 The model
I.2.1 The model setup
Consider two regions connected by multiple transmission lines. We define
the maximum capacity K [MW] as the maximum possible electricity flow
between the two regions when all electricity lines are in operation. Some
time before real time (for example in the day-ahead market for the 24 hours
of the next day), the TSO determines how much electricity flow k [MW]
to schedule between the two regions.3 The TSO always schedules less flow
than the maximum capacity K to account for (i) unplanned outages of
transmission lines and transformers – which decrease the maximum capacity
– and to account for (ii) forecast errors, loop flows and unplanned outages of
generation plants and large loads – which causes the physical flow to differ
from the scheduled flow.
The left-hand panel of Figure I.1 shows the maximum capacity K and
the scheduled flow k. The reliability margin is defined as the difference
between maximum capacity and scheduled flow: K−k (Neuhoff et al., 2013).
The TSO keeps this margin because the physical flow could differ from the
scheduled flow and the maximum capacity could be lower than expected
due to transmission line failures. The right-hand panel of Figure I.1 shows
a possible real-time realization of maximum capacity and physical flow. In
this case a combination of a higher physical flow and a line failure causes the
physical flow kRT to be larger than the real-time maximum capacity KRT at
some point. As the transmission capacity of the remaining lines is insufficient
to accommodate the physical flow between the regions, the TSO needs to
do a corrective action such that the physical flow is back within the bounds
of the real-time maximum capacity: kRT <KRT . Possible corrective actions
3If the two regions are in a different price zone, the TSO directly decides on the
scheduled flow by imposing a limit on cross-regional flows. If the two regions are within
a price zone, the TSO only indirectly decides on the scheduled flow by using preventive
redispatch of generation.
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are use of generation reserves or involuntary load shedding – also called non-
price rationing, demand curtailment or controlled rolling blackouts (Joskow,
2008b). Generation reserves allow increasing or decreasing generation in
different parts of the network, while load shedding amounts to deliberately
restricting electricity supply in parts of the network. If the physical overflow
is not adequately dealt with within a certain period of time, this could lead
to cascading uncontrolled network collapses and large-scale blackouts (e.g.
in the U.S. (2003) , Italy (2003), Brazil and Paraguay (2009), India (2012)
and Turkey (2015)).
Figure I.1: (a) Maximum capacity K and scheduled flow k before real time. (b)
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This paper studies the optimal investment (K∗) and optimal scheduled
use (k∗) of transmission capacity between two regions. Suppose that these
decisions are made by a welfare-maximizing TSO, the entity responsible
for dispatch, congestion management, maintenance and investment of the
transmission network.4 Optimally a TSO schedules less electricity flow k
than the maximum capacity K. It keeps a scheduled reliability margin K−k
or equivalently, it keeps a line loading α = kK < 1. Before determining the
optimal investment and optimal use of transmission capacity, we study the
three types of costs and benefits that constitute net interconnection surplus.
4If the operational, maintenance and investment responsibility tasks are split, the re-
spective entities are called the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the independent
transmission company (Transco). The ownership or division of tasks does not fundamen-
tally affect the core of our analysis.
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I.2.2 The three constituents of net interconnection surplus
First, scheduling an electricity flow k from a low-cost region to a high-
cost region creates interconnection benefit, or gross interconnection surplus,
by enabling a reduction of production costs. The difference of production
costs5 between a system with some constrained transmission lines and one
with infinite transmission capacity, plus the consumer dead-weight loss from
the associated changed prices, are called the congestion costs of the system
(Joskow, 2006).6 In addition to decreased congestion costs, interconnection
decreases the cost of reserves through reserve sharing and demand smoothing
(Baldursson et al., 2016b), it creates more competition in the generation
market (Borenstein et al., 2000) and facilitates the integration of renewable
generation. The function S(k) summarizes the interconnection benefit. It
is an increasing and concave function:
S′(k) ≥ 0 and S′′(k) < 0 (1.1)
Second, transmission line failures and physical flows that diverge from sched-
uled flows could require corrective actions by the TSO. In the remainder of
this paper we will assume that load shedding is the only corrective action
available. In addition, we assume that the TSO is able to estimate the ex-
pected interruption cost (EIC) of load shedding. The EIC depends on both
scheduled electricity flow k and maximum capacity K. Ceteris paribus, the
EIC is increasing and convex in k and decreasing and convex in K.
EIC ′k(k,K) > 0 and EIC ′′k (k,K) > 0
EIC ′K(k,K) < 0 and EIC ′′K(k,K) > 0 (1.2)
5Assuming perfectly competitive producers and assuming that the generation cost is
the social cost of generation, i.e. including externalities like CO2, NOX , SOX , particulate
matter, noise, etc.
6To manage congestion, cheap generation in an export-constrained region is decreased,
while more expensive generation in an import-constrained region is increased. In uniform-
price zones, redispatch is the responsibility of the TSO, who gives a congestion payment
to redispatched generators. In nodal pricing or market splitting, congestion is managed
implicitly by prices. Different congestion management methods lead to different physical
and financial flows, and have different effects on TSOs (Holmberg and Lazarczyk, 2015)
and on producers (Dijk and Willems, 2011).
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Third, installing and using transmission capacity has a cost. Suppose
that the transmission costs only depend on the maximum capacity K. That
is, we incorporate operations, maintenance and investment costs but ne-
glect losses and line-loading induced depreciation and maintenance, which
depend on the ratio of k and K. The cost of transmission capacity, c(K),
is increasing in K:
c′(K) > 0 (1.3)
I.2.3 The optimal solution
Following the above assumptions, net surplus of transmission interconnec-
tion is given by:7
max{k,K}{S(k) −EIC(k,K) − c(K)} (1.4)
Net surplus is interconnection benefit minus expected interruption costs and
transmission investment costs. It is maximized by selecting the optimal
scheduled flow k and maximum capacity K.8 These are calculated from the
first-order conditions of net surplus (1.4):⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
S′(k) = EIC ′k(k,K)−EIC ′K(k,K) = c′(K) (1.5)
The first trade-off between interconnection benefit and expected interrup-
tion costs is the TSO’s short-term decision. Given a constant maximum
capacity K, electricity flow k is optimally scheduled up to the point where
the additional increase of interconnection benefit equals the additional in-
crease of expected interruption costs. The short-term first-order condition is
thus a trade-off between congestion and reliability: increasing the scheduled
7The constraint k ≤K is never binding in expected terms. That is, it is assumed that
at k = K, marginal interconnection benefit is lower than marginal expected interruption
costs. However, kRT can be higher than KRT in real time, as was illustrated in Figure I.1.
8Note that equation (1.4) represents the maximization of net interconnection surplus.
If the interconnection is between two TSO zones z, the optimal electricity flow kz (and
thus Kz) can differ from the point of view of each TSO, depending on the division of
interconnection benefit and expected interruption costs. This may lead to strategic TSO
behavior (Glachant and Pignon, 2005).
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flow decreases congestion but increases the expected interruption cost. As
a consequence, complete elimination of congestion costs at all times entails
a too large expected interruption cost, while aiming for a 100 % reliable
transmission system entails a too large congestion cost.
Both S(k) and EIC(k,K) could change over time. For example, S(k)
increases if autarkic prices are more apart and EIC(k,K) increases in case
of adverse weather (Kirschen and Jayaweera, 2007).
The trade-off between expected interruption costs and transmission in-
vestment costs determines the TSO’s long-term decision of how large the
maximum capacity K should be. Since the two first-order conditions are
interdependent, the optimal maximum capacity is determined by a trade-off
between reliability, congestion and investment. Increasing maximum capac-
ity and keeping the scheduled electricity flow constant, decreases expected
interruption costs. Increasing maximum capacity and keeping expected in-
terruption costs constant, decreases congestion costs.
The first-order conditions (1.5) lead to the following result:
Proposition 1. Consider two regions between which a flow K can be trans-
ferred. Optimally, the TSO should:
i. In the short term, schedule electricity flow until the marginal intercon-
nection benefit equals the marginal expected interruption costs.
ii. In the long term, increase maximum capacity K until the marginal
expected interruption cost equals the marginal cost of interconnection.
I.3 Analysis
I.3.1 The expected interruption cost
To make the above optimal solution more concrete, we calculate the expected
interruption cost of a simple network, as a function of k and K.9 Assume two
regions connected by n identical transmission lines with a joint maximum
capacity of K MW. Each line has a transmission capacity of K/n MW, the
9For a numerical illustration see (Kirschen and Jayaweera, 2007). They calculate the
expected interruption cost of a IEEE 24-bus reliability test system.
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same technical characteristics and the same probabilistically-independent
failure probability pf . Suppose that the scheduled flow k equals the physical
flow in real time. That is, only the availability of maximum capacity is
uncertain. When, due to line failures, only i of the n lines are available, the
TSO needs to shed (k − inK)+ MW of load, assuming that load shedding
is the only available corrective action. For example, if maximum capacity
is 4,000 MW, scheduled flow is 3,000 MW, and only 3 of 5 identical lines
are available, 3000 − 354000 = 600 MW of load shedding is needed to keep
physical flow below the available transmission capacity of 2,400 MW. The
cost of shedding a MW of load is represented by the value of lost load
(VOLL), which is the lost surplus when a MWh of energy is not served to
consumers demanding this energy.10 VOLL (V ) is generally expressed in
e/MWh. The above assumptions lead to the following EIC:
EIC(k,K) = n∑
i
pi (k − i
n
K)+ V (1.6)
where pi = (ni)(1− pf)i(pf)(n−i) is the probability that i of n lines are avail-
able, given i.i.d. failures. This specific expected interruption cost functional
form fulfills the above assumptions (1.2): it is increasing in k, decreasing in
K and convex piecewise-linear in k and K.
The short-term first-order condition showed that the optimal scheduled
flow k is at the point where the marginal interconnection benefit equals the
marginal EIC. Assuming the EIC of equation (1.6) this is:
S′(k) = n∑
i
pi1+(i)V
where 1+(i) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if i < n kK
0 if i ≥ n kK
(1.7)
where 1+ is the indicator function, which is equal to one if load shedding is
needed, i.e. if (k − inK) is positive.
Equation (1.7) shows that the optimal electricity flow depends on the
network topology (n), the line failure probability (pf ), the value of lost load
10A rich literature exists on measuring the value of supply interruptions using stated
preference (Ovaere et al., 2016; Pepermans, 2011; Reichl et al., 2013), revealed preference,
indirect analytical methods (de Nooij et al., 2007) or case studies.
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(V ), the marginal interconnection benefit (S′), and maximum capacity (K).
For example, in case of adverse weather (pf high) or when consumers have a
high VOLL, the TSO should schedule a lower electricity flow. To summarize:
Proposition 2. When the EIC is as in equation (1.6), the TSO should
optimally increase the electricity flow when failure probabilities decrease,
marginal interconnection benefit increases, VOLL decreases, and maximum
capacity increases.
I.3.2 The optimal price difference and cost recovery of trans-
mission investments
In the standard economic transmission investment model with 100% reliable
transmission capacity (K = k), as in (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004a, p.152) and
(Turvey, 2006), the optimal investment in transmission capacity is at the
point where the marginal benefit of interconnection equals the marginal cost
of transmission:
S′(K∗) = c′(K∗) (1.8)
Only incorporating congestion costs into the interconnection benefit, the
marginal benefit is equal to the price difference ∆p(k) between the two
zones. Additionally, assuming a constant marginal cost of interconnection
c, the expression becomes:
∆p(K∗) = c (1.9)
This standard result is altered when reliability is included. Assuming the
expected interruption cost of equation (1.6), we can combine the two first-
order conditions to get the following expression:
∆p(k∗) = c + n∑
i
pi1+(i)(1 − i
n
)V (1.10)
This shows that reliability concerns cause the optimal price difference to
be larger than the marginal investment cost. The wedge between the price
difference and the marginal investment cost increases with VOLL and with
failure probability.
Cost recovery of transmission investments also changes by including
reliability concerns. Without reliability concerns, it follows from equation
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(1.9) that congestion rent K∆p equals variable transmission investment cost
cK∗.11 With reliability concerns and assuming that EIC is a homogeneous
function of degree h, the first-order conditions (1.5) combine to:12
k∗∆p(k∗) = cK∗ + hEIC(k∗,K∗) (1.11)
That is, optimally, the congestion rent earned by the TSO (left-hand side) is
larger than the cost of transmission investment (cK∗). For example, if the
expected interruption cost is the one of equation (1.6), which is homogeneous
of degree h = 113, the optimal congestion rent equals the sum of investment
cost and interruption costs. This excess revenue could be used to compensate
consumers for their interruption costs. To summarize:
Proposition 3. If reliability is considered, the optimal price difference leads
to more than sufficient congestion rent to remunerate the cost of transmis-
sion capacity. If the expected interruption cost is homogeneous of degree 1,
the excess congestion rent can fully compensate consumers for their inter-
ruption costs.
I.3.3 Economic versus reliability transmission investments
Some TSOs and regulators consider reliability transmission investments and
economic transmission investment as being two separate objectives: FERC
(2006), ENTSO-E (2014a, p.60), PJM (Joskow, 2005, p.111). Economic
transmission investments are conceptualized as being developed to reduce
congestion costs, while reliability transmission investments are conceptual-
ized as necessary to meet engineering reliability criteria. However, first-order
conditions (1.5) show that a categorization into reliability transmission in-
vestment and economic transmission investment is arbitrary. Investing in
11In reality, congestion rent falls considerably short of variable investment costs, as illus-
trated by Pe´rez-Arriaga et al. (1995), due to lumpiness and decreasing marginal transmis-
sion investment costs. In addition, fixed transmission investment costs are not recovered.
Also note that the TSO only earns congestion rent on transmission lines between different-
price zones.
12Using Euler’s Homogeneous Function Theorem: EIC ′kk +EIC ′KK = hEIC
13This means that with equal line loading α, an optimal transmission network that is
twice as large has twice as much expected optimal interruption costs. That is, there is
constant returns to scale in interruption costs.
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more transmission capacity can lead to more interconnection benefit and to
a lower expected interruption cost, depending on the TSO’s choice of sched-
uled flow k. In the short term, one can increase reliability by increasing
congestion, and vice versa.
I.3.4 General model formulation
The analysis up to now was restricted to a two-region network with constant
interconnection benefit and EIC. This section generalizes our results to a
stochastic model and to general networks.
I.3.4.1 Stochastic model
We distinguish different states of the world. Every state of the world is a
particular combination of parameter values for demand and supply condi-
tions, failure probabilities, VOLL, etc. If t ∈ T is the state of the world, the
objective function becomes:
max{kt,K}{St(kt) −EICt(kt,K) − c(K)} (1.12)
This means that for each state of the world t one should schedule electricity
k until the marginal surplus equals the marginal expected interruption cost:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
S′t(kt) = EIC ′t,k(kt,K) ∀t ∈ T− ∫T EIC ′K(kt,K)f(t)dt = c′(K) (1.13)
The first line of (1.13) shows that kt is different for different states of the
world. For example, when interconnection benefit is high, increase scheduled
flow; and when expected interruption costs are high, decrease it. The first
order condition for investment (second line of (1.13)) shows that one should
increase maximum capacity K until the marginal cost of interconnection
equals the marginal expected (over all states of the world) interruption costs.
I.3.4.2 General network
If the network consists of N nodes and L lines, the objective function be-
comes
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max{Ð→k ,Ð→K}{S(Ð→k ) −EIC(Ð→k ,Ð→K) − c(Ð→K)} (1.14)
where Ð→k ∈ RL is the vector representing the flows over the L lines of the
network and Ð→K ∈ RL is the vector representing the transmission capacity of
the L lines of the network. However, the TSO does not directly control the
flows on the transmission lines Ð→k . During day-ahead generation dispatch
the TSO decides on a generation schedule Ð→g ∈ RN , which leads to a unique
power flow schedule Ð→k .14 Therefore, reformulate the objective function as:
max{Ð→g ,Ð→K}{S(Ð→g ) −EIC(Ð→g ,Ð→K) − c(Ð→K)} (1.15)
The first-order conditions are:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
S′gn(Ð→g ) = EIC ′gn(Ð→g ,Ð→K) ∀n ∈ N−EIC ′Kl(Ð→g ,Ð→K) = c′Kl(Kl) ∀l ∈ L (1.16)
That is, for each node n schedule generation capacity gn until the
marginal surplus equals the marginal expected interruption cost. In the opti-
mum, congestion-increasing generation (S′gn < 0) decreases EIC; congestion-
decreasing generation (S′gn > 0) increases EIC. The long-term first-order
condition shows that for each line l one should increase transmission capac-
ity until the marginal cost of interconnection equals the marginal expected
interruption costs.15
I.4 The N-1 reliability criterion
Currently all TSOs use the N-1 reliability criterion or some variant.16 The
N-1 criterion states that an unexpected outage of a single system component
14In the two-region analysis with inelastic demand D, generation g translates directly
into a flow k: g −D = k.
15In reality, both the large number of states of the world and lumpy investments with
large fixed costs make it impossible to satisfy the long-term first-order condition for all
lines l. Discrete investment decisions are studied in more detail in section I.5.2.
16For example: N-0 during maintenance, considering double-line failures during adverse
weather, N-1 of credible contingencies (like multiple dependent failures), stronger reliabil-
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(lines, transformers, generation plants, large loads, etc.) may not result in a
loss of load. That is, when a single system component fails, the transmission
system should still be able to accommodate all flows without load shedding.
This also implies that, following the N-1 reliability criterion, a simultaneous
failure of multiple system components could require load shedding to avoid
a black out.
I.4.1 Operational planning decision
First we analyse how the N-1 reliability criterion determines the TSO’s op-
erational planning decision of how much electricity flow to schedule. By
prohibiting lost load in case of a single contingency, the N-1 reliability cri-
terion determines the electricity flow kN−1 allowed on the network as the
maximum flow that the network can accommodate after each possible single
contingency. We represent this decision as the allowed maximum line loading
αN−1 = kN−1/K, since in the short-term maximum capacity K is constant.
Figure I.2 shows how to determine the allowed line loading αN−1 for two
different networks, with equal maximum capacity between two regions East
and West.
Network (a) shows two nodes connected by four identical transmission
lines. Each line carries 25% of the total electricity flow. The line loading im-
plied by the N-1 reliability criterion is αN−1 = 0.250.33 = 0.75, since the network
should be able to cope with a loss of one line, or a quarter of the maximum
capacity. For example, if each line has a thermal limit of 1,000 MW, 3,000
MW is available in each N-1 state.
Network (b) shows the same four identical lines, but with two addi-
tional identical lines within East and West. Demand and supply are split
evenly within each zone. Nodes W1 and W2 each supply half of net exports,
while nodes E1 and E2 each consume half of net imports. If a transmission
line in this interconnected system fails, the power flows are redistributed au-
tomatically throughout the network according to Kirchoff’s laws. A lossless
DC Power flow analysis17 calculates that in this network the maximum flow
ity criteria for cities or certain business districts, etc. For example, the Dutch regulator
has changed the reliability criterion to ‘N-1 during maintenance, unless the costs exceed
the benefits’ (de Nooij et al., 2010).
17A DC power flow is a linear approximation of the Kirchoff’s laws that assumes that (i)
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Figure I.2: Different allowed line loadings αN−1, depending on the topology of
the network.
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on a single line in case of a line failure is 37.5% of the total flow, which occurs
when one of the interzonal lines fails, as shown for line W1 −E1 in the lower
part of Figure I.2 (b).18 As a result, the N-1 reliability criterion dictates a
line loading of αN−1 = 0.250.375 = 0.67, which is the ratio of the maximum flow
of the N state and the maximum flow of all of the N-1 states. Note that in
meshed networks the line loading parameter represents capacity utilization,
i.e. the percentage of maximum capacity that is used to schedule power
flow. The flow on individual lines differs from this value. In this network
topology, if capacity utilization is below 67% of maximum capacity, the flow
on each of the six transmission lines never exceeds its thermal limit in case
one of the six lines fails. For example, if each line has a thermal limit of
1,000 MW, the scheduled electricity flow allowed by the N-1 reliability cri-
terion is 2667 MW. In case one of the interzonal lines fails, two interzonal
lines are at their thermal limit of 1000 MW, the third interzonal line is at
667 MW and the intrazonal lines are at 333 MW.
This example shows that the allowed N-1 line loading or capacity uti-
voltage angle differences between neighbouring nodes are small, (ii) the voltage is equal
for all nodes, and (iii) line resistances are negligible compared to line reactances (Van den
Bergh et al., 2014).
18The appendix shows the manual power flow calculation for this simple network.
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lization αN−1 depends on network topology19, but not on the probability of
line failures or the cost of interruptions.
Proposition 4. The N-1 reliability criterion determines a maximum line
loading αN−1 that depends on the network topology, but does not depend
on the probability of line failures, the interconnection benefit, or the cost of
interruptions.
I.4.2 Investment decision
A TSO strictly following the N-1 reliability criterion ensures that in every
state of the world the criterion is met. This means that the maximum
line loading is αN−1, irrespective of the TSO’s investment decision. As a
consequence, the TSO does not directly assess the effect of transmission
investments on reliability. While the optimal investment decision is a trade-
off between interconnection benefit, reliability and investment cost (first-
order conditions (1.5)), the N-1 investment decision is a trade-off between
only interconnection benefit and investment cost:
max{KN−1}{S(αN−1KN−1) − cKN−1}Ð→ S′(αN−1KN−1) = c (1.17)
That is, an N-1 investment aims at alleviating congestion, not improving
reliability, which is exogenously-determined by the N-1 reliability criterion.
The investment could increase reliability, however, but it is not its objective.
An intermediate step between N-1 reliability management and optimal
reliability management is when the TSO determines the line loading using
the optimal short-term first-order condition, but the maximum capacity
using equation (1.17):
max{K∗ST }{S(α∗K∗ST ) − cK∗ST }Ð→ S′(α∗K∗ST ) = c (1.18)
That is, by considering reliability optimally in the short term, but not in
the long term. As interconnection benefit S is increasing concave in α,
comparison of equations (1.17) and (1.18) shows that K∗ST is lower than
KN−1 if α∗ is higher than αN−1, and vice versa.
19The N-1 line loading also depends on technical characteristics of the transmission lines
and the spatial distribution of demand.
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Comparing optimal maximum capacity K∗ with the above maximum
capacities is less straightforward in general terms, as the EIC function can
be very complex. However, comparison is possible by assuming that EIC is
homogeneous of degree h. Equation (1.11) can be written as:
S′(α∗K∗) = c
α∗ + hEICα∗K∗ > c (1.19)
As the right-hand side of equation (1.19) is higher than the marginal cost
of capacity investment c, comparing equation (1.19) with the first-order
condition of equation (1.18) shows that maximum capacity is always lower
when reliability management is optimal in the short- and the long-term than
when it is only optimal in the short-term: K∗ < K∗ST . That is, if a TSO
makes the optimal trade-off for operational decisions but not for investment
decisions, there is always an overinvestment of transmission capacity. On
the other hand, comparing equation (1.19) with the first-order condition of
equation (1.17) reveals that optimal maximum capacity is lower than N-1
maximum capacity if the optimal line loading is higher than the N-1 line
loading: K∗ < KN−1 if α∗ > αN−1. If optimal line loading is lower than the
N-1 line loading, the result is ambiguous. However, as a low optimal line
loading also increases the right-hand side of equation (1.19), N-1 maximum
capacity is only lower than optimal maximum capacity if optimal line loading
is considerably lower than N-1 line loading. To summarize, the N-1 criterion
leads to overinvestment, except when the optimal line loading is considerably
lower than N-1 line loading.
Proposition 5. Suppose the expected interruption cost function is homo-
geneous. If the N-1 criterion is too conservative (αN−1 < α∗), it leads to
overinvestment in transmission capacity: K∗ <KN−1.
I.5 Numerical illustration
I.5.1 A simple network
To illustrate the analysis, we assume functional forms for the three com-
ponents of net interconnection surplus: interconnection benefit, expected
interruption cost and transmission investment cost.
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First, suppose that interconnection benefit S(k) consists only of the
decrease of congestion costs. Competition effects are neglected, and the
importing country is not structurally depending on imports, meaning that
decreasing the scheduled electricity flow does not lead to preventive load
shedding in the importing country. To express the interconnection benefit,
suppose that the slope of the residual supply curve SEres in the exporting
country is bE and the slope of the residual demand curve DIres in the im-
porting country is bI . Figure I.3 shows how the supply and demand curves
of the importing and exporting region lead to the residual supply curve and
the residual demand curve. Scheduling an electricity flow k causes prices to
converge, leading to increased producer surplus (A+B) and decreased con-
sumer surplus (A) in the exporting region and increased consumer surplus
(D+E) and decreased producer surplus (E) in the exporting region (Turvey,
2006). The sum of the two CR areas is the congestion rent, which is the
product of the price difference and the scheduled flow. The interconnection
benefit S(k) is the sum of additional producer surplus (B), congestion rent
(CR) and additional consumer surplus (D):
S(k) = ∆PSE +CR +∆CSI= 1
2
(pE2 − pE1 )k + k((pI1 − pE1 ) − (bE + bI)k) + 12(pI1 − pI2)k= k
2
bEk + k(∆p − (bE + bI)k) + k2 bIk= k(∆p − 0.5(bE + bI)k)
(1.20)
where ∆p = pI1−pE1 is the initial price difference before interconnection. The
above expression shows that interconnection benefit is increasing with ∆p,
decreasing with bE+bI and concave in k (which is in line with the assumption
of equation (1.1)). The scheduled electricity flow that completely eliminates
congestion cost (CC) by equalizing prices in the exporting and importing
region is kmax = ∆p/(bE + bI).
Second, assume the following expected interruption cost function of two
regions connected by n identical transmission lines:
EIC(k,K) = n∑
i
pi
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣(k − inK)+V + ((k −
i
nK)+
A
)a VBO⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (1.21)
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Figure I.3: Change of interconnection benefit with scheduled flow k: consumer
surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), congestion rent (CR) and con-
gestion cost (CC).
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where pi is the probability that i lines are available, V the value of lost
load and VBO the cost of a blackout. This EIC is increasing in k, decreas-
ing in K and convex in k and K (which is in line with the assumption of
equation (1.2)). The first part of the EIC is the expected cost due to load
shedding (equation (1.6)), the second part is the expected cost of a black
out. We add this expected cost of a black out because each overflow that
requires corrective load shedding has a probability of leading to a blackout,
for example if corrective load shedding fails or if overloaded lines trip before
load shedding is executed. We assume that an overflow (k − inK)+ has a
probability ((k− inKA )+)a to lead to a widespread blackout. The parameter A
is a value that is larger than the maximum scheduled flow k, such that the
probability is always lower than one. The higher this parameter A, the lower
the probability that overflows lead to a blackout. In addition, a > 1, such
that the probability is increasing with increasing overflow. That is, larger
overflows have an increasingly higher probability of leading to a blackout.
Suppose that VBO [e/h] is the cost of a blackout.20
Third, suppose that increasing maximum transmission capacity K has
a constant marginal cost c.21 Following the above functional form assump-
20As an illustration, values can be found on http://www.blackout-simulator.com/
(Reichl et al., 2013).
21Obviously there are economies of scale in transmission. A cost function of c(K) =
F + cK has increasing returns to scale and would yield qualitatively the same results as
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tions, net interconnection surplus is:
max{k,K}{k(∆p − 0.5(bE + bI)k) − n∑i pi
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣(k − inK)+V + ((k −
i
nK)+
A
)a VBO⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ − cK}
(1.22)
We assume the illustrative parameter values of Table I.1 for respectively
interconnection benefit, EIC and investment cost. Numerical optimization
of this objective function leads to the following optimal capacities:
k∗ = 1667 MW and K∗ = 2089 MW
The optimal line loading α∗ equals 0.7979, compared to the N-1 line
loading αN−1 = 0.75. The specific four-line topology and the chosen param-
eter values result in an optimal line loading that is less conservative than
the N-1 line loading. However, numerical results for optimal capacities differ
greatly with the parameter values. Figure I.4 shows the optimal short-term
line loading (bold curve) for different values of the cost of blackout VBO, line
failure probability pf , initial price difference ∆p, and the sum of the slope
of the residual supply and demand curves bE + bW . Maximum capacity is
fixed at the optimal capacity K∗ for the parameter values of Table I.1. The
dot in the four graphs indicates the optimal line loading α∗ = 0.7979, while
the dashed line represents the N-1 line loading αN−1 = 0.75. The graphs of
Figure I.4 show that the optimal line loading changes if the economic and
technical parameters change. The top left-hand graph shows that the opti-
mal line loading decreases with the cost of a blackout. The top right-hand
graph shows that the line loading should optimally be higher than the N-1
the current analysis.
Table I.1: Illustrative parameter values
∆p = 9 [€/MWh] V = 5000 [€/MWh] c = 3 [€/MWh]
bE + bI = 0.003 [€/MW 2h] pf = 10−4 [/]
VBO = 108 [€/h]
n = 4 [/]
a = 2 [/]
A = 2000 [/]
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line loading when the probability of line failure is low, while the line loading
should optimally be lower than the N-1 line loading if the probability of
line failure is high. For intermediate failure probability values, the N-1 line
loading is optimal in this simple two-node example. The same is true for
the initial price difference; if ∆p is higher, the line loading should optimally
be higher.
Figure I.4: Optimal short-term line loading α∗ for different values of VBO, pf , c
and bE + bW .
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Maximum capacity also depends on the above parameter values. While
the short-term optimal line loading changes in real time in response to chang-
ing parameter values, such as the actual price difference or the line failure
probabilities, maximum capacity changes in response to persistent changes
of parameter values, such as the cost of a blackout or the average price dif-
ference. Figure I.5 shows the optimal maximum capacity K∗ (from equation
(1.22)), optimal short-term maximum capacity K∗ST (from equation (1.18)),
and N-1 maximum capacity KN−1 (from equation (1.17)) for different values
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of the parameters. The optimal short-term maximum capacity K∗ST (dashed
line) is close to the optimal maximum capacity K∗ (solid line) if the optimal
line loading differs substantially from the N-1 line loading. For our param-
eter values this is the case when bE + bI is high and VV BO, pf and ∆p are
low. By contrast, if the optimal line loading is close to the N-1 line loading,
optimal short-term maximum capacity K∗ST is closer to the N-1 maximum
capacity (dotted line). Note that Figure I.5 confirms the results of section
I.4.2 and of proposition 5. Optimal maximum capacity K∗ is always lower
than optimal short-term maximum capacity K∗ST , while the relative value
of K∗ST and KN−1 depends on the ratio of line loadings.
Figure I.5: Optimal, optimal short-term and N-1 maximum capacity for different
values of VBO, pf , c and bE + bW .
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Figure I.6 shows the effect of different degrees of optimal reliability
decisions on long-term surplus, for different values of the parameters. This
is the value of equation (1.22) for optimal reliability S∗ (solid line), for
optimal short-term reliability but non-optimal investment S∗ST (dashed line)
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and for N-1 reliability in the short and long term SN−1. These graphs show
that S∗ST is weakly lower than S∗, and SN−1 is weakly lower than S∗ST .
For the parameter values of table I.1, surplus increases with 4.6% when
moving from the N-1 reliability criterion to optimal short-term reliability
without optimal investment; and it increases with an additional 12.1% when
also investment is optimal. In this case only a quarter of potential surplus
gains is obtained when moving to optimal short-term reliability management
without altering investment practices. The remaining three quarters are only
obtained when the TSO also moves to investment that makes an optimal
trade-off of congestion, reliability and investment costs. This division is
different for other parameter values. For example, with a low cost of blackout
or a low failure probability, the bulk of the surplus gain is obtained by having
the optimal short-term trade-off. For the price difference and the supply and
demand slopes surplus gains are also substantial but small relative to the
change of surplus with these parameters.
In this simple numerical illustration, the gains of moving from N-1
reliability management to optimal short-term reliability management are
between 0% and a few tens of percents, and between 14% and a few tens of
percents when moving to optimal short- and long-term reliability manage-
ment.22 This illustration thus indicates the magnitude of different degrees
of optimal reliability decisions. To get a better estimate of the inefficien-
cies of the N-1 reliability criterion in operational planning and in invest-
ment, detailed engineering studies are needed. They model in more detail
the network, the failure contingencies, the supply and demand conditions
and the values of lost load of different consumer groups at different times.
As a first illustration, Heylen et al. (2016b) estimate the short-term effi-
ciency improvement to be 2% for a 5-node system and 6.6% for the 24-bus
IEEE-RTS system (Grigg et al., 1999). Second, He et al. (2010) estimate
the efficiency improvement to be between 0.3% (normal weather) and 7.1%
(adverse weather) for a 6-bus system, and 4.8% for the 24-bus IEEE-RTS.
These are short-term efficiency gains. Our numerical illustration indicated
22The gains of more optimal decisions are a combination of lower interruption costs,
lower investment costs and lower congestion costs. All three gains lead to a higher con-
sumer surplus, either directly through lower wholesale prices or lower interruption costs,
or indirectly through lower transmission tariffs.
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that optimal investment practices could double or triple these gains.
Figure I.6: Optimal surplus (solid), surplus for optimal short-term reliability
(dashed) and surplus for N-1 reliability (dotted) for different values of
VBO, pf , c and bE + bW .
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I.5.2 More complex networks
The previous section illustrated the analysis of this paper in a simple net-
work. It showed that scheduled flow and maximum capacity under the N-1
reliability criterion differ from the optimal values, which are determined
from the trade off between congestion, reliability and investment. As this
simple network neglected loop flows, this section extends the illustration of
optimal reliability and investment to more complex networks with lumpy
investments and stochastic operational states.
Assuming the same functional forms and parameter values of section
I.5.1, only the expected interruption cost function changes between different
network topologies. The interconnection benefit function S(k) is the same
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as in section I.5.1. However, as expected interruption costs influence both
the short-term and long-term first-order condition, both optimal scheduled
flow k∗ and maximum capacity K∗ will change.
Suppose we have the four-node network (a) on the top left-hand side
of Figure I.7. Each line has the same reactance, except for the line between
node E and node a, which has a reactance that is twice as high. A lossless
DC Power flow analysis calculates that 60% of flow from E to I will pass
by the southern route, while 40% will use the northern route.23 Assuming
that each line has a thermal limit of 1000 MW, maximum capacity K is
1667 MW (1000/0.6).24 In that case, the southern lines are at their thermal
limit of 1000 MW, while the northern lines are at 667 MW. Scheduled flow
determined by the N-1 reliability criterion kN−1 is 1000 MW, as after a
single line failure only one of the two routes can be used. The optimal
scheduled flow is determined from the short-term trade-off between marginal
interconnection benefit and marginal expected interruption cost:
S′(k∗) = EIC ′k(k∗,K) (1.23)
The expected interruption costEIC(k,K) is calculated using equation (1.21),
with the difference that (i) the overflow (k − inK)+ has to be evaluated for
each individual line, as in the general network formulation of equation (1.14),
and (ii) we take the weighted sum over all 2n contingencies that can happen
with n transmission lines: the (n1) single line contingencies, the (n2) simul-
taneous double contingencies, etc. Using the parameter values of Table I.1,
the optimal scheduled flow k∗ is 1172 MW.
Next, assume the same network topology but with an additional line
between node a and b. Figure I.7 (b) presents the resulting power flows,
which show that the flow through line E-b increases from 60% to 64% of
scheduled flow. This phenomenon is known as the Braess Paradox (Braess,
1968) and occurs when a so-called Wheatstone bridge is added between two
parallel lines. In that case, more flow passes through the low-reactance line
23In short, the higher the reactance x of a path, the less power flows through it. As the
reactance of the northern route is 3x and the reactance of the southern route is only 2x,
40% ( 2x2x+3x ) of the flow passes by the northern route.
24If the flow on a line l is xl of total flow and this line’s thermal limit is Ll, maximum
capacity is determined as the lowest value of Ll
xl
,∀l.
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Figure I.7: Capacities K, kN−1 and k∗ [MW] for different network topologies.
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(E-b) to bypass the high-reactance line (E-a) via the Wheatstone bridge.
As the maximum line flow in the network increases, maximum capacity
decreases to 1562 MW (1000/0.64). Because still only 1000 MW can be
transmitted in case line a-I or line b-I fails, the additional Wheatstone line
has no reliability benefit in this particular topology and both kN−1 and k∗ do
not change. In less stylized topologies, however, the Wheatstone line has a
reliability benefit. For example, when lines a-I and b-I have a larger thermal
limit than lines E-a and E-b (e.g. 2000 MW instead of 1000 MW), adding
the Wheatstone line increases the N-1 scheduled flow from 1000 MW to 1333
MW (1000/0.75),25 or, more generally, decreases expected interruption costs
at equal scheduled flow:.
EICwith−ab(k,K) < EICwithout−ab(k,K) ∀k ≤K (1.24)
Because of the optimal short-term trade-off (1.23) between congestion and
reliability, every improvement of the EIC function automatically transfers
to both improved reliability and congestion. When lines E-a and E-b have
25The maximum flow of 75% occurs when line a-I fails. In that case, the reactance of
the path E-a-b is 3x, while path E-b has a reactance of x.
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a thermal limit of 2000 MW instead of 1000 MW, optimal scheduled flow
k∗ increases from 1172 MW to 1350 MW.
The effect of a Wheatstone addition on reliability and congestion has
also been studied by Blumsack et al. (2007). However, by not allowing for a
reliability margin (i.e. K=k), they conclude that a Wheatstone line addition
increases congestion, because K decreases.26 By contrast, the above analy-
sis shows that by introducing TSO reliability management into the model,
whether it is the N-1 reliability criterion or the optimal reliability criterion,
both N-1 scheduled flow kN−1 and optimal scheduled flow k∗ increase, even
though maximum capacity K decreases. The Braess Paradox is thus not
present anymore when reliability management is considered.
Figure I.7 (c) shows the power flows of a topology with a direct con-
nection between E and I. As power flows are now more equally spread in the
system, maximum capacity increases. Because of the additional line to node
I, both the N-1 scheduled flow and the optimal scheduled flow increase. Fig-
ure I.7 (d) shows that when a Wheatstone-like line is added to topology (c),
maximum capacity, N-1 scheduled flow and optimal scheduled flow increase
even more.
Lastly, we study discrete investment decisions under different reliabil-
ity criteria. As the N-1 and the optimal reliability criterion lead to different
levels of congestion and reliability, the investment decision will also be dif-
ferent. Suppose a TSO wants to assess if the two line additions of the
right-hand side of Figure I.7 improve net interconnection surplus. Table
I.2 shows the change of short-term net surplus, i.e. interconnection benefit
minus expected interruption costs, as a function of the price difference ∆p.
The first part of this table shows results for optimal reliability management.
They show that both scheduled flow and short-term net surplus increases
with the price difference. The increase is larger for the first investment than
for the second.
The second part of Table I.2 shows results for N-1 reliability manage-
ment. N-1 scheduled flow increases from 1000 MW to 1333 MW for line
E-I investment and further to 1375 MW for the additional line b-a invest-
26In addition, they show that this trade-off is only present in systems with an embedded
Wheatstone sub-network.
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Table I.2: Change of scheduled flow [MW] and short-term net interconnection sur-
plus [e/h] for line investment E-I and for an additional line investment
b-a, at different levels of ∆p. The first part shows optimal results; the
second part shows N-1 results.
∆p k∗ [MW] S(k∗) −EIC(k∗,K) [e/h]
5 1000 → 1360 → 1470 3500 → 4003 → 4062
7 1090 → 1510 → 1590 5586 → 6922 → 7147
9 1170 → 1662 → 1716 7847 → 10097 → 10441
11 1260 → 1780 → 1840 10282 → 13524 → 14014
13 1350 → 1830 → 1840 12890 → 17164 → 17694
Average change of ST optimal net surplus 2321 and 330
∆p kN−1 [MW] S(kN−1) [e/h]
5 1000 → 1333 → 1375 3500 → 4666 → 4813
7 1000 → 1333 → 1375 5500 → 7332 → 7663
9 1000 → 1333 → 1375 7500 → 9998 → 10313
11 1000 → 1333 → 1375 9500 → 12664 → 13063
13 1000 → 1333 → 1375 11500 → 15330 → 15813
Average change of ST ’N-1’ net surplus 2498 and 335
38
CHAPTER I. OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY
ment, irrespective of the price difference. N-1 scheduled flow is always lower
than optimal scheduled flow, which varies with the price difference. For N-1
reliability management, only the increase of interconnection benefit mat-
ters for the investment decisions, not the reliability benefit, as was shown
in equation (1.17). The last column presents the perceived benefit of N-1
investment.
Supposing that all five price differences ∆p happen with equal proba-
bility throughout the year, the average increase of short-term net surplus is
2321 e/h for the optimal reliability criterion and the perceived short-term
net surplus is 2498 e/h for the N-1 reliability criterion. If the cost of the
line E-I investment is between 2321 e/h and 2498 e/h, line E-I is installed
when the TSO uses N-1 reliability management but not when its reliability
management is optimal. Above a cost of 2498 e/h, even a TSO that uses
the N-1 reliability criterion will not invest in this line; below a cost of 2321
e/h, all TSOs will invest, irrespective of their reliability management. Line
b-a will only be built for very low investment costs.
I.6 Moving beyond the N-1 reliability criterion
The N-1 reliability criterion has been carried over from the old regime of
regulated vertically integrated monopolies (Joskow, 2006). It has achieved
acceptable results over the past decades, but is considered inadequate in the
future system characterized by more decentralized decision makers, more
uncertainty, more interconnected networks, more variable renewable gen-
eration, more NIMBY27 and environmental concerns, and a general trend
towards a more efficient management. In such a system, the probabilistic
approach of this paper is more efficient than the N-1 reliability criterion
because it allows TSOs to base their reliability decisions on VOLL, demand,
weather conditions, (expected) intermittent generation, etc.
TSOs are starting to be aware of the inefficiencies of the N-1 criterion
but many barriers still must be overcome. First, in actual large, meshed
networks, calculating the expected interruption cost requires large comput-
ing power. Second, calculating the expected interruption cost is a complex
27Not In My Back Yard: opposition by local residents to nearby development projects.
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issue, while the N-1 criterion is a straightforward and easily comprehensi-
ble decision rule. Third, a large amount of technical and economic data is
needed. On the technical side one needs demand data, forecast errors, main-
tenance planning, repair times, wind and solar data, failure probabilities of
all system components as a function of temperature and weather28, etc. On
the economic side one needs accurate estimates of interconnection benefit
and VOLL.29
Despite the above-mentioned barriers, some steps are possible towards
a more efficient reliability management. First, instead of only considering
single outages, the contingency list could include simultaneous outages with
a high probability of occurrence or high-impact outages. Similarly, single
outages with very low probability of occurrence or very low impact could be
excluded. The decision to include or exclude certain contingencies is made
by calculating (an approximation of) the average impact. The contingency
list could also depend on the weather and the region. Second, because of
advances in communication and information technologies, technical data can
be recorded at a decreasing cost. Devices to measure climatic data, real-
time voltage and current data, and regional demand and generation data
are in an adoption phase in Europe (GARPUR, 2015). Third, VOLL data
need to be improved. VOLL studies are laborious and rather expensive,
but widespread roll-out of smart meters will facilitate the determination of
VOLL of different consumers at different times by offering reliability con-
tracts to (large) consumers. Fourth, TSO and market data could be used
to determine costs of preventive and corrective actions – such as the cost
of congestion and the cost of balancing and reserves. These can be used to
make a trade-off between the costs and benefits of reliability decisions.
The optimal reliability rule always weakly increases net interconnection
surplus but this gain has to be weighed against the additional cost of getting
289 out of the 10 most risky days in 2010-2014 in the North American bulk power system
were caused by adverse weather (NERC, 2015)
29Because of difficulties to estimate VOLL (CEER, 2010), VOLL is usually assumed to
be a constant value per TSO zone. In reality the VOLL depends on the type of interrupted
consumer, the duration and region of interruption, the time of occurrence, etc. Including
these factors yields even higher efficiency gains. Ovaere et al. (2016) estimate additional
efficiency gains up to 43%.
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the needed data, running a larger simulation, and even the cost of dealing
with decreased equity of reliability between consumers. More detailed stud-
ies are needed to do this.
I.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model that explicitly considers the possibility of trans-
mission line outages and uncertainty of demand and intermittent supply.
The simple model of this paper clarifies reliability issues in electricity net-
works. First, there is no direct link between investment and congestion,
because of reliability concerns. The effect of line investment on congestion
and reliability depends on the reliability criterion. Second, because TSOs
keep a reliability margin, the Braess paradox disappears. Line investment
increases reliability and decreases investment, for both the N-1 an the op-
timal reliability criterion. Third, the currently-used N-1 reliability criterion
is suboptimal. A probabilistic criterion is more efficient, as it takes into ac-
count the expected cost and likelihood of failures. The model shows that the
optimal transmission reliability margin is determined by a trade-off between
congestion and reliability. These depend on economic and technical param-
eters and on the network topology, while the currently-used N-1 reliability
criterion determines the reliability margin based on the network topology
only. Our optimal probabilistic approach is a benchmark that shows the
possible efficiency improvements of moving towards a reliability criterion
based on expected interruption costs.
This paper provides a qualitative analysis of transmission reliability
and reliability criteria. To support the transition towards a probabilistic
approach, more quantitative analysis is needed, especially on the effects of
the reliability criterion on transmission investment.
In a system characterized by increased renewable generation and dif-
ficulties to build new lines, power system operation will be closer to its
transmission capacity limits. In such a stressed system the gains of a proba-
bilistic reliability management are expected to be even higher. Fortunately,
advances in communication and information technologies are making it pos-
sible to move towards a probabilistic approach of reliability management.
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A reliability criterion that is adapted to the challenges and needs of our
modern society affects all of us. It allows a better assessment of the risks
and better integration of renewable generation, while lowering the cost of
our electricity system.
An important caveat is that TSOs are assumed to pursue the correct
efficiency objective and that TSOs cooperate in international transmission
to maximize their joint surplus. This is obviously more difficult to monitor
when TSOs use a probabilistic reliability criterion than when they use the
N-1 reliability criterion.
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I.A Power flow calculation
The solution of a power flow is usually found using numerical methods (Zim-
merman et al., 2011), but it is possible to manually calculate power flow for
simple networks using the superposition method. As an illustration, this
appendix explains the power flow calculation of the four-node network of
section I.4.1 where line W1 −E1 is out. Figure I.8 shows the four different
ways electricity flow is transferred from West to East when the direct line
between W1 and E1 is out: W1 → E1, W1 → E2, W2 → E1 and W2 → E2.
For each of the cases one can calculate how the flow is distributed over the
different lines. The flow distribution is determined by the reactance of the
difference paths. In short, the higher the reactance of a path, the less power
flows through it. As before, suppose that all lines have an identical reactance
x.
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Figure I.8: Manual power flow calculations.
In case (a) the path through W2 and the path through E2 have equal
reactance 2x, such that the flow is distributed equally over both paths. In
case (b) the path W1−W2−E1−E2 has a reactance of 1+ 11+ 11+1 = 53 , while the
direct path between W1 and E2 has a reactance of x = 1. Therefore, the flow
on line W1 −E2 is 5/31+5/3 = 62.5 %, while the flow via path W1 −W2 −E1 −E2
is 37.5%. The flow distribution of cases (c) and (d) are calculated in the
same way.
The final flow on a line is calculated as the superposition of the four
cases. For example, the flow on lineW1−W2 is 0.25(0.5+0.375−0.125−0.25) =
12.5 %, while the flow on line W1−E2 is 0.25(0.5+0.625+0.125+0.25) = 37.5
%.
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Chapter II
A Multi-Dimensional
Analysis of Reliability
Criteria: From Deterministic
N-1 to a Probabilistic
Approach
II.1 Introduction
A large number of papers have been studying probabilistic reliability criteria
as alternatives to the currently-used deterministic N-1 reliability criterion
(Karangelos and Wehenkel, 2016a; He et al., 2010; Fu and McCalley, 2001;
Capitanescu et al., 2007, 2011a, 2012; Dogan et al., 2016). They argue
that probabilistic reliability criteria are better suited to meet the current
challenges of the electricity transmission system: uncertain and variable
demand and supply, decentralized decision makers, highly interconnected
networks, difficulties in building new lines and a general trend towards a
more efficient use of the transmission system (Ovaere and Proost, 2016).
Because probabilistic reliability criteria make a trade-off between costs and
benefits of reliability actions, they lower system costs, especially in stressed
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and volatile systems.
However, despite their advantages, probabilistic reliability criteria are
not yet used by transmission system operators (TSOs)1 in operational plan-
ning and real-time operation. TSOs are not eager to change their reliability
management and criterion, due to both the satisfactory results obtained in
the past and the transparency of the currently used N-1 reliability crite-
rion. Probabilistic reliability criteria, in contrast, are perceived to be more
complex and less transparent.
This paper argues that the strict dichotomy between the deterministic
N-1 criterion and a full probabilistic approach is a simplification. Several
reliability criteria exist between these two extremes. To distinguishes in-
termediate steps, this paper proposes a classification of reliability criteria
based on four characteristics: (i) the set of considered system states, (ii)
the objective function, (iii) the allowed real-time actions and (iv) optional
non-technical constraints. Next, in order to convince TSOs to move away
from the deterministic N-1 criterion, this paper suggests an assessment of
different reliability criteria along five dimensions: (i) expected total cost,
(ii) unreliability, (iii) inequality between consumers, (iv) data needs and
availability and (v) ease of use. Finally, we illustrate the multi-dimensional
performance assessment of our six proposed reliability criteria in a five-node
test system. This illustration, however, does not intend to identify the fun-
damentally optimal reliability criterion for actual large-scale systems, but
intends to indicate general characteristics and performance of different reli-
ability criteria. TSOs and regulators can use the methods of this paper to
carry out a multi-dimensional analysis for their own system.
Section II.2 presents the classification and describes six reliability cri-
teria that range from the deterministic N-1 reliability criterion to a full
probabilistic reliability criterion. Section II.3 discusses the five indicators to
evaluate the performance of reliability criteria. The six reliability criteria
are then evaluated along the five indicators in a case study in section II.4.
1We use the term ‘TSO’ throughout this paper, but the core of our analysis does
not change with the level of ownership unbundling of the network (full ownership un-
bundling, independent system operator or independent transmission operator) or with
the geographical area of focus (e.g. in North America: independent system operator or
regional transmission organization)
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Table II.5 summarizes the result of this multi-dimensional analysis. Section
II.5 discusses the results, while section II.6 discusses a practical application
of the classification framework. Section II.7 concludes.
II.2 Reliability criteria
Reliability criteria guide the reliability management of TSOs, from long-
term system development to short-term operational planning and real time
operation (Ovaere and Proost, 2016). In each of these planning horizons,
the TSO continuously takes actions to minimize the cost of satisfying the
reliability criterion. This paper focuses on the minimization problem of the
TSO in operational planning and real-time operation:
min
ap,ac,Pc
[C(ap, ac, Pc)] (2.1)
s.t. Gs(ap, ac, Pc) = 0,Hs(ap, ac, Pc) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S (2.2)
In operational planning and real-time operation, the TSO’s objective is to
minimize total cost C(ap, ac, Pc), while satisfying the power flow equations
(equality constraints Gs) and operational limits (inequality constraints Hs)
(Capitanescu et al., 2011b). During operational planning, the TSO takes
the most cost-effective preventive actions ap to ensure that these constraints
are met in all considered system states s ∈ S.2 The set of considered system
states also depends on the reliability criterion.
If contingencies happen in real time and preventive actions turn out
to be insufficient, the TSO can take corrective actions ac or resort to load
curtailment Pc.3 They choose the cheapest actions that are within the con-
straints of the applied reliability criterion to make sure operational limits are
still met. Unconsidered system states could lead to uncontrolled brownouts
or blackouts, if corrective actions are not able to deal with the realized
real-time system state.
2Examples of available actions in the operational planning stage are generation re-
dispatch, branch switching, phase shifting transformer tap changing, and ensuring the
availability of upward and downward reserves (Baldursson et al., 2016b).
3Possible corrective actions are branch switching, secondary voltage control, capacitor
and reactor bank switching, the use of upward and downward reserves, phase shifting
transformer tap changing and load curtailment (Capitanescu et al., 2011b).
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The remainder of this section formulates and discusses six reliability
criteria.4 They are defined by four characteristics: (i) the set of considered
system states S, (ii) the allowed TSO actions in considered system states,
(iii) the objective function to minimize and (iv) optional non-technical con-
straints. Table II.1 summarizes the analyzed reliability criteria along these
four characteristics.5
II.2.1 N-1 reliability criterion
Currently, all TSOs use the N-1 reliability criterion or some variant in short
term reliability management. This straightforward criterion states that after
an unexpected outage of a single system component, the transmission system
should still be able to accommodate all flows without load curtailment. A
direct link between the preventive and corrective stage is not made if not
required and the system is secured ahead of real time, if possible. The TSO’s
objective function is deterministic and limited to minimizing the cost of
preventive actions. The expected cost of corrective and curtailment actions
in real time are not explicitly considered. The set of considered system states
consists of all N-1 contingencies and is usually called the N-1 contingency
set. In case of N-1 network contingencies, the network should be able to
accommodate all resulting flows. The mathematical formulation of the N-1
reliability criterion is:
min
ap
[Cprev(ap)] (2.3)
s.t. Gsn(ap) = 0 ∀sn ∈ SN−1,network (2.4)
In case of N-1 generation contingencies, real time corrective actions ac, like
upward and downward use of reserves, are needed to restore the balance
between demand and supply.
Gs(ap, asc) = 0 ∀s ∈ SN−1,generation (2.5)
4To simplify the notation, Gs() represents both the equality and inequality constraints
in system state s.
5The discussed reliability criteria mainly focus on risk-neutral reliability management.
Alternatively, risk averse objective functions can be considered that are typically imple-
mented using robust optimization techniques (Bertsimas et al., 2011).
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In any case, load curtailment is not allowed in N-1 system states (i.e. in both
network and generation N-1 contingencies). The N-1 reliability criterion
does not explicitly prepare for multiple contingencies. In these cases, load
curtailment could turn out to be required to prevent a blackout in real time
operation.
In many countries, the exact definition of the N-1 reliability criterion
differs from the above strict formulation. The next reliability criterion al-
lows for a more general set of considered system states than the strict N-1
contingency set.
II.2.2 Deterministic reliability criterion with a different set
of considered system states
The mathematical formulation of this reliability criterion is similar to that
of the N-1 reliability criterion. the primary difference being that the set of
considered system states is allowed to differ from the N-1 contingency set.
min
ap
[Cprev(ap)] (2.6)
s.t. Gs(ap) = 0 ∀s ∈ Sp (2.7)
s.t. Gs(ap, asc) = 0 ∀s ∈ S ∖ Sp (2.8)
This reliability criterion requires a TSO to minimize its cost of preventive
actions Cprev while meeting the constraints for a subset of all considered sys-
tem states Sp with preventive actions only and for the remaining considered
system states S ∖Sp with both preventive and corrective actions in order to
balance demand and supply. The set of considered system states S could be
anything. For example, include N-1 network contingencies, but exclude gen-
erator and busbar failures from the N-1 contingency set (GARPUR, 2014,
p.25); increase the contingency set to include multiple dependent failures
with a high probability of occurrence; change the contingency set over time
(e.g. including double-circuit failures only during adverse weather) or be-
tween regions (e.g. including more contingencies for urban areas or business
districts); etc. In addition to contingencies, the set of considered system
states could also include deviations from the expected operating condition,
like forecast errors of demand and intermittent supply. In its most general
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form, the set of considered system states S is the Cartesian product of cred-
ible contingencies and considered operating conditions. S is always a subset
of the infinite set of all possible future real-time states and contingencies
(RT). Figure II.1 illustrates different sets of considered system states in the
Cartesian plane of contingencies and operating conditions: the set of N-1
network contingencies SN−1,netw, the set of N-1 contingencies SN−1, a set of
N-k contingencies SN−k, and a general set S of contingencies and operating
conditions.
Figure II.1: Different sets of considered system states in the Cartesian plane of
contingencies and operating conditions.
S
RT
Contingencies
Operating conditions
SN−1,netw
SN−1
SN−k
It is also possible that (well-informed) state selection leads to a set of
considered system states in which not all of the N-1 contingencies are in-
cluded. This might be, for instance, because the probability of occurrence or
the impact of the excluded states is too low. The impact on the performance
indicators of such sets is hard to predict, as this is an interaction between
the impact of the additional and removed operating states.
II.2.3 Probabilistic reliability criterion without load curtail-
ment in considered states S
If the TSO takes the expected cost of corrective actions in considered system
states s ∈ S into account in operational planning, its objective function
becomes probabilistic. The TSO simulates which actions it will take in each
of the considered system states and the expected cost is calculated as the
product of the cost of actions in each state and its associated probability of
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occurrence. First, suppose that load curtailment is not allowed in considered
system states. The mathematical formulation becomes:
min
ap,asc
[Cprev(ap) +∑
s∈S pis (Ccor(asc))] (2.9)
s.t. Gs(ap, asc) = 0 ∀s ∈ S (2.10)
The difference between this criterion and the previous criterion is that a
TSO now incorporates the effect of its preventive actions on the cost of its
corrective actions, instead of just checking if the constraints are met. This
allows an explicit trade off between preventive and corrective actions.
II.2.4 Probabilistic reliability criterion
If, in addition, load curtailment is allowed in considered system states and
the TSO also takes the expected cost of load curtailment into account in
its operational planning minimization, this results in a full probabilistic
reliability criterion (McCalley et al., 2004; Kirschen and Jayaweera, 2007;
He et al., 2010). The mathematical formulation is:
min
ap,asc,P
s
c
[Cprev(ap) +∑
s∈S pis (Ccor(asc) +Ccurt(P sc ))] (2.11)
s.t. Gs(ap, asc, P sc ) = 0 ∀s ∈ S (2.12)
The difference between this criterion and the previous criterion is that the
effect of preventive actions on the cost of corrective actions and load curtail-
ment is incorporated. This allows an explicit trade off between preventive,
corrective and curtailment actions.
II.2.5 Probabilistic reliability criterion with a constraint on
the aggregate reliability level
While the full probabilistic reliability criterion aims at minimizing the ex-
pected total cost (ETC), it can also reduce the reliability level considerably
(Ovaere et al., 2016). Therefore, social and political concerns could lead to
the addition of a constraint on the value of the aggregate reliability level P¯ .
51
II.3. Performance evaluation of reliability criteria
Such a constraint limits the decrease of the reliability level. If the constraint
is binding, ETC will be higher. The mathematical formulation becomes:
min
ap,asc,P
s
c
[Cprev(ap) +∑
s∈S pis (Ccor(asc) +Ccurt(P sc ))] (2.13)
s.t. Gs(ap, asc, P sc ) = 0 ∀s ∈ S (2.14)
s.t. ∑
j∈J∑s∈S pisP sc (j) ≤ P¯ (2.15)
with J the set of all consumers and P sc (j) the load curtailment [MW] of
consumer j in state s.
II.2.6 Probabilistic reliability criterion with constraints on
individual reliability levels
The reliability constraint can also be imposed at the level of the individual
instead of the aggregate. In that case, the constraint provides a minimal
reliability level P¯c(j) for each consumer j.
min
ap,asc,P
s
c
[Cprev(ap) +∑
s∈S pis (Ccor(asc) +Ccurt(P sc ))] (2.16)
s.t. Gs(ap, asc, P sc ) = 0 ∀s ∈ S (2.17)
s.t. ∑
s∈S pisP sc (j) ≤ P¯c(j) ∀j ∈ J (2.18)
II.3 Performance evaluation of reliability criteria
The performance of power system reliability criteria is multi-faceted and
several opposing objectives need to be considered. Some of them can be
quantified, while others are qualitative in nature.
II.3.1 Quantitative indicators
There are three important quantitative indicators that determine the per-
formance of different reliability criteria: expected total cost (ETC), relative
load curtailment (RLC) and inequality between consumers (UENS).
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Table II.1: Summary of reliability criteria.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1. Set of
considered states
SN−1 SN−k S S S S
2. Curtailment
allowed in S
no no no yes yes yes
3. Objective
function
Det.1 Det. Prob.2 Prob. Prob. Prob.
4. Non-technical
constraints
/ / / / P¯ P¯c(j)
1 Deterministic 2 Probabilistic
(a) Deterministic with N-1 contingency set
(b) Deterministic with different set of considered states
(c) Probabilistic without curtailment
(d) Probabilistic
(e) Probabilistic with aggregated constraint
(f) Probabilistic with individual constraint
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Socio-economic performance is evaluated in terms of expected total
cost. It is the sum of the cost of preventive actions, the cost of corrective
actions and interruption costs. Interruption costs equal the amount of load
curtailed times the value of lost load (VOLL) and represent the consequences
of an interruption for the consumers. The total cost (TC) at a certain time
t and real-time state rt is equal to:
TC(rt, t) = ∑
ap∈ApCprev(ap) + ∑ac∈AcCcor(ac)+∑
j∈J V OLL(j) ⋅ Pc(j) (2.19)
where Ap is the set of executed preventive actions, Ac the set of executed
corrective actions and J the set of consumers in the system. The expected
total cost (ETC) over all times t and real-time states rt is equal to:
ETC =∑
t∈T pi(t) ∑rt∈RT pi(rt∣t) ⋅ TC(rt, t) (2.20)
with pi(t) the probability of being at time t and pi(rt∣t) the probability of
being in real time state rt at time t. The set T contains for example all
8760 hours of a typical year or a representative subset of time instants.
Since the set RT is the infinite set of all possible contingencies and all
possible operating conditions, (2.20) is in practice evaluated for a finite
subset RT ′ ⊆ RT , where the set of considered system states S ⊆ RT ′ (Heylen
et al., 2016a).
The amount of load curtailment in the system, aggregated, per node or
per consumer, is here expressed in terms of relative load curtailment. Rela-
tive load curtailment RLC is rescaled to the equivalent number of minutes
curtailed in a year:
RLC = (1 − PD − Pc
PD
) ⋅ 8760 ⋅ 60 [min/year] (2.21)
with PD the total demand and Pc the curtailed load. The indicator RLC is
thus a measure of the average unreliability of the system.
Reliability criteria that result in large differences of RLC between con-
sumers or between nodes might not be socially acceptable. Therefore, equal-
ity is another important aspect to consider in the selection of a practical re-
liability criterion. Inequality can be quantified in a single number by using
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a Gini-based performance indicator UENS . The inequality coefficient UENS
is defined as (Heylen et al., 2017a):
UENS = ∣1 − (∑
k
(Dk −Dk−1) ⋅ (Ek +Ek−1)∣ (2.22)
where D is the cumulative share of demand, E the cumulative share of en-
ergy not supplied (for example over a year) and k an index counting over
consumers or consumer groups. The groups are ordered based on decreas-
ing reliability values. If UENS equals 0, unreliability is distributed equally
among the entities under study, i.e. nodes, consumer groups or individual
consumers.6 If the inequality indicator UENS is closer to 1, all interruptions
are concentrated in one or a few consumer groups or nodes (Ovaere et al.,
2016).
II.3.2 Qualitative indicators
Next to the three quantitative performance indicators, two qualitative indi-
cators are considered: (i) the amount and availability of the required input
data and (ii) ease of use. The first refers to the complexity, correctness and
cost of acquiring input data; while the second refers to the ease of inter-
preting and reacting to the output. As these are hard to quantify, a scoring
system from +++ to - is used.
Appropriate data are important for decent reliability management. The
amount and availability of the required input data are qualitative aspects
that should be considered when evaluating alternative reliability manage-
ment strategies. Handling a large amount of possibly more complex data
makes the methodology more complex and the results can be sensitive to
the correctness of the provided data. Moreover, collecting additional data is
time consuming and can be costly. An additional qualitative indicator that
represents the effect of these aspects should be considered in the criterion
selection.
The ease of use of the currently used N-1 criterion is one of the reasons
why TSOs are not eager to change their reliability management. Proba-
6Note that the inequality indicator can not be calculated if reliability is 100% for all
consumer groups in all nodes. In that case inequality UENS equals 0.
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bilistic approaches are typically risk based, taking into account exact prob-
abilities and severities of the considered operating states. Deterministic
approaches, on the other hand, simplify the situation by assuming all consid-
ered operating states to be equally probable and equally severe. Moreover,
ease of use is influenced by the number of operating states to consider. Given
the increased uncertainty in power systems due to the increased penetration
of renewable energy sources, it might be beneficial to consider additional
operating states in the decision making. However, this makes the decision
making process more complex.
II.4 Case study
A case study on a five-node test system applies the proposed performance
evaluation to the six reliability criteria introduced in section II.2. The results
are summarized in Table II.5.
II.4.1 Data
The illustrative five-node test system is based on the Roy Billinton reliability
test system (Billinton et al., 1989), as shown in Fig. II.2. Transmission line
and generation data are summarized in tables II.2 and II.3 respectively.
Figure II.2: Circuit diagram of the test system
1 2
3 4
5
Total system demand is based on the hourly load profile defined in
(Grigg et al., 1999). For simplification a year is represented by 72 time
instants, each with its probability of occurrence.7 Total system demand at
7The 72 time instants represent 6 periods in the year (winter, early spring, late spring,
summer, early autumn and late autumn), 3 types of days (weekday, Saturday and Sunday)
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Table II.2: Line data
From To x Capacity Failure
node node [pu] [MVA] probab.
1 3 0.18 85 0.0017
2 4 0.6 71 0.0057
1 4 0.48 71 0.0046
3 4 0.12 71 0.0011
3 5 0.12 71 0.0011
1 3 0.18 85 0.0017
4 5 0.12 71 0.0011
Table II.3: Generation data
Node Capacity Type Cmarg Failure
[MW] [e/MWh] probab.
1 40 coal 13.83 6.2E-7
1 40 coal 13.83 6.2E-7
1 10 coal 13.83 6.2E-3
1 20 wind 0.04 6.2E-3
2 40 coal 13.83 6.2E-7
2 20 coal 13.83 6.2E-3
2 20 wind 0.01 6.2E-3
2 20 wind 0.03 6.2E-3
2 20 wind 0.05 6.2E-3
2 5 coal 13.83 6.2E-3
2 5 coal 13.83 6.2E-3
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Table II.4: Summary of the three cases for the sensitivity analysis
More stressed Base case Less stressed
Load 105% 100% 95%
Failure rates 150% 100% 75%
Repair times 150% 100% 75%
Line rating 91% 100% 136%
each of the 72 time instants is calculated as the mean over all valid hours.
By weighing the outcomes of the different time instants by their probability
of occurrence, the quantitative indicators are evaluated for a year.
This numerical illustration uses VOLL data from Norway (EnergiNorge,
2012). Two consumer types are considered: residential and non-residential
customers. The share of residential and non-residential demand in total
system demand changes throughout the year, as presented in (Ovaere et al.,
2016).
In this paper, an analytical non-sequential state enumeration technique
is applied. The quantitative performance indicators are evaluated for a set
of time instants T for which forecast values for load and renewable power
generation are given. Preventive reliability management is simulated for a
set RT of real time realizations. This set is the Cartesian product of possible
contingencies and real time operating states.8 The latter are conditional
upon the forecast values of net demand. Preventive and corrective reliability
management are modeled using a DC security constrained optimal power
flow (DC-SCOPF) in AMPL (Fourer et al., 1987), taking into account the
specifics per criterion as discussed in the next section. The simulations are
done in Matlab using an AMPL interface.
The simulation is repeated for a more stressed and a less stressed case
as defined in table II.4 in order to verify the sensitivity of the results.
and 4 times during the day (night, morning, noon and evening).
8Most probable contingencies up to cumulative probability of 99.73% and 11 realiza-
tions of net total demand based on a normal distribution of which the mean equals the
forecast value and the coefficient of variation is 4%.
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II.4.2 Implementation of the reliability criteria
The reliability criteria introduced in table II.1 are practically implemented
as follows.
Criterion (a) considers all N-1 branch and generator outages in the
preventive decision stage. All these operating states are considered to be
equally probable. Load curtailment is avoided for this contingency set and
all consumers are treated equally. The objective is to secure the system
preventively as much as possible and corrective actions are considered as a
last resort. The above also holds for criterion (b), but the set of considered
contingencies is different.
Criteria (b) - (f) consider a larger set of contingencies than criterion (a):
The most probable contingencies up to a cumulative probability of 99.7%
are considered. Therefore, the failure of some large generator units is not
considered in the contingency set of criteria (b) - (f) in this case study, due
to their low probability of failure.
The set of considered system states S for reliability criteria (c) - (f)
consists of the Cartesian product of the elements of the contingency set and
7 possible real time realizations of net total demand. These realizations are
determined based on a normal distribution with the forecast value of net
total demand as mean and a coefficient of variation of 4%. Probabilistic
criteria (c) - (f) take into account the exact probabilities in the decision
making.
While probabilistic criterion (c) tries to avoid load curtailment, criteria
(d) - (f) allow load curtailment if this tends to be more cost effective. How-
ever, criteria (e) - (f) have upper limits on the amount of load curtailment,
i.e. 0.4 MW aggregated load curtailment for criterion (e) and 0.4 MW load
curtailment distributed over the consumer groups according to their demand
share for criterion (f).
The set of operating states used in criterion (b), SN−k, and criteria (c)
- (f), S, is graphically illustrated in Fig. II.3. Some system states included
in the N-1 contingency set are not included in the alternative sets SN−k and
S, due to their low probability of occurrence
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Figure II.3: Graphical representation of the set of operating states used in crite-
rion (1) SN−1, criterion (2) SN−k and criteria (3) - (6) S.
S
RT
Contingencies
Operating conditions
SN−1,netw SN−1,gen
SN−1
SN−k SN−k SN−k
II.4.3 Results
Table II.5 summarizes the performance of the six reliability criteria in the
considered case study.
The first row of Table II.5 shows that expected total cost decreases
when moving from criterion (a) to criterion (d) and increases again when
imposing restrictions on the aggregate (crit. (e)) and individual (crit. (f))
reliability level. Criterion (b) results in a lower ETC than criterion (a),
because in our case study the set of considered system states S excludes low-
probability contingencies that require costly preventive actions. Generally,
the change of ETC from (a) to (b) depends on the current performance
of the N-1 criterion. If the N-1 criterion is too stringent, enlarging the
set of considered system states leads to even higher total costs. If the N-
1 criterion is too loose, enlarging the set of considered system states could
lead to lower total costs. Next, ETC decreases by moving from deterministic
criteria (a) and (b) to probabilistic criterion (c), because more information is
included in the operational planning decision. Criterion (c) makes an explicit
trade-off between preventive and expected corrective actions (Strbac et al.,
1998). By additionally allowing load curtailment, if this is less costly than
alternative corrective actions, criterion (d) leads to even lower ETC. In this
case study, most of the decreased ETC is due to a better trade-off between
preventive and expected corrective actions (crit. (c)). A smaller part is due
to allowing load curtailment in considered system states (crit. (d)). The
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higher VOLL is compared to the costs of other corrective actions, the larger
this effect (Ovaere et al., 2016). The ETC of criteria (e) and (f) can be
anywhere between the ETC of criteria (a) and (d), and even higher than the
ETC of criterion (a), depending on the level of the constraint. The more
stringent the imposed reliability constraint, the higher the ETC. Individual
constraints on the reliability level (crit. (f)) always lead to a higher ETC
than an aggregate constraint (crit. (e)), as load curtailment of low-VOLL
consumers is now substituted for corrective or preventive actions, or load
curtailment of consumers with a higher VOLL. To summarize:
ETCd ≤ ETCc ≤ ETCb and ETCa
ETCf ≥ ETCe ≥ ETCd (2.23)
The second row shows the unreliability for each of the six criteria. The
effect of a particular reliability criterion on the reliability level is closely
related to its effect on ETC. Criterion (b) has a slightly higher unreliability,
because in our case study not all elements in the N-1 contingency set SN−1
are part of the set S. Moving from deterministic to probabilistic criteria
has a mixed effect on reliability, depending on the exact formulation of the
criterion. Disallowing load curtailment in considered states (crit. (c)) leads
to an equal or lower unreliability than for deterministic reliability criteria.
Unreliability is not zero because load curtailment could still be necessary in
non-considered states. Allowing load curtailment in considered states (crit.
(d)) decreases ETC even more, but at the expense of a highly increased
unreliability. Evidently, constraints on the reliability level (crit. (e) - (f))
decrease the unreliability, but at the expense of a higher ETC. To summarize:
RLCc ≤ RLCd ≥ RLCe ≥ RLCf (2.24)
The third row shows the inequality between consumers. It seems that in-
equality is inversely proportional to ETC. Deterministic criteria lead to
higher ETC and lower inequality.9 Probabilistic criteria lead to lower ETC
and higher inequality. The reason is that deterministic criteria treat all con-
sumers equally, while probabilistic criteria differentiate between consumers
9If the amount of load curtailment is too low, i.e. RLC < 0.01 min in this case study,
the inequality does not give useful information.
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or nodes in terms of VOLL. Constraints on the reliability level decrease in-
equality, but at the expense of higher ETC. Inequality is lower if individual
constraints on load curtailment are applied (crit. f) than for criteria (d)
and (e). This is the case, because the inequality resulting from the differen-
tiation in VOLL is reduced by these individual limits, which are based on
consumers’ demand share. To summarize, we observe the following inequal-
ities in our case study9:
UENS,d ≥ UENS,c ≥ UENS,b ≥ UENS,a
UENS,f ≤ UENS,eandUENS,d (2.25)
The fourth row shows that data needs increase from left to right. Proba-
bilistic approaches (c) - (f) typically require more information than deter-
ministic approaches. Firstly, exact probabilities of failures should be known.
Moreover, forecast errors can be considered and for criterion (e) and (f) ap-
propriate limits on load curtailment should be determined. Some of these
data are currently not available for TSOs and might be hard to obtain in
practice. Failure probabilities might be imprecise, as well as forecast errors,
which might lead to inappropriate reliability management.
The last rows show that the ease of using the considered criteria de-
creases from left to right, because more operating states need to be consid-
ered, more information needs to be taken into account and the probabilistic
nature of criteria (c) - (f) adds a layer of complexity to reliability manage-
ment.
Table II.6 summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis for the two
cases defined in table II.4. In the more stressed case, the relative difference
in total system cost between the deterministic and probabilistic approaches
is slightly decreased. Both in the more stressed and the less stressed case,
the trends in differences between the criteria in terms of ETCrel, RLC and
UENS are the same as in the base case.
II.5 Discussion
Once the list of credible operating states against which the system needs
to be secured is specified for a deterministic criterion (e.g. crit. (1) and
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Table II.5: Performance evaluation of the six considered reliability criteria: The
first three indicators give a numerical value and the last two indicators
are expressed as a value (-/+/++/+++) from worst to best (relative).
Criteria of table II.1
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1. ETCrel [%] 100 90.09 34.40 26.63 33.83 34.50
2. RLC [min] 0.0046 0.0074 0.0046 18.87 1.83 0.19
3. UENS [/] 0.741 0.3212 0.819 0.811 0.794 0.604
4. Data needs
and availability
+++ ++ + + - -
5. Ease of use +++ ++ + + - -
5a. Type Det. Det. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob.
5b. # of states1 19 28 196 196 196 196
5c. # info +++ ++ + + - -
1 Dependent on the state selection algorithm
The numerical values cannot be generalized to real systems, but the
trends between reliability criteria can.
Table II.6: Sensitivity of the six considered reliability criteria in a more stressed
case and a less stressed case
More stressed Criteria of table II.1
case (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
ETCrel [%] 100 86.38 36.05 27.89 37.04 37.42
RLC [min] 0.0796 0.0689 0.0632 20.3 1.92 1
UENS [/] 0.353 0.411 0.552 0.815 0.693 0.581
Less stressed Criteria of table II.1
case (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
ETCrel [%] 100 90.46 32.31 25.00 31.66 32.33
RLC [min] 0.0002 0.0016 0.0001 17.7 1.82 0.189
UENS [/] 0.718 0.476 0.620 0.814 0.829 0.629
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(2)), it is straightforward to use. Probabilistic reliability management is
less transparent and more difficult to handle due to the higher number of
system states. Appropriate state selection techniques are required (Plat-
brood et al., 2011) as the set of considered states impacts the performance.
A well selected set of considered system states reduces conservatism regard-
ing low probability N-1 states which may be costly to secure. Additional
states with high impact may be considered. The optimal set of operating
states for a particular criterion differs between systems.
More advanced probabilistic reliability management approaches require
a larger amount of typically more complex data. This makes the method-
ology more complex. Even a simple probabilistic reliability management
strategy requires additional information. Firstly, failure and repair rates
of components should be known, which might be imprecise due to the low
number of failures of system components. Results can be sensitive to the
exactness of the values of the provided data. In this respect, accounting for
imprecise probability in the decision making might be favourable (Coolen
et al., 2011). Secondly, additional costs are taken into account that are
difficult to determine. One of the additional costs that is considered in a
probabilistic approach is the interruption cost, which depends on the value
of lost load (VOLL). By using detailed VOLL data, we can differentiate
between consumers. This leads to large efficiency savings, but comes at the
cost of increased inequality of reliability, as shown in table II.5 and (Ovaere
and Proost, 2016; Heylen et al., 2017a). Thirdly probability distributions of
forecast errors of load and wind power generation can be taken into account,
which might be multivariate in nature.
In practice, additional decision stages exist in short term reliability
management on top of the two decision stages considered in this paper ()i.e.
day ahead operational planning and real time operation). One distinguishes
the D-2 decision stage, the intraday decision stage with the intraday mar-
ket, the short term preventive stage and the short term stage in which
automatic actions are performed. Corrective actions which are required in
real time in order to secure the system might not work as expected. This
is an additional uncertainty that can be considered in probabilistic reliabil-
ity management (Karangelos and Wehenkel, 2016a; Vadlamudi et al., 2016;
64
CHAPTER II. ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Calvo et al., 2016). Each of these decision stages is also influenced by exter-
nal factors that are out of the control of the TSO, such as markets, balance
responsible parties, generators and loads.
As the five performance indicators have different units, an optimal re-
liability criterion does not exist. It is the regulator’s task to determine the
adequate reliability criterion based on the TSO’s capabilities and society’s
preferences.
II.6 Application of the classification framework
Probabilistic reliability criteria are not yet used in practice, but the EU
FP7 project GARPUR has proposed and analyzed an advanced, probabilis-
tic, short-term reliability management approach and criterion (Karangelos
and Wehenkel, 2016a; GARPUR, 2016). The GARPUR approach can be
analysed by our proposed classification framework along the four character-
istics of Table II.1:
1. The set of considered system states is determined using a discarding
principle, which neglects a subset of contingencies for which the ex-
pected interruption cost is lower than a specified maximal, residual
risk level. This set differs for different time instants.
2. Curtailment is allowed in considered system states.
3. The objective function is probabilistic and aims at minimizing total
socio-economic system cost.
4. A reliability target ensures that the probability of reaching non-considered
system states is lower than a fixed tolerance. This non-technical con-
straint effectively puts a limit on the aggregate reliability level.
In light of these four characteristics, the reliability approach proposed in the
GARPUR project resembles criterion (e) of our classification framework.10
As analyzed in section II.4.3, this category of criteria leads to a lower ETC
than deterministic criteria, without overly decreasing reliability.
10While this paper focuses on the four high-level characteristics of different reliability
criteria, the GARPUR project has focused more on the equally-important topic of the
exact implementation of probabilistic criteria and the tuning of decision parameters, such
as the set of considered system states (Karangelos and Wehenkel, 2016a; GARPUR, 2016).
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II.7 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a classification of reliability criteria according to
four characteristics. A case study has illustrated how different reliability cri-
teria can be compared in a multi-dimensional analysis of three quantitative
and two qualitative indicators for short-term reliability management. This
case study shows that the largest savings of expected total cost are due to a
trade-off between preventive and corrective actions. A smaller portion is due
to the trade-off between preventive and curtailment actions. Limits on indi-
vidual or aggregate unreliability levels decrease unreliability and inequality,
but increase expected total costs when compared to a full probabilistic ap-
proach.It is up to TSOs to carry out the proposed multi-dimensional analysis
for their system and up to regulators to weigh the different quantitative and
qualitative indicators.
Three directions for further research are identified. First, more the-
oretical and applied research is needed on the intermediate steps between
the deterministic N-1 criterion and probabilistic criteria. This will lead to
practical points of reference for TSOs to bridge the gap between them. In
particular, more studies are needed that quantify ETC and other indica-
tors of reliability criteria (reliability, equality, data needs, etc.) over a year,
instead of for specific operating conditions. Second, more data are needed
such that TSOs are able to apply the multi-dimensional analysis to their
own large-scale systems. Third, standardized methods should be developed
to help regulators decide on optimal reliability criteria.
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Chapter III
Cost and Quality Regulation
of a Monopolist
III.1 Introduction
When regulating monopoly firms, not only is it important to give incentives
for cost efficiency, incentives for optimal quality are important as well. This
is especially the case for monopolies supplying necessity goods and services
like electricity, gas, water, sewage, telecommunications and transport. Inad-
equate quality of these goods has far-reaching effects on society, ranging from
decreased comfort and economics losses to diseases and deaths. As a result,
many of the monopolies supplying these goods are subject to some kind of
quality incentives, like minimum quality standards and quality targets with
financial penalties and rewards.
Some theoretical papers have studied separately the effect of price reg-
ulation and quality regulation on quality (Spence, 1975; Sheshinski, 1976;
Besanko et al., 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Sappington, 2002; Kidokoro,
2002; Weisman, 2005), but less focus has been on the joint regulation of price
and quality. In addition, these papers focus on regulating optimal quantity
and quality of goods, while in practice many regulatory policies focus on
reducing costs and guaranteeing quality. Therefore, this paper proposes a
model to jointly study the regulation of cost-efficiency and quality. To do
so, we focus on the monopolist’s cost function, instead of its demand curve.
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This focus on cost reduction, while neglecting the effect of price and quality
on demand, is particularly applicable to regulation of monopolies supplying
necessity goods, as their demand does not react strongly to price and quality
changes.
Many of the results in the literature on quality regulation1 depend
on the consumer demand curve. Spence (1975) has shown that an unregu-
lated monopolist may over- or undersupply quality depending on consumers’
marginal and average valuation of quality. Sheshinski (1976) extended this
analysis to monopolies facing price, quantity and quality regulation. His re-
sults of optimal and regulated quality depend on quality and quantity being
complements or substitutes. Similarly, the result of Besanko et al. (1987),
who study the effect of price ceilings and minimum quality standards on
a monopolist supplying a range of products, depends on the willingness to
pay for quality. Lewis and Sappington (1992); Laffont and Tirole (1993);
Weisman (2005) and Kidokoro (2002) introduce effort into their model, but
they assume that costs are separable in quality and effort. They find that a
price cap decreases quality, but the results of Lewis and Sappington (1992)
and Laffont and Tirole (1993) hinge on quantity and quality being comple-
ments or substitutes, while Weisman (2005) assumes these cross derivatives
are small. Kidokoro (2002) additionally finds that a price cap decreases
investment-related quality but increases effort-related quality.
In many countries, some of the public utility industries, particularly
electricity and gas, have been restructured. In that case, because of its
natural monopoly properties, only the infrastructure part of the supply chain
is still a regulated monopoly. In the competitive parts of the supply chain,
regulation of cost efficiency and quality is less important as the market
takes care of this. In the remainder of this paper, when referring to ’the
monopolist’, I have in mind these regulated network monopoly parts of
public utility industries.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature on quality reg-
ulation. First, we explicitly identify the effect of incentive power on quality
and on cost-reducing or quality-increasing effort. Second, by introducing an
1For an excellent overview of this literature we refer to (Sappington, 2005), and (Ajod-
hia and Hakvoort, 2005) for an overview focused on quality regulation of electricity dis-
tribution networks.
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incentive power for both cost and quality, we are able to characterize the
effect of both incentives on effort and quality. Third, we analyze the role of
a monopolist’s cost function that is not separable in quality and effort.
Our regulatory scheme is a linear hybrid regulation with cost and qual-
ity incentives. In the spirit of Schmalensee (1989), we depart from the
optimal regulation literature and focus on ’good’ linear regulatory regimes
in the presence of real-life constraints such as (i) the regulator’s inability
to tax or subsidize the monopolist, (ii) limited information, and (iii) the
regulator’s and the monopolist’s uncertainty about future parameter values.
Because of the incentive power of the hybrid regulation, we can study the
continuum between pure rate-of-return (ROR) or cost-of-service regulation,
and pure price-cap (PCR) or revenue-cap regulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 introduces a model
of cost and quality, both in general terms as with specific functional forms.
Next, section III.3 studies the cost and quality regulation, also both in gen-
eral terms as with specific functional forms. The analysis shows that both
quality and effort increase with the power of the quality incentive. The ef-
fect of the power of the cost incentive is ambiguous but under reasonable
assumptions it increases effort and decreases quality. Section III.4 studies
incentive power under uncertainty. Because a higher incentive power in-
creases both socially-costly profit, and cost-reducing effort and quality, we
show that the power of the cost incentive and the quality incentive are op-
timally below one. In section III.5, the theoretical model is compared with
regulation in practice by analyzing case studies in electricity, gas and water.
Finally, section III.6 concludes.
III.2 A model of cost and quality
III.2.1 General model
The most important element of our model is the cost function of the mo-
nopolist. The quantity demanded is fixed. We consider a convex total cost
C(q, e) of service2 that is increasing in the quality level q and decreasing in
2In the remainder of the paper, this cost is referred to as service cost, as most monop-
olies supply a service, rather than a good. For example, electricity, water, gas, telecom-
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cost-reducing effort e:
C ′q > 0, C ′′qq ≥ 0, C ′e < 0, C ′′ee ≥ 0 and C ′′qqC ′′ee − (C ′′qe)2 ≥ 0 (3.1)
That is, the marginal cost increase of quality increases with quality and the
marginal cost decrease of effort decreases with effort.
The effort e can be interpreted as all monetary and non-monetary ac-
tions that decrease the cost of supplying the monopolist’s service or good at
a certain quality level q. If effort increases, a monopolist can decrease costs
without decreasing quality or similarly, increase quality without increas-
ing cost. Examples of cost-reducing effort are investments in lower power
losses in electricity networks or in better maintenance technologies for gas
pipelines. Equivalently, examples of quality-increasing effort are cutting
trees near electricity lines, controlling the pressure of gas pipelines, checking
water quality, increasing the number of airport security guards, etc. Exert-
ing this effort e entails a cost or disutility ψ(e) for the monopolist. This
cost is increasing and convex in effort. As in (Schmalensee, 1989), notation
and prose are simplified by treating ψ(e) as a pecuniary cost.
Consumers derive a total benefit V (q) from consuming the good or
service with quality level q. This benefit is increasing and concave in the
quality level. To facilitate the comparative statics exercise, suppose that
V (q) = V v(q), where V > 0 is the valuation of quality. Estimates of V exist,
for example in electricity, where it is called the value of lost load (VOLL).
It represents the cost of unserved electricity and is expressed per quantity
demanded (e.g. e/MWh) (Ovaere et al., 2016).
Lastly, to ensure the monopolist a non-zero profit, he should be paid at
least the sum of effort and service costs. Since regulators are (generally) not
able to tax or subsidize the monopolist, we assume that these costs are com-
pletely covered by consumer payments.3 For example, network tariffs for
electricity transmission and distribution networks, capacity and commodity
charges for gas, access charges for telecommunication services, infrastruc-
munication services, transport, etc.
3Pricing of a natural monopoly is an important question but is not dealt with in this
paper, as we assume demand to be inelastic to changes in price and quality. In practice
average cost pricing and uniformly increasing prices above marginal costs are used (Laffont,
1994), while Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is the theoretical optimum (Boiteux, 1956).
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ture charges for railroads, tolls for toll roads, airport fees, etc. In most
network industries the monopolist is not free to choose the price structure
independently. Only in the telecommunications industry, companies have
some freedom to choose prices. The sum of all consumer payments should
be sufficient to guarantee the monopolist at least a non-negative profit in all
possible states of nature to guarantee service, especially when the product
or service sold is a necessity (such as water, gas or electricity) (Schmalensee,
1989). As a result, the profit of the monopolist is:
Π = consumer payments −C(e, q) − ψ(e) ≥ 0 (3.2)
We suppose that the regulator strictly prefers consumer surplus (CS) to
monopoly profit, i.e. social welfare = CS + αΠ, with α < 1 (Baron and
Myerson, 1982; Armstrong and Sappington, 2004). Therefore, it is optimal
to just repay the monopolist’s network and effort costs, and keep socially
costly monopoly profit Π equal to zero. This is only possible under perfect
information. Under imperfect information, the monopolist earns a positive
expected profit (see section III.4).
Combining the above assumptions, a welfare-maximizing regulator chooses
effort e and quality q to maximize the following function:
max{q,e} V (q) − (C(q, e) +Π + ψ(e)) + αΠ (3.3)= V (q) − (C(q, e) + ψ(e)) − (1 − α)Π (3.4)
s.t. Π ≥ 0 (3.5)
This leads to the following first-order conditions for optimal quality and
effort:
V ′q −C ′q = 0
C ′e + ψ′e = 0 (3.6)
The first-order conditions show that the quality level is optimal at the point
where the marginal increase of consumer benefit equals the marginal social
cost of the cost increase; and the effort is optimal at the point where the
marginal decrease of service costs equals the marginal increase of effort costs.
Since effort and service costs are convex and consumer benefit is concave, a
global maximum exists.
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Totally differentiating the first-order conditions, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. If total cost is convex (assumptions (3.1)), optimal quality
increases with the valuation of quality:
dq∗
dV
≥ 0
The effect of the valuation of quality on optimal cost-reducing effort depends
on the cross derivative of service costs C ′′eq:
de∗
dV
≥ 0 if C ′′eq ≤ 0 and de∗
dV
≤ 0 if C ′′eq ≥ 0
Proof. The total derivatives of the first-order conditions are:⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C ′′qq − V ′′qq C ′′qe
C ′′eq ψ′′ee +C ′′ee
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ dq
∗
de∗
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ v
′
q
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦dV (3.7)
which leads to the following expressions:
dq∗
dV
= v′q(ψ′′ee +C ′′ee)(C ′′qq − V ′′qq)(ψ′′ee +C ′′ee) −C ′′2qe = ≥ 0≥ 0 (3.8)
de∗
dV
= −v′qC ′′eq(C ′′qq − V ′′qq)(ψ′′ee +C ′′ee) −C ′′2qe = ≥ or ≤ 0≥ 0 (3.9)
The first part of this proposition is straightforward. The optimal qual-
ity level increases if quality is valued more. The second part, however,
depends on the cross derivative of service costs. If it is negative, effort
increases with the valuation quality. Figure III.1 shows two service cost
functions with negative cross derivative. The upper curve is with low effort,
the lower curve with higher effort. A negative cross derivative means that
the marginal cost decrease of cost-reducing effort increases with the level of
service costs (vertical lines), or alternatively, the marginal quality increase of
quality-increasing effort decreases with the level of service costs (horizontal
lines). On the other hand, if the cross derivative of service costs is positive,
effort decreases with the valuation of quality. However, the cross derivative
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Figure III.1: Cost-reducing effort (vertical lines) and quality-increasing effort
(horizontal lines) for a negative cross derivative of service costs.
Cost
ρ
1
is unlikely to be positive in reality, as this would mean that the marginal
quality increase of quality-increasing effort increases with the level of service
costs.
To illustrate the above analysis, the next section proposes functional
forms for network and effort costs. The service cost has a negative cross
derivative in this illustration.
III.2.2 Model with specific functional forms
First, we consider the following service cost function, which satisfies assump-
tions (3.1):
C(q, e) = β
e(1 − q) , q ∈ [0,1], β, e > 0 (3.10)
where the cost parameter β determines the service cost for a given level of
effort e and quality q. The cost parameter β is exogenous and depends, inter
alia, on consumer density, geography, climate, consumer density, employee
wages, yearly demand, size of the network, economies of scale, and economies
of scope. Quality varies between zero and one, with a value of one indicating
a perfect quality level and zero indicating no quality. The service costs
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C(q, e) increase with quality.4 The cost of reaching a perfect quality level
(q = 1) is infinite. For example, a completely reliable gas or electricity
network requires large reliability margins and thus many redundant lines
and pipelines (Ovaere and Proost, 2016). Similarly, to completely eliminate
congestion, an airport needs many runways, a railway network many tracks,
a toll road many parallel lanes, and a telecommunications network many
links and towers.
Second, effort costs have the following functional form:
ψ(e) = E
2
e2, E > 0 (3.11)
where the effort cost parameter E is strictly positive. A higher effort leads
to a higher quality level for the same service costs or lower service costs for
the same quality level. If effort is higher than one, service costs decrease; if
effort is lower than one, service costs increase. Lastly, consumer benefit is
linear in quality: V (q) = V q.
Putting together the above functional forms, the optimal quality and
effort are:5
q∗ = 1 − (Eβ2
V
3 )0.2
e∗ = (V β
E2
)0.2 (3.12)
These expressions show that the optimal quality decreases with effort cost
and service cost, and – as predicted by proposition 1 – increases with V. The
optimal effort level decreases with effort cost, increases with service cost and
– again, as predicted by proposition 1 – increases with V.
As an illustration for electricity networks, take the following numerical
values: E = 0.4, β = 0.000078 and V=VOLL=5000 [€/MWh]. This yields an
optimal effort of e∗=1.05, which means a cost decrease of about 5%. The
4Reichl et al. (2008) confirm that the reliability level of transmission networks increases
with service costs. They find that annual average interruption duration increases by
1.36 minutes if average service costs decrease by 1e/MWh. Likewise, in a case study of
Italian distribution system operators (DSOs), Cambini et al. (2016) find that operating
expenditures and capital expenditures affect service quality.
5Appendix III.A repeats the analysis of this section for different functional forms and
finds similar results.
74
CHAPTER III. COST AND QUALITY REGULATION
optimal quality level is q∗=0.999885, which means a reliability of electricity
supply of 99.9885%, or equivalently an unavailability of 60 minutes per year.
If, ceteris paribus, the cost β is 20% higher, the optimal effort is
e∗H=1.09 and the optimal quality level is q∗H=0.999877. That is, if the mo-
nopolist is high cost (a higher β), it is optimal to exert more cost-reducing
effort and have a lower quality level. Figure III.2 exemplifies the above illus-
tration. This figure plots the convex service costs (solid lines) and the total
costs (dotted lines) for a low value of β (thick lines) and a high value of β
(thin lines), and the lost benefit from a less than perfect quality (dash-dot
lines), i.e. the cost V (1 − q).
Figure III.2: Optimal quality level as a function of service costs (solid lines) and
the costs of low quality (dash-dot lines), with A = 0.4, V = 5000,
βL = 0.000053 and βH = 1.2βL.
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This section dealt with optimal cost and quality of a monopolist. The
next section analyses the cost and quality regulation of a monopolist.
III.3 Cost and quality regulation
As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Schmalensee (1989) have noted,
most incentive schemes observed in practice are linear. In addition, Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987) note that linear contracts enjoy a robustness
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that makes them effective in a wide range of situations. Therefore, as in
(Schmalensee, 1989), we propose a linear regulatory scheme that leads to
’good’ results in many settings, but is not optimal for all functional forms
and distributions of uncertainty. Contrary to Schmalensee (1989), who as-
sumes simple functional forms and does not arrive at analytical solutions, we
arrive at insightful comparative static results without functional forms and
analytical solutions with a fairly complex functional form for service costs.
The main difference with Schmalensee is that we assume that demand is
perfectly inelastic. In this section, we first study a general model of cost
and quality regulation, then we discuss the model with specific functional
forms.
III.3.1 General model of cost and quality regulation
The previous section studied optimal quality and effort of a monopolist. In
reality, however, the monopolist’s objective function can diverge from welfare
maximization. Therefore, a regulator, who is assumed to be a benevolent
maximizer of social welfare,6 designs a regulatory scheme that attempts to
give the monopolist the correct incentives to align its profit maximization
objective with welfare maximization. This paper studies a revenue cap R
with cost-efficiency and quality incentives:
R = bC + (1 − b)C + bV V (q − q) with b ∈ [0,1] (3.13)
Each year the regulated monopolist earns a revenue R, which depends on a
cost norm C, its realized service costs C, a quality norm q, and its realized
quality level q. The allowed revenue R increases with both realized service
costs and realized quality.7 However, the regulated monopolist is remuner-
ated only a fraction (1-b) of its realized service costs and earns the remain-
ing fraction b of the ex-ante determined cost norm C, also called justified
costs. This cost norm is determined by the regulator based on the regulated
6A regulatory agencies can also be captured by interest groups, as analyzed in Stigler
(1971) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11)
7We assume that quality is verifiable, such that a regulator can use observed quality,
without needing to resort to sales incentives and threats to reputation (Laffont and Tirole,
1991; Lewis and Sappington, 1991).
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monopolist’s historical costs, on benchmark analyses of other monopolists
(Schleifer, 1985)8, and on assumptions of the growth rate of the retail price
minus the anticipated rate of technological progress (RPI-X) (Littlechild,
1983). The fraction b is the power of the cost incentive.9 The higher b, the
more of its revenue is allocated independently of realized costs; the lower b,
the more of its service costs are remunerated in function of realized costs.
As before, revenue is raised through consumer payments.10
A regulatory scheme with b = 1 amounts to a pure revenue cap, while
b = 0 amounts to cost-of-service regulation. There is a sizable literature that
studies the properties, advantages and disadvantages of these two limits of
the regulatory spectrum. For an excellent overview we refer to (Liston, 1993;
Laffont and Tirole, 1993) and (Decker, 2014).
Revenue cap (3.13) is sometimes expressed in terms of a cost-sharing
parameter, for example in the regulation of electricity networks in Great
Britain (see section III.5.3.1). The cost-sharing parameter s is the fraction
of cost under- or overperformance that is paid by consumers. In that case
the cost incentive of the revenue cap is:
R = C + s(C −C) = (1 − s)C + sC (3.14)
which shows that the cost-sharing parameters is one minus the incentive
power, i.e. s = 1 − b.
To revenue cap (3.13), a quality incentive is added. If quality q is above
the quality norm q, the monopolist earns an additional revenue of bV V (q−q);
if the quality is lower than the quality norm, a penalty of bV V (q − q) is
subtracted from its allowed revenue. The parameter bV is the power of the
quality incentive. Similar to the power b of the cost incentive, a high power
8See (Estache et al., 2004) and (Giannakis et al., 2005) for examples of electricity
network benchmarking.
9We assume that the rate of return on realized service costs (1 − b)C is equal to the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and thus does not end up in the profit of the
monopolist. If the rate of return is r [%] higher than the WACC, the analysis is still valid
but the power of the cost incentive is adjusted downwards: br = b − (r −WACC)(1 − b).
10Since consumer charges are often set at the beginning of a year or regulatory period,
and total consumption and realized service costs are only known at the end, an excess
or deficit of raised revenue is possible. However, consumer charges are set such that the
excess or deficit revenue balance is zero over time.
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of the quality incentive means that deviations from the quality norm have a
larger effect on the monopolist’s allowed revenue. The parameter V is the
(average) quality valuation of consumers.
To summarize, the monopolist’s allowed revenue depends on ex-ante
determined cost and quality norms, and on ex-post realized service cost
and quality. However, cost and quality norms could depend on ex-post
parameters, such as peak or total demand, to eliminate demand effects.
If a monopolist is subject to revenue cap (3.13), its profit function to
maximize is:
max{eM ,qM} b(C −C(qM , eM)) + bV V (qM − q) − ψ(eM) (3.15)
where eM and qM are the effort and quality chosen by the monopolist. This
leads to the following first-order conditions for the monopolist’s choice of
quality and effort:
bV V − bC ′q = 0
bC ′e + ψ′e = 0 (3.16)
The first-order conditions tell that the monopolist chooses the quality level
such that the marginal increase of its regulated revenue from the quality
incentive equals the marginal increase of its regulated revenue from the cost
incentive; and it chooses its effort such that the marginal increase of its
regulated revenue from the cost incentive equals its marginal cost of effort.
As before, a global maximum exists because effort and service costs are
convex and the quality incentive is concave.
Under perfect information the cost norm C¯ and quality norm q can be
chosen such that the socially-costly profit of the monopolist is zero.
Comparing first-order conditions (3.6) and (3.16) leads to a straight-
forward proposition:
Proposition 2. If a monopolist is regulated according to revenue cap (3.13)
and the regulator has perfect information, its quality and effort are optimal
at incentive powers b = 1 and bV = 1.
This result is in line with the optimal regulation literature (Laffont and
Tirole, 1986, 1993) that finds that incentive power equals one under perfect
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information11, while under imperfect information a low-cost (efficient) mo-
nopolist self-selects a higher incentive power if a menu of linear contracts is
offered.
In addition to proposition 2, total differentiation of the monopolist’s
first-order conditions leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If total cost is convex (assumptions (3.1)), the power of the
quality incentive bV increases the monopolist’s quality and has an ambiguous
effect on the monopolist’s effort:
dqM
dbV
≥ 0
deM
dbV
> 0 if C ′′eq < 0 and deMdbV ≤ 0 if C ′′eq ≥ 0
The power of the cost incentive b has an ambiguous effect on both the mo-
nopolist’s quality and effort:
dqM
db
≥ or ≤ 0 if C ′′eq ≤ 0 and dqMdb < 0 if C ′′eq > 0
deM
db
≥ or ≤ 0 if C ′′eq ≤ 0 and deMdb > 0 if C ′′eq > 0
Proof. The total derivatives of the first-order conditions are:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bC ′′qq bC ′′qe
bC ′′eq ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ dqMdeM
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ V0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦dbV (3.17)⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bC ′′qq bC ′′qe
bC ′′eq ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ dqMdeM
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ −C
′
q−C ′e
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦db (3.18)
11To our knowledge the optimal regulation literature does not say anything about the
incentive power of the quality incentive.
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which leads to the following expressions:
dqM
dbV
= V (ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee)
bC ′′qq(ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee) − b2C ′′2qe = ≥ 0≥ 0
deM
dbV
= −bC ′′eq
bC ′′qq(ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee) − b2C ′′2qe = ≥ or ≤ 0≥ 0
dqM
db
= −C ′q(bC ′′ee + ψ′′ee) + bC ′eC ′′eq
bC ′′qq(ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee) − b2C ′′2qe = ≥ or ≤ 0≥ 0
deM
db
= −bC ′′qqC ′e + bC ′′eqC ′q
bC ′′qq(ψ′′ee + bC ′′ee) − b2C ′′2qe = ≥ or ≤ 0≥ 0
(3.19)
The results of proposition 2 depend on the cross derivative of service
costs. If this is zero (e.g. C = q − e, as in (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter
4)), quality decreases with the power of the cost incentive and increases with
the power of the quality incentive, while effort decreases with the power
of the cost incentives and does not change with the power of the quality
incentive. On the other hand, if the cross derivative is negative, a higher
power of the quality incentive increases both quality and effort. The effect
of the power of the cost incentive is ambiguous. Both quality and effort
could increase or decrease with incentive power.
Proposition 3 predicts the effect of the power of the cost and the power
of the quality incentive on both quality and effort. The theoretical liter-
ature focused so far on the effect of the cost incentive on quality. Their
prediction is in line with proposition 3. Sheshinski (1976) finds that with
a positive cross derivative of inverse demand with respect to quality and
quantity (pqx > 0), a price cap decreases quality if the cross derivative of
profits is negative (piqx < 0) and increases quality if the cross derivative of
profits is positive (piqx > 0). The effect is ambiguous for a negative cross
derivative of inverse demand. Similarly, Kidokoro (2002) finds that quality
decreases with incentive power for investment-related quality and increases
with incentive power for effort-related quality.
The theoretical predictions of proposition 3 are confirmed by the (small)
empirical literature of quality in electricity networks. Ter-Martirosyan and
Kwoka (2010) find that incentive regulation is associated with significantly
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longer duration of service outages (dqdb < 0), but that this quality reduction
is offset when regulation includes quality incentives ( dqdbV > 0). Similarly,
Schmidthaler et al. (2015) find that the introduction of quality incentives
leads to reductions of the annual outage duration by 16.05% on average
( dqdbV > 0). In the telecommunications industry, the empirical results (in the
U.S.) have been mixed (Banerjee, 2003; Sappington, 2003; Ai et al., 2003).
However, since cost and quality incentives were introduced simultaneously
in many states, their effects are difficult to disentangle ( dqdbV db >< 0).
III.3.2 Model of cost and quality regulation with specific
functional forms
Using the functional forms of section III.2.2, the monopolist’s quality and
effort are:
qM = 1 − (b2Eβ2
b3vV
3 )0.2
eM = (bV bV β
E2
)0.2 (3.20)
These expressions show that both quality and effort increase with the power
bV of the quality incentive – as predicted by proposition 3, because C ′′qe < 0
for our assumed cost function. Proposition 3 is ambiguous on the effect of b
on quality and effort, but the above expressions show that for our assumed
cost function, quality decreases and effort increases with the power b of the
cost incentive. The alternative functional forms in Appendix III.A yield
similar results.
Figure III.3 plots the monopolist’s relative effort and quality as a func-
tion of the power of the cost incentive (b) and the quality incentive (bV ).12
Relative effort is defined as the ratio of the monopolist’s effort and the opti-
mal effort, while relative quality is defined as the inverse ratio of unreliability
(1-quality). For example, a relative quality of 2 means that the monopolist’s
unreliability (e.g. expressed in interrupted or congested hours) is half the
optimal unreliability. Darker regions represent higher relative values. The
12It should be noted that the values depend on functional form assumptions but not on
parameter values.
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left graph of Figure III.3 shows that the monopolist’s quality is too high in
the upper-left corner, where the quality incentive is high and the cost incen-
tive is low. Similarly, its quality is too low in the lower-right corner, where
the quality incentive is low and the cost incentive is high. The black line
in the center indicates the incentive values that lead to the optimal quality,
the dashed lines indicate a relative of 2 and 0.5 respectively. Evidently, this
line goes through b = bV = 1. The right graph of Figure III.3 shows that the
monopolist’s effort increases with both the quality and the cost incentive.
In the limit of a strict cost-of-service regime (b = 0) the effort is zero and
the quality is infinitely high if the quality incentive is positive. In the limit
of a strict price cap regime (b = 1) the quality decreases with a decreasing
quality incentive. Of course, the theoretical result of both limits exagger-
ates the monopolist’s behavior in practice. Quality and cost are bounded
by opposition from both the regulator and consumers to unacceptably high
or low levels (Sappington and Weisman, 2010).
Figure III.3: Relative quality 1−q∗1−qM and relative effort eMe∗ for different values of
b and bV
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III.4 Cost and quality regulation under uncertainty
Proposition 2 stated that under perfect information both the power of the
cost and the quality should equal one, because the cost norm C¯ and quality
norm q can be chosen such that the socially-costly profit of the monopolist is
zero. In reality, however, the regulator is uncertain about current costs and
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future cost realizations. As the regulator should guarantee the monopolist a
non-negative profit in all possible states of nature, he can at best choose the
norms such that the monopolist’s profit is zero in the worst-case scenario.
In other states of nature the monopolist’s profit will be positive and his
expected profit E[Π] will thus be positive. The regulator’s maximization
problem is:
max{b,bV } V (qM) − (C(qM , eM) + ψ(eM)) − (1 − α)E[Π(qM , eM , )]
s.t. min{} Π(qM , eM , ) ≥ 0 (3.21)
where qM(b, bV ) and eM(b, bV ) are determined from equation (3.16). The
parameter  represents the uncertainty about the monopolist’s parameters.
A higher  means higher uncertainty (Schmalensee, 1989). Asymmetric in-
formation is not assessed. We assume that the monopolist does not have
more information about future parameter values than the regulator or that
he does not use this asymmetric information to his benefit. The constraint
ensures that the monopolist’s profit is at least non-negative for all values
of the parameter . We assume the functional forms of section III.2.2 and
assume that the regulator knows these functional forms but is uncertain
about the values of the parameters E, β and V . To derive meaningful an-
alytical results, we assume the functional forms of section III.2.2. Suppose
that his aggregate uncertainty about these parameters is characterized by(EβV 2)0.2(1 + ), where the regulator knows that  has a symmetric prob-
ability density function f() with support [-, ]. This leads to the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. Under the above assumptions, the fixed payment and the expected
profit increase with the power of both the cost and quality incentive.
Proof. Using expressions (3.20) of the monopolist’s choice of effort and qual-
ity, expressions for service costs, effort costs and the cost of unreliability (1-q)
are:
C(q, e) = Ab0.4V
b0.6
, ψ(e) = A
2
b0.4V b
0.4 and (1−q)V = Ab0.4
b0.6V
, with A = (Eβ2V 2)0.2
(3.22)
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To have Π( = ) = 0, fixed payments should equal:
bC + bV V (1 − q) = 2.5Ab0.4V b0.4(1 + ) (3.23)
The expected profit is:
E[Π(qM , eM)] = 2.5Ab0.4V b0.4∫ − ( − )f()d = 2.5Ab0.4V b0.4 (3.24)
because ∫ −( − )f()d =  for symmetric distributions.
This result is in line with the simulation model of Gasmi et al. (1994)
and empirical evidence in the telecommunications industry (Sappington,
2002; Hauge and Sappington, 2010). Since this lemma shows that expected
profit increases with the power of both the cost and quality incentives, the
regulator faces a trade-off between optimal cost and quality incentives, and
higher expected profit for the monopolist. Increasing the incentive powers
increases socially-costly profit but increases cost-reducing effort and quality
(see proposition 3). This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In the presence of uncertainty ( > 0) and socially-costly
consumer payments, and assuming the above functional forms, the optimal
power of the cost incentive and the quality incentive are equal and below one:
b∗ = b∗V = 11 + 5(1 − α) < 1 (3.25)
Proof. Inserting the functional forms and the expression for expected profit
from Lemma 1 into the regulator’s maximization (3.21) yields the following
expression:
max{b,bV }V −Ab0.4b0.6V − (Ab
0.4
V
b0.6
+ A
2
b0.4V b
0.4) − 2.5(1 − α)Ab0.4V b0.4 (3.26)
Which leads to the following first-order conditions:
2 b
bV
− 3 + b + 5(1 − α)b = 0 (3.27)
− 3 + 2bV
b
+ bV + 5(1 − α)bV = 0 (3.28)
which results in b∗ = b∗V = 11+5(1−α) . Appendix III.A shows that the result is
robust for different functional forms.
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This proposition shows that the power of the cost and quality incentives
(i) should be equal, and (ii) should decrease with increasing uncertainty and
decreasing preference for monopoly profit. This last result is similar to
Schmalensee (1989) who states that ROR regulation is preferred at high
levels of uncertainty. However, in our case the incentive power decreases
with the level of uncertainty and only equals ROR regulation in the limit.
Comparing with expressions (3.20), both effort and quality are thus lower
under uncertainty than under perfect information.13 Section III.5.3 will
show case studies for which the incentive power of the cost incentive is
between 0.46 and 0.63. This value is in line with the prescription of equation
(3.25). For example, if α = 0.5 and  = 0.4, i.e. monopoly profit is valued
50% less than consumer surplus and the monopolist has an uncertainty of
[-40%,+40%] over the parameter values, optimal incentive power equals 0.5.
From proposition 4 it is straightforward to show the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Under the above assumptions, expected total cost of the mo-
nopolist increases with the power of the quality incentive, and decreases with
the power of the cost incentive, except for very high uncertainty () and a
very low preference for monopoly profit (α).
Proof.
TC = C(qM , eM) + ψ(eM) + (1 − α)E[Π(qM , eM)] (3.29)
= Ab0.4V ( 1b0.6 + b0.42 + 2.5(1 − α)b0.4)
When the parameters E, β and V are expressed on a per quantity
basis, the above result also applies to the average price or consumer tariff.
The theoretical prediction of corollary 1 is also confirmed by the empirical
literature of price-cap regulation in the U.S. telecommunications industry.
After introduction of price-cap regulation, Mathios and Rogers (1989) find
significantly lower rates, Kaestner and Kahn (1990) find lower prices, Ai
13A related setting that leads to similar conclusions about the optimal incentive power
is one where the cost and quality norms are determined endogenously according to some
backward-looking rule, see appendix III.B.
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and Sappington (2002) find that costs are generally lower, and Blank et al.
(1998) find no evidence of reduced prices.
III.5 Regulation in practice
III.5.1 The difference between different regulations
Figure III.4 compares the the cost and quality regulation of this paper
(CQR) with rate-of-return regulation (RORR), price-cap regulation (PCR)
and earning-sharing regulation (ESR) (Schmalensee, 1989; Gasmi et al.,
1994; Lyon, 1996; Weisman, 2005; Blank and Mayo, 2009). The figure links
the actual rate of return with the rate of return received by the monopo-
list. Under RORR the rate of return received by the monopolist is always
the same, irrespective of its cost-reducing efforts or exogenous cost shocks.
On the other side of the spectrum, under PCR the monopolist receives all
changes of the actual rate of return, irrespective of being due to exogenous
factors or endogenous cost-reducing effort by the monopolist. The cost and
quality regulation (CQR) of this paper is in between these two extremes.
The monopolist receives only fraction b of changes of the actual rate of re-
turn. This linear regulation is a simple form of earning-sharing regulation
(ESR), or equivalent profit-sharing or sliding-scale regulation, which has a
non-constant power of the cost incentive and caps on minimum and maxi-
mum received rate of return. As this allows for more degrees of freedom than
the linear model of this paper, ESR probably leads to a higher efficiency,
if designed properly.14 Therefore, having a more intricate regulation is a
trade-off between providing better incentives to the monopolist and the cost
of needed information. As an example, in their search for explanations for
the short tenure of ESR in the US telecommunications industry, Sappington
and Weisman (2010, p.246) state that ESR introduces contentious technical
issues because the sharing rule depends on the level of measured earnings.
This is not a problem for linear regulation as the incentive power is constant.
14However, since analytical expressions are not possible anymore, simulations are needed
to assess if ESR is more optimal than our analyzed CQR, and which extensions lead to
the largest welfare gain: caps, asymmetry and the number of steps in the incentive power.
This is an interesting avenue for future research, a point also noted by (Joskow, 2014).
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Figure III.4: Comparing rate-of-return regulation (RORR), earning-sharing reg-
ulation (ESR), the cost and quality regulation of this paper (CQR)
and price-cap regulation (PCR).
Actual ROR
ROR received by
the monopolist
45○
PCR (b = 1)
RORR (b = 0)
Fair rate
of return
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CQR (0 ≤ b ≤ 1)ESR (b not constant)
III.5.2 Scope of the revenue cap
Up to now, we assumed that all costs of a monopolist are included under the
revenue cap. However, if only a part of a monopolist’s total costs are subject
to cost incentives and his other costs earn a regulated rate of return, the
monopolist may distort the relative use of its costs, similar to the famous
Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962).15 For example, in the
regulation of transmission networks in Sweden, cost incentives only apply
to operating costs (OC), while capital costs (CC) earn a regulated rate of
return (NordREG, 2012).
If operating costs are decreasing in capital costs, e.g. OC = β/CCe(1−q) ,
monopolists with cost incentives on operating costs and a regulated rate
of return on capital costs have a tendency to overinvest in capital costs to
decrease operating costs. If a quality incentive is included, the monopolist’s
15Giannakis et al. (2005) find a trade-off between operating and capital expenditures in
UK electricity distribution networks.
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effort and quality will be (similar to equations (3.20)):
eM = (bbV V β
E2CC
)0.2
qM = 1 − ( b2Eβ2
b3V V
3
CC2
)0.2 (3.30)
In theory this leads to zero effort and perfect quality, but in reality the
decrease of operating costs and the increase of capital costs are limited by
regulatory, societal and political constraints.
As a reaction to this distortion of costs, OFWAT, the Water Services
Regulation Authority of England and Wales, changed its regulation from one
where operating and capital costs were regulated separately (2010-2015), to
one where all costs are regulated under the same revenue cap (2015-2020),
a so-called Totex approach, see section III.5.3.3.
III.5.3 Case studies
This sections analyzes case studies in electricity, gas and water networks,
where hybrid revenue caps are used in combination with quality incentives.
We will see that incentive power of the quality incentive is equal to one
in all case studies, except for regulation of electricity networks in Norway,
where it is equal to 0.6. On the other hand, the incentive power of the cost
incentive is between 0.46 and 0.63 in all case studies.
III.5.3.1 Regulation of electricity transmission and distribution
networks in Norway and Great Britain
Electricity transmission and distribution networks in Norway are regulated
using the cost and quality revenue cap regulation that is studied in section
III.3 of this paper. In its most simplified form, the Norwegian regulation is:
R = 0.6C + 0.4C + 0.6V (q − q) (3.31)
That is, the power of the cost and quality incentives are equal and equal
to 0.6. The cost and quality norms are based on historical values and on
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benchmarking analysis.16 The quality incentive adds or subtracts an amount
from the allowed revenue cap of the transmission or distribution system op-
erator, so that the quality improvements or deteriorations are socialized
over all consumers. There is no direct compensation to affected consumers.
However, the treatment of quality incentives is much more elaborate than
presented in equation (3.31). The quality norm is formulated on the basis
of interruption costs, a method known as the cost of energy not supplied
(CENS) regulation. In the CENS regulation, interruption costs IC are cal-
culated for different consumer groups c, and both the time t and duration d
of interruptions u [MWh] have an effect on interruption costs (Kjolle et al.,
2008). In summary:
R = 0.6C + 0.4C + 0.6(IC − ∑
c,t,d
V (c, t, d)u(c, t, d)) (3.32)
Similar regulation exists in many other countries such as England,
Wales, Scotland, the Netherlands (Hesseling and Sari, 2006) and Australia17.
In Great Britain, the three transmission owners – National Grid Electricity
Transmission (NGET TO) in England and Wales, Scottish Hydro Electric
Transmission (SHE) in the north of Scotland, and SP Transmission (SPT)
in the south of Scotland– and the system operator (NGET SO) are regulated
using the RIIO regulatory framework18, which gives cost and quality incen-
tives over the eight years from 2013 - 2021. The power of the cost incentive
is about 0.5 for each of the British transmission owners. This incentive is
chosen by OFGEM, the regulator of electricity and gas, based on the trans-
mission owners’ proposal of costs. A proposal closer to efficient costs (as
determined by the OFGEM) received a higher incentive power (OFGEM,
2016).19 Table III.1 shows that NGET has an incentive power of 0.4689,
16This is done for many distribution networks worldwide, but less for transmission net-
works, as there are relatively few of them, they depend on many variables (the distribution
of generation and load, geographic topography, the attributes and age of the legacy net-
work, population density, etc.), and there is no uniform definition of transmission networks
(Joskow, 2014).
17In Australia the incentive power is b = 0.3 for transmission and distribution system
operators (Australian Energy regulator, 2013).
18RIIO stands for Revenue = Incentives+Innovation+Outputs
19For the period 2005-2006, the system operator was offered a menu of contracts where
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while SHE and SPT have 0.5.20 The same table also shows the results of
RIIO in 2015-2016 for all three transmission owners and the system opera-
tor. NGET TO spent £644m less than allowed and retained 46.89 % of this
as higher allowed revenue.
Table III.1: Results of RIIO in 2015-2016 for the three electricity transmission
networks (source: OFGEM (2016)).
m£ 2015-16 Prices NGET TO NGET SO SHE SPET
Allowed Totex C 1,805 137 781 354
Actual Totex C 1,161 137 524 358
Over-/underspend C −C -644 -1 -257 4
Incentive power b 0.4689 0.4689 0.5 0.5
Allowed Totex R = bC + (1 − b)C 1,463 137 652 356
In addition to the above cost incentive, the British electricity networks
are also subject to a range of additional incentive in the following cate-
gories: safety, reliability, availability, customer satisfaction, connections and
environment (OFGEM, 2016). We focus on the reliability incentive.21 The
reliability incentive is expressed in energy not supplied (ENS) [MWh]. Ta-
ble III.2 shows the ENS of the electricity networks for 2013-2016. The value
of lost load (VOLL) is considered to be 16,000 £/MWh in GB, irrespec-
tive of consumer groups, time of interruption or duration, as in the CENS
regulation of Norway. The target ENS is constant over the eight years of
RIIO 2013-2021. Note that ENS is considerably below target, which leads
to large rewards to the electricity networks. A possible explanation is that
the incentive power of the quality incentive is one. That is, over- or un-
derperformance is not shared with consumers. As predicted by equations
(3.20), this leads to too-high quality and effort. From Figure III.3, it can be
a higher cost norm was combined with a lower upside and higher downside sharing factor
(s = 1− b). Option 1: C = £480m with sup = 0.6 and sdown = 0.15; Option 2: C = £500m
with sup = 0.4 and sdown = 0.2; Option 3 C = £515m with sup = 0.25 and sdown = 0.25
(Joskow, 2014).
20RIIO does not use ’incentive power’ b but ’sharing factor’ s = 1 − b, defined as R =
C + s(C −C).
21For an overview of quality of electricity supply in almost all European countries, we
refer to (CEER, 2011).
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seen that b = 0.5, bV = 1 leads to a quality level that is twice the optimal.
Table III.2: ENS of the GB electricity transmission networks for 2013-2016
(source: OFGEM (2016)).
NGET SHE SPET
Target ENS [MWh] 316 120 225
ENS 2013-2014 135 36 42
ENS 2014-2015 9 106 3
ENS 2015-2016 4 0 14
Cumulative reward [m£] 12.8 3.5 9.9
III.5.3.2 Regulation of gas distribution networks in Britain
The eight British gas distribution networks are also regulated according to
the above RIIO regulation (OFGEM, 2017b). Table III.3 shows that the
incentive power for the eight British gas distribution networks is between
0.63 and 0.64 over the eight years from 2013 - 2021. This table shows that
all distribution utilities underspend and earn a higher allowed revenue.
Table III.3: Results of RIIO in 2015-2016 for the eight gas distribution networks
(source: OFGEM (2017b)).
£m 2015-16 Prices EoE Lon NW WM NGN Sc So WWU
Allowed Totex C 316 303 237 186 261 196 406 254
Actual Totex C 297 238 226 172 227 165 336 209
Over-/underspend C −C -19 -65 -11 -14 -34 -31 -70 -45
Incentive power b 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.637 0.637 0.632
Allowed Totex R = bC + (1 − b)C 309 279 233 181 249 185 380 238
Just as in the RIIO regulatory framework for electricity, gas networks
are also subject to a range of additional incentives in the following categories:
network safety, customer service, social obligations, network reliability, new
connections and environmental protection. Some of them have a pecuniary
reward or penalty, others are reputational.
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III.5.3.3 Regulation of water and wastewater utilities in England
and Wales
Water and wastewater utilities in England and Wales are privately owned
and operated. An independent economic regulator (OFWAT) supervises
the private utilities and applies various forms of benchmarking or yardstick
competition to encourage performance improvements (Decker, 2014). Reg-
ulation of quality is of paramount importance as it directly affects human
health and consumers are generally not able to assess the safety of the water.
As already explained in section III.5.2, OFWAT uses a Totex-approach
for its 2015-2020 regulatory period. This means that all costs of a water
utility are regulated under the same revenue cap. OFWAT’s 2014 price re-
view for the 2015-2020 period consisted of two steps. First, water utilities
had to submit business plans that specified their detailed proposal of ob-
jectives (C and q), penalty and reward schemes (V ) and efficiency sharing
factors (s = 1 − b) (OFWAT, 2013). Based on their business plans, water
utilities were awarded a ’enhanced’ or ’non-enhanced’ status. As many wa-
ter utilities had provided their proposals in words instead of numbers, only
two utilities were awarded the enhanced status. In a second step, OFWAT
proposed a menu of incentives to the utilities, based on all submitted busi-
ness plans and historical data. Table III.4 and Table III.5 show respectively
the menu choice of the cost incentive for the enhanced and non-enhanced
utilities in wholesale water and wastewater services. Water utilities with
enhanced status received menus with higher incentive power and higher ad-
ditional income for equal menu choice. The menu choice indicates how much
this choice differs from OFWAT’s estimate of efficient costs. For example,
a menu choice of 85 means that the company?s expenditure choice is 15%
lower than the estimate of efficient costs. An enhanced water utility that
chooses the 85 menu receives a cost norm of 96.25% of its allowed expen-
diture and an additional bonus of 2.55%, while a non-enhanced utility only
receives a bonus of 2.3%.
Subsequently, the resulting allowed revenue is complemented with the
different quality incentives, such as leakage, compliance with quality stan-
dards, unplanned interruptions, Satisfaction with taste and odour, etc. Some
of them have a pecuniary reward or penalty, others are reputational.
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Table III.4: Menu of cost incentives for enhanced utilities in wholesale water and
wastewater services (source: OFWAT (2014)).
Menu choice 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115
Incentive power b 59% 58% 57% 56% 55% 54% 53% 52
Cost norm C [%] 95 96.25 97.5 98.75 100 101.25 102.5 103.75
Additional income [%] 2.55 1.95 1.33 0.68 0 -0.70 -1.43 -2.18
Table III.5: Menu of cost incentives for non-enhanced utilities wholesale water
and wastewater services (source: OFWAT (2014)).
Menu choice 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130
Incentive power b 54% 53% 52% 51% 50% 49% 48% 47% 46% 45% 44%
Cost norm C [%] 95 96.25 97.5 98.75 100 101.25 102.5 103.75 105 106.35 107.5
Additional income [%] 2.3 1.76 1.2 0.61 0 -0.64 -1.30 -1.90 -2.70 -3.44 -4.20
III.6 Conclusions
This paper studied a linear cost and quality regulation of monopolies con-
fronted with inelastic demand. This is a suitable assumption for network
industries, such as electrical grids, gas pipelines, water supply, (rail)roads
and telecommunications. The main regulatory issues in these industries
are incentives for quality and cost-reducing effort, instead of quality and
quantity. As the literature on quality regulation of a monopolist has so far
mainly focused on optimal quantity and quality, this paper complements the
literature by studying the monopolist’s cost function instead of its demand
curve.
The analysis shows that both quality and effort increase with the power
of the quality incentive. The effect of the power of the cost incentive is am-
biguous but under reasonable assumptions it increases effort and decreases
quality. Next, we show for a range of functional forms that under uncer-
tainty, the power of the cost incentive and quality incentive should optimally
be equal and below one. Last, three case studies in electricity, gas and water
show that hybrid revenue caps with quality incentives are increasingly used
in network industries. This paper proposes a simple and straightforward
model to study behavior of the monopolist under these regulatory schemes.
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III.A. Robustness of results with respect to functional forms
By focusing on cost efficiency, we necessarily neglect optimal pricing
issues (allocative efficiency) and quantity decisions. Although we have ar-
gued that this is a suitable assumption for network industries, it would be
interesting to extend the analysis to quantity, quality and effort, probably
with specific functional forms to obtain unambiguous results. Another in-
teresting extension of the analysis would be to include multiple separate
quality incentives, as is done in reality. The current quality variable can
be interpreted as a vector and thus contains many aspects of quality, but
this does not allows us to explicitly study trade-offs between quality aspects.
These important questions are left for future research.
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III.A Robustness of results with respect to func-
tional forms
Table III.6 shows monopoly quantity and effort depending on functional
form assumptions. The first row shows the results of section III.2.2 and
III.3.2. Row 2 yields similar results as row 1. For row 3, however, effort
decreases with the power of the cost incentive. That is, it is profitable to
decrease quality so much that effort can also be decreased. The last column
of this table shows that all three functional forms lead to similar results for
optimal incentive power under uncertainty. Table III.7 shows the results of
comparative statics, which is as prediction by proposition 3.
III.B Backward-looking cost and quality norms
Suppose now that both the regulator and the monopolist have perfect in-
formation about current and future parameters, but that the cost norm and
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Table III.6: Monopoly quantity and effort depending on functional form assump-
tions.
C(e, q) ψ(e) eM qM Uncertainty: b∗ = b∗V
(1) βe(1−q) E2 e2 ( bβbV VE2 )0.2 1 − ( b2β2Eb3V V 3 )0.2 11+5(1−α)
(2) (1−e)β1−q E1−e 1 − ( E2bβbV V )1/3 1 − ( bβEb2V V 2 )1/3 11+3(1−α)
(3) (1 − e)βq3 E1−e 1 − 27E2bβb3V V 3 b2V V 29bβE 11+(1−α)
Table III.7: Comparative statics depending on functional form assumptions.
dqM
dbV
dqM
db
deM
dbV
deM
db
c′′eq < 0 + - - +
c′′eq = 0 + - 0 +
c′′eq > 0 (1) + - + +(2) + - + +
(3) + - + -
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quality norm are determined according to some backward-looking rule (Laf-
font and Tirole, 1993, p.401). That is, there is a pre-scheduled regulatory
process to reset or ’ratchet’ the norms based on realized cost and quality of
previous years (Joskow, 2008a). Some examples:
Ct = Ct−1 and qt = qt−1
Ct = t−1∑
i=t−N
Ci
N
and qt = t−1∑
i=t−N
qi
N
(3.33)
Ct = kCt−1 + (1 − k)Ct−1 and qt = kqt−1 + (1 − k)qt−1
In that case, a forward-looking monopolist will take into account the
effect of its current effort and quality on future norms and thus on its profit.
The proof below shows that the monopolist’s cost-reducing effort and the
quality in its zone are:
eM(α) = (bV βα
E2
)0.2
qM(α) = 1 − (b2Eβ2
V 3α
)0.2 (3.34)
Where:
α = {1 − δ,1 − 1
N
(δ + δ2 + ... + δN), 1
1 + kδ1−δ } and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (3.35)
for the norms of equation (3.33). A low α means that the monopolist has
a lower incentive for effort and quality. This is because it anticipates the
effect of its current actions on future profits, through the backward-looking
cost and quality norms. That is, high effort and high quality now will lead
to lower cost and higher quality norms in the future. However, this effect
can be counteracted by decreasing the incentive power, because its positive
effect on the quality level is larger than its negative effect on effort. The
optimal incentive power is a trade-off between a higher quality and higher
service costs. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If the cost and quality norms are determined according to
some backward-looking rule, a forward-looking monopolist will have too low
incentives for cost-reducing effort and quality. In that case, the optimal
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incentive power is
b∗ = 3α0.2
2 + α0.6 ≤ 1 (3.36)
where a low α means lower effort and quality incentives.
Proof. We assume that cost-reducing effort has no durable impact on the
cost parameter β. The cost function does only depend on a monopolist’s
current cost-reducing efforts. This is different from Auray et al. (2011), who
analyze quality regulation when effort has a long-lasting impact.
For Ct = Ct−1 and qt = qt−1, the monopolist’s two-period utility is:
b( β
et−1ut−1 − βetut ) + V (qt − qt−1) − E2 e2t+ δ(b( β
etut
− β
et+1ut+1 ) + V (qt+1 − qt) − E2 e2t+1)
(3.37)
Which leads to:
eNO,t = (bV β(1 − δ)
E2
)0.2
qNO,t = 1 − ( b2Eβ2
V 3(1 − δ))0.2 (3.38)
The same analysis is valid for Ct = t−1∑
i=t−N CiN and qt = t−1∑i=t−N qiN .
For Ct = kCt−1+(1−k)Ct−1 and qt = kqt−1+(1−k)qt−1, the monopolist’s
infinite-period utility is:
∞∑
t=1 δt−1(b(Ct − βetut ) + V (qt − qt) − E2 e2t) (3.39)
The monopolist’s maximization problem at each period t is:
b(Ct − αct) + V (αqt − qt) − E2 e2t (3.40)
where α = −1+ δk + δ2k(1− k)+ δ3k(1− k)2 + ... = −11+ kδ1−δ (Laffont and Tirole,
1993, p.402). As before, this leads to:
eNO,t(α) = (bV βα
E2
)0.2
qNO,t(α) = 1 − (b2Eβ2
V 3α
)0.2 (3.41)
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Including eM(α) and uM(α) in equation (3.21) leads to the following
total socio-economic cost:
(Eβ2V 2)0.2 ((b2
α
)0.2 + ( 1
b3
)0.2 + (b2α2)0.2
2
) (3.42)
The first-order condition of this objective function is
0.4
α0.2
b−0.6 − 0.6b−1.6 + 0.2α0.4b−0.6 = 0 (3.43)
This leads to the following optimal incentive power:
b∗ = 3α0.2
2 + α0.6 ≤ 1 (3.44)
If δ = 0.95, N = 5 and k = 0.5, the optimal incentive powers of equation
(3.35) are {0.76,0.88,0.9}.
This analysis shows that backward-looking cost and quality norms are
suboptimal if the monopolist is forward-looking. A solution is to use bench-
mark analysis of similar monopolists, as is done for electricity distribution
system operators (Estache et al., 2004; Giannakis et al., 2005).
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Chapter IV
Cross-Border Exchange and
Sharing of Generation
Reserve Capacity
IV.1 Introduction
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are responsible for the security of
their transmission system. They use upward and downward reserves to
deal with imbalances, caused by unanticipated outages and forecast errors
of demand and intermittent supply. Historically, each TSO procured and
activated its reserves in its own zone. However – following cooperation in
forward markets, the day-ahead market and the intraday market – some
TSOs in Europe and the United States recently started cross-border co-
operation of reserves. Current cooperation projects are voluntary but the
European balancing guideline obliges European TSOs to cooperate on re-
serves procurement and activation within two to four years after its adoption
(ENTSO-E, 2014b). This obligation will increase the number of cross-border
balancing projects.
The benefits of cross-border cooperation of reserves have already been
studied in the literature. Most of the literature presents case study results.
Vandezande et al. (2009) estimate that a Belgium-Netherlands balancing
market would have decreased activation costs by 29-44% in 2008, depend-
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ing on the availability of cross-border capacity. Likewise, Van den Bergh
et al. (2017) estimate the benefits of cross-border activation of reserves to
be around e25 million a year for a case study of the 2013 Central Western
European electricity system (Belgium, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands). However, they find lower benefits of cooperation if transmission con-
straints are neglected during cross-border procurement. Farahmand et al.
(2012) study the integration of the balancing and procurement markets of
Northern Europe, Germany and the Netherlands. They estimate savings
of approximately e400 million per year. Gebrekiros et al. (2013) find only
a reduction of 2% of procurement costs in a small numerical illustration.
van der Weijde and Hobbs (2011) quantify the inter-market benefits using a
stylised 4-node network. They find that the benefits of coordinating balanc-
ing markets generally exceed unit commitment benefits. In a future with a
45% penetration of renewable generation, Mott MacDonald (2013) estimates
operational cost savings of exchange and sharing of reserves on European
scale in the order of e3 billion a year. They assume that the increased inter-
mittent and unpredictable generation capacity results in increased volumes
of imbalances.
The case study approach in the literature means that there is still a
lack of understanding, whether and to what extent TSO cross-border coop-
eration is economically efficient for each TSO zone and for the region as a
whole. The contribution of this paper is to present a general model that
analyses three degrees of TSO cooperation in reserves provision. First, we
examine autarkic TSO reserve provision - a non-cooperative TSO equilib-
rium. Next we study the supply efficiency of reserves exchange, where a TSO
can acquire reserve capacity in the adjacent TSO area. The last case inves-
tigates reserves sharing. Reserves sharing leads to both supply efficiency
and dimensioning efficiency. We show that each step in the integration of
zones results in progressively lower expected socio-economic costs. We also
present a numerical example in order to illustrate the three scenarios. In ad-
dition, to get an understanding of their order of magnitude, we estimate the
possible efficiency gains of cross-border procurement of generation reserves
in Central West Europe and Iberia, based on publicly available procure-
ment data. Lastly, we show that the gains of cooperation are not equally
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distributed across TSOs. Some TSOs may even experience an increase of
procurement costs, which makes voluntary cross-border cooperation harder
to achieve. As the European balancing guideline does not specify the details
of inter-TSO agreements, there is, however, room for bargaining.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes various
concepts of electricity balancing, together with types and examples of cross-
border balancing mechanisms. Section IV.3 introduces the model and anal-
yses different degrees of cooperation of cross-border reserves procurement.
In section IV.4, we estimate the possible efficiency gains of cross-border pro-
curement of generation reserves in Central West Europe and Iberia. Next,
section IV.5 studies the implementation of cross-border reserves procure-
ment. Section IV.6 concludes.
IV.2 Electricity balancing
Electricity balancing is the continuous process, in all time horizons, through
which TSOs ensure that a sufficient amount of upward and downward re-
serves are available to deal with real-time imbalances between supply and
demand in their electricity transmission system. Imbalances occur due to
forecast errors of demand and renewable supply and unforeseen events such
as line failures and generation outages. If imbalances between supply and
demand persist for a certain period of time, the electricity system could
collapse, leading to a blackout.
Most transmission systems consist of different interconnected networks,
which are each governed by one TSO. Since system frequency is shared on all
voltage levels of a synchronous area, due to the technical characteristics of
electricity, power system reliability is considered to be a common good. That
is, a non-excludable but rival good. This means that a MW of power can only
be used once and that it is technologically difficult to prevent interconnected
TSOs from using more than they provide. Underprovision of reserves in
one TSO zone could thus lead to a widespread blackout throughout the
synchronous area. Therefore, to prevent this ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, all
TSOs in a synchronous area are obliged to provide reserves.
Figure IV.1 shows the two stages of electricity balancing: procurement
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and activation. First, to ensure that sufficient reserves are available for
real-time balancing, TSOs procure an amount of reserves – so-called reserve
capacity or balancing capacity – in advance.1 This reserve requirements,
R, is stipulated by network codes and guidelines. To determine the least-
cost procurement of reserve capacity to meet the reserve requirement, the
TSO holds an open bidding process for each type of reserves2 for a given
future contracting period. Balancing service providers can submit reserve
capacity bids, indicating the size [MW] and the price of the bid [e/MW/hour
availability]. In the illustration of Figure IV.1, bid 1, bid 2 and part of bid
3 are accepted in the procurement phase to meet a reserve requirement R.
Accepted bids are obliged to be available throughout the contracting period.
Second, in each activation period3 of the contracting period the TSO holds
another open bidding process where both the procured reserve capacity and
available non-procured capacity submit balancing energy bids. Bids are
accepted by financial merit order to meet the real-time imbalance or reserve
need rt of the system. Accepted positive bids increase their generation, while
accepted negative bids decrease their generation. In return, they receive the
activation price pact. In the illustration of Figure IV.1, bid 2, part of bid 3
and an additional non-procured bid are accepted in the activation phase to
meet the real-time imbalance rt.4
1Even network operators with a real-time balancing spot market, like CAISO and
Transpower, still procure some reserve capacity in advance. CAISO procures in the day-
ahead market and hour-ahead market (Zhou et al., 2016), while Transpower holds a yearly
tender for long-term contracts (Transpower, 2013). According to Transpower (2013), the
procurement costs are e46.7 million per year.
2In Europe, three main categories of reserves exist: (1) Frequency Containment Re-
serves (FCR), which is used for stabilising the frequency after a disturbance; (2) Auto-
matic and Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR and mFRR), which bring the
frequency back to its setpoint value; and (3) Reserve Replacement (RR), which replace
the active reserves such that they are available to react to new disturbances (ENTSO-E,
2014b). These three types are called primary, secondary and tertiary reserves in North
America (Ela et al., 2011).
3The activation period, also called settlement period, can be 15 minutes, 30 minutes or
1 hour depending on national market design characteristics. This should be standardized
for cooperating TSO zones. According to Neuhoff and Richstein (2016), convergence to
the largely used 15 min period is supported by most.
4An alternative to merit order activation is pro-rata activation. In that case all pro-
cured reserves are activated but in proportion to their relative procurement bid size.
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Figure IV.1: Procurement of reserve capacity and activation of balancing energy.
t0
tPROCUREMENT
contracting period
ACTIVATION t
activation period
9am 9.15am
[MW]
[e/MW]
R
1
2
3
[MW]
[e/MWh]
2
3 1
rt
pact
In many TSO zones procurement and activation is more complex than
the explanation above. For example, some TSOs co-optimise the market
clearing of different types of reserves or assess the reserve capacity bid and
the balancing energy bid jointly (50Hertz Transmission GmbH et al., 2014).
Both generation and demand could voluntarily participate in balancing
markets, i.e. in both procurement of reserve capacity and activation of
balancing energy. However, if the upward reserve need is so large that
available reserves are insufficient, the TSO will involuntarily shed load as a
last resort to avoid a blackout.
IV.2.1 Cross-border balancing
Under the impulse of increasing renewable energy integration, supranational
legislation (ENTSO-E, 2014b), and a general drive for more cost efficiency
and reliability, some TSOs have started to coordinate electricity balanc-
ing between neighbouring TSO zones. Often cited benefits of cross-border
balancing include a more efficient use of electricity generation, including
reduced renewable energy curtailment (Mott MacDonald, 2013); reduced
reserve needs (NREL, 2011); a higher reliability level (Van den Bergh et al.,
2017); internalisation of external effects on neighbouring TSOs (Tanger˚as,
2012), a standardization of the rules and products, which creates a level-
playing field (ENTSO-E, 2014b); and improved market liquidity, which in-
creases competition (Hobbs et al., 2005). In the end, all these benefits
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decrease the socio-economic cost of balancing. This paper focuses on the
first two of the above-mentioned benefits:
(A) Supply efficiency: balancing services, both procurement of reserve
capacity to meet reserve requirements and activation of balancing en-
ergy to meet real-time imbalances, are supplied by the cheapest bal-
ancing service providers. That is, if the market is enlarged, expensive
balancing services in one part of the market can be substituted for
cheaper ones in a different part of the market. The scope for sup-
ply efficiency depends on the difference of procurement and activation
costs between cooperating TSO zones.
(B) Dimensioning efficiency: less procurement of reserve capacity is
needed if a TSO in need of capacity can use idle reserve capacity of
adjacent TSO zones.
Cross-border cooperation yields benefits both in procurement of reserve
capacity and activation of balancing energy. Table IV.1 shows the different
degrees of cooperation that are possible in procurement and in activation.
Table IV.1: Degrees of cooperation in cross-border balancing between TSO zones.
PROCUREMENT ACTIVATION
of reserve capacity of balancing energy
To meet the reserve requirements resulting To meet real-time imbalances resulting from
from reserve dimensioning forecast errors and unforeseen events
Autarky: no cross-border cooperation Autarky: no cross-border cooperation
Exchange: procure reserves in other zones Imbalance netting: avoid counteracting
Sharing: multiple zones take into account activation
the same reserves Exchange: activate reserves in other zones
First, the three degrees of cooperation in procurement of reserve capac-
ity are autarky, exchange and sharing. Reserves exchange makes it possible
to procure part of the required level of reserves in adjacent TSO zones.
These reserves are contractually obliged to be available for activation by
the contracting TSO and they can only contribute to meeting this TSO’s
required level of reserves. Reserves exchange changes the geographical dis-
tribution of reserves. More reserves are procured in cheap TSO zones and
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less in expensive TSO zones. Reserves exchange increases supply efficiency
by decreasing the procurement costs.
Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to take into account the same
reserves to meet their reserve requirements resulting from reserve dimen-
sioning.5 A TSO in need of balancing energy can use this shared capacity,
if other TSOs do not. Reserves sharing leads to both supply efficiency and
dimensioning efficiency.
Second, the three degrees of cooperation in activation of balancing en-
ergy are autarky, imbalance netting and exchange. Imbalance netting avoids
counteracting activation of balancing energy in adjacent TSO zones. For
example, activating upward reserves in response to a negative imbalance in
one TSO zone, and separately activating downward reserves in response to
a positive imbalance in another TSO zone, is inefficient since counteracting
imbalances naturally net out on synchronous networks. A simple coordi-
nation of imbalances could avoid this inefficiency. Imbalance netting is a
constrained version of exchange of balancing energy.
Exchange of balancing energy is a further degree of cooperation in
activation of balancing capacity. It implies that cooperating TSOs construct
a common merit order of balancing energy bids and select the least-cost
activation that meets the net imbalance of the joint TSO zone.6 Imbalance
netting and exchange of balancing capacity increase supply efficiency by
decreasing the activation costs.
IV.2.2 Examples of cross-border balancing
Balancing and reserve cooperation between TSOs is still in its infancy. How-
ever, a few examples of successful cooperation exist in Europe and the United
States:
In Europe, ENTSO-E is reviewing a number of pilot projects with the
aim to test the feasibility of a multi-TSO cooperation on the cross border
procurement of reserve capacity and activation of balancing energy. First,
5In practice, reserves exchange and sharing is not limitless. Baldursson et al. (2016b)
summarize the limits on reserves exchange and sharing, as imposed by the EU guideline
on electricity transmission system operation (European Commission, 2016).
6Other market arrangements, like BSP-TSO and an additional voluntary pool, are also
possible (Doorman and Van der Veen, 2013).
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the International Grid Control Cooperation (IGCC) is a project of imbalance
netting of frequency restoration reserves (FRR) to avoid counteracting acti-
vation of balancing energy (Just and Weber, 2015). The IGCC was launched
in 2012 and currently consists of TSOs from Austria, Belgium, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Second, a
part of this group of countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands
and Switzerland) also jointly procure frequency containment reserves (FCR).
Third, the Trans-European Replacement Reserves Exchange (TERRE) is es-
tablished between UK, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Switzerland. The project aims to jointly activate replacement reserves
(ENTSO-E, 2016b; Neuhoff and Richstein, 2016). A fourth example of TSO
cooperation is the Regulating Power Market (RPM), which was established
in 2002 between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The RPM is a
common merit order of manual frequency restoration reserves (mFRR) acti-
vation. Since the Electricity Balancing guideline obligates European TSOs
to cooperate on imbalance netting, exchange of balancing services and shar-
ing of reserve capacity, within two to four years after its adoption (ENTSO-
E, 2014b, articles 13-20), the number of projects is expected to increase in
the future.
In the United States, a cross-border energy imbalance market (EIM)
was established between CAISO and PacifiCorp in November 2014. As of
2016 the cross-border EIM consists of five network operators and public
utilities in eight states. According to CAISO (2016), the current benefits of
the three main participants (CAISO, PacifiCorp and NV Energy) amounted
to $88.19 million between 2014Q4 and 2016Q2 and are expected to increase
even more in the future with an increased share of renewable generation.
IV.3 Benefits of cross-border reserves procurement
This section studies the benefits of cross-border procurement of reserve ca-
pacity. We derive analytical expressions for the optimal level of procured
reserves and study the associated cost decreases. Each degree of cross-border
cooperation is analysed: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing.
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IV.3.1 Model
This model studies two TSO zones i = 1,2 that can either not cooperate (au-
tarky), exchange reserves or share reserves. The need for reserves in TSO
zone i at a certain instant is denoted by a random variable ri [MW]. This is
the real-time imbalance between supply and demand due to a combination
of forecast errors of demand and intermittent supply, and failures of genera-
tion capacity or transmission components. We denote the joint probability
density function of the reserve needs by f(r1, r2) and the marginal density
functions of r1 and r2 by f1 and f2 respectively.7 The TSO’s variable of
choice is Ri [MW], the quantity of reserves procured for its own zone i. The
contracting period for the procurement of reserve capacity could be e.g. an
hour, a week, a month, or a year. In the model we only focus on procurement
of upward reserves. Negative reserve procurement is the mirror analysis and
its equations are similarly interpreted.
In this paper we are interested in efficiency gains from exchange or
sharing of reserve procurement, not efficient activation as such. Hence, the
model does not take reserves activation into consideration and we therefore
take marginal generation costs to be equal to zero. Costs of procuring Ri
of reserve capacity in TSO zone i, however, are not zero and are given by
γi(Ri), with γi increasing, smooth and convex.
Figure IV.2 summarizes the order of events. First the TSO at each node
i chooses how much reserve capacity Ri to procure. In case of exchange or
sharing of reserves, the procurement may entail payments between TSOs.
Next, in real time, the actual need for reserves ri is observed in each node
i. The procured reserves will be used to accommodate the reserve needs.
In case local reserves are insufficient, TSOs will use exchanged or shared
reserves, or, as a last resort, carry out load shedding. Last, settlement
payments - if any - are made.
7The joint probability density function f(r1, r2) will in general depend on the procure-
ment interval and the time to real-time operation.
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Figure IV.2: Order of events
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IV.3.2 Optimal autarkic TSO reserve provision
We first consider the case where there is no trade or exchange of reserves
between zones. Thus, each TSO zone operates as an isolated “island”. In
reality, network codes and guidelines stipulate the quantity of reserves each
TSO zone is required to procure.8 However, here we pursue an alterna-
tive approach by considering the first-best outcome within this setting, i.e.
where TSO i procures a quantity of reserves Ri such that expected social
surplus in Zone i is maximized.9 We assume the value of lost load (VOLL -
measured in e/MWh) is fixed at v and that electricity demand Di is price
inelastic and also valued at v. Hence, for a given level of reserve needs ri
and procured reserves Ri social surplus is given by consumer surplus net
of costs of interruptions (due to unserved demand) and costs of procuring
reserves,
Si = vDi − v [ri −Ri]+ − γi (Ri) . (4.1)
The TSO selects Ri to maximize E [Si] with respect to Ri
max
Ri
{vDi − v∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri)dri − γi (Ri)} (4.2)
Equivalently, since demand is inelastic, the TSO can minimize combined
costs of interruptions and reserves, i.e.
min
Ri
{v∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri)dri + γi (Ri)} . (4.3)
8Such an exogenous requirement is also standard in reliability management of the day-
ahead market, where the N-1 reliability criterion is used instead of balancing the costs of
reliability and interruptions (Ovaere and Proost, 2016).
9If the reserve requirements of network codes diverge from this first-best optimum (e.g.
due to imperfect information or socio-political constraints), costs are higher than in the
first-best.
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This is the approach we shall use henceforth.10
Differentiating (4.3) we derive the following first-order condition for the
optimal quantity of reserves Rai in autarky:
vPr{ri > Rai } = γ′i (Rai ) . (4.4)
The condition (4.4) is very intuitive: reserves should be procured up to the
point where the marginal cost of procurement (right-hand side) is equal to
the marginal expected cost of interruptions (left-hand side). The higher
the variance of the probability density function of reserve needs, i.e. the
higher the uncertainty, the more generation reserves need to be procured.
However, it is not efficient to procure reserve capacity for every possible
level of reserve needs. For those with a very low probability of occurrence,
it makes more sense to bear the cost of an interruption than to procure
additional reserve capacity. Optimal procurement increases with the VOLL
v. The second-order condition for minimum is easily seen to be satisfied.
IV.3.3 Reserves exchange
We now turn to the case of reserves exchange, which as explained earlier,
makes it possible to procure part of the required level of reserves in adjacent
TSO zones. We assume here that sufficient transmission capacity is available
to accommodate the flows arising from use of reserve capacity in adjacent
TSO zones and thus neglect any limits transmission capacity constraints
would place on reserves exchange (Van den Bergh et al., 2017). That is, there
is only load-shedding if ri > Ri, irrespective of where the reserve capacity
is procured. To make the setting non-vacuous we assume that procurement
costs are not symmetrical so there is a motive for reserves exchange.
This sections shows that exchange of reserves only leads to supply ef-
ficiency, not dimensioning efficiency. We study two variants of reserves ex-
change. First, that the required level of reserves in each TSO zone is the
same as in autarky (regulated reserve levels); and second, that it is adjusted
10Note that this minimization of procurement costs and expected interruption costs is
a classic vendor problem (Arrow et al., 1951), with respectively the cost of purchasing
stocks and the penalty for depleted stocks.
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in accordance with procurement prices of reserves exchange (locally optimal
reserve levels).
IV.3.3.1 Regulated reserves levels
Here we assume, in accordance with the EU guideline on electricity trans-
mission system operation (European Commission, 2016), that the required
level of reserves in each TSO zone is the same as in autarky, i.e. Rai .
In the first-best solution for this setting the two TSOs jointly minimise
total costs of procurement, subject to the constraint on reserves. That is,
the cheapest reserve capacity in the two TSO zones is procured first. This
amounts to the following constrained cost minimization
min
R1,R2
{γ1(R1) + γ2(R2)} s.t. R1 +R2 = Ra1 +Ra2. (4.5)
Note that Ri denotes the combined quantity of reserves procured in Zone i
by the two TSOs. The side constraint simply says that the overall quantity
of reserves procured has to equal the sum of the required reserve levels in the
two zones. This minimization problem is easily seen to lead to the following
set of equations: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ′1(R1) = γ′2(R2)
R1 +R2 = Ra1 +Ra2. (4.6)
That is, overall costs are lowest when the marginal cost of reserve procure-
ment is equal in the two TSO zones. Fig. IV.3 shows this cost minimization
graphically.
The axis runs from left to right for TSO zone 1 and from right to left for
TSO zone 2. The upward sloping lines are the marginal procurement costs in
Zone 1 and 2. Clearly, if costs are symmetrical in the two zones, then there
is no reason to exchange reserves and the optimal solution is for each TSO
to procure reserves within his own zone. If costs are asymmetrical, then
there is a rationale for exchange. The grey area in the figure represents the
reduction of procurement costs under the optimal procurement of reserves
as compared to the costs in autarky where exchange is not possible and each
zone supplies its own required reserves.
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Figure IV.3: Cost minimization under reserves exchange between two TSO zones
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IV.3.3.2 Locally optimal reserves levels
In the previous section we considered reserves exchange where required re-
serve levels were assumed to be given by regulation.11 Since the regulatory
levels in our model were set so as to match marginal costs of interruptions
and reserves, the resulting outcome after opening up for exchange is, how-
ever, no longer an optimum: marginal interruption costs no longer match
marginal costs of procuring reserves; it will be tempting to lower required
reserves in the cheaper zone, where marginal procurement costs have risen,
and raise them in the more expensive zone, where they have fallen.
So another scenario is possible when TSOs are allowed to adjust their
reserves levels in accordance with prices; this would seem likely to be the
tendency over the longer run.
Again, we begin by considering the first-best solution for the present
setting. This involves finding the jointly optimal reserve levels, viz. solving
min
R1,R2,Re1,R
e
1 s.t. R1+R2=Re1+Re2 {
2∑
i=1 v∫ ∞Rei [ri −Rei ] fi (ri)dri +
2∑
i=1γi (Ri)}
(4.7)
where Rj is the amount of reserves procured in Zone j (as before) and Rei
is the amount of reserves procured by TSO i.
11We assumed the regulation to hold TSOs to autarkic levels, even after exchange is
allowed, but in principle the regulation could be set at any arbitrary level.
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It is readily seen that the optimal solution in this case is determined by
the condition that all marginal costs be equal, both across zones and cost
types. In other words,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vPr{r1 > Re1} = vPr{r2 > Re2} = γ′1 (R1) = γ′2(R2)
R1 +R2 = Re1 +Re2. (4.8)
IV.3.4 Reserves sharing
Reserves sharing allows multiple TSOs to draw on the same reserves re-
sources to meet their required level of reserves when it comes to operation.
Recall that while exchange of reserves only leads to supply efficiency, re-
serves sharing leads to both supply efficiency and dimensioning efficiency.
As before, we assume that transmission capacity is sufficient to always ac-
commodate the flows arising from use of reserve capacity in adjacent TSO
zones. That is, there is only load-shedding if r1 + r2 > R1 +R2.
In our model, reserves sharing amounts to maximizing the surplus of
the two zones jointly, in effect uniting them.12 As before, since we take
demand to be inelastic, this is tantamount to minimizing expected costs of
interruptions and procurement:
min
Rs1,R
s
2
{v∫ ∞0 ∫ ∞Rs1+Rs2 [r1 + r2 −Rs1 −Rs2] f (r1, r2)dr1dr2 − γ1 (Rs1) − γ2 (Rs2)}
(4.9)
The optimal reserve capacities when reserves sharing is allowed, Rs1 and Rs2,
are determined from the following first-order conditions:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vPr{r1 + r2 > Rs1 +Rs2} = γ′1 (Rs1)
vPr{r1 + r2 > Rs1 +Rs2} = γ′2 (Rs1) (4.10)
which are derived by differentiation of (4.9) with respect to Rs1 and Rs2,
respectively. The first-order equations imply that marginal costs of reserves
procurement are equal to VOLL times the loss of load probability in the two
zones together. Clearly, this implies that marginal costs of procurement are
12As a simplification, we neglect any limits on reserves sharing, see Baldursson et al.
(2016b).
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equal at the optimal levels of procurement, γ′1(Rs1) = γ′2(Rs2). Hence, the
costs of reserves procurement are minimized as in reserves exchange, but for
different levels of reserves and, hence, also reliability.
IV.3.5 Efficiency of different degrees of cooperation
To compare the efficiency of the different degrees of cooperation, we need to
compute the total costs cj for each degree of cooperation j ∈ {a, e, l, s}. It
leads to the following proposition (with a formal proof in Appendix).
Proposition 6. Each step in the integration of zones results in progressively
lower expected socio-economic costs, i.e. ca ≥ ce ≥ cl ≥ cs.
Proof. Recall that for each degree of cooperation j ∈ {a, e, l, s}, Rji is the
optimal amount of reserves procured in Zone i and cj is the sum of procure-
ment costs and interruption costs in both TSO zones. By contrast, Ri is
the amount of reserves procured by TSO i. Equation (4.11) is the sum of
procurement costs and interruption costs with autarky. This minimization
determines Ra1 and Ra2. Adding an additional variable Re1 leads to equal
interruption costs and weakly lower procurement costs in equation (4.12).
The inequality is strict if Re1 ≠ Ra1 and Re2 ≠ Ra2. Adding even more vari-
ables to allow a trade off between procurement costs and interruption costs
causes equation (4.13) to be weakly lower than equation (4.12). Again the
inequality is strict if Re1 ≠ Ra1 and Re2 ≠ Ra2. To proof the last inequality, no-
tice that equation (4.13) equals equation (4.14) if the correlation of reserve
needs is one. If the correlation is lower than one, both procurement costs
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and interruption costs decrease.
ca = min
Ra1 ,R
a
2
{vE [r1 −Ra1]+ + vE [r2 −Ra2]+ + γ1(Ra1) + γ2(Ra2)} (4.11)
≥ ce = min
Re1
{vE [r1 −Ra1]+ + vE [r2 −Ra2]+ + γ1(Re1) + γ2(Ra1 +Ra2 −Re1)}
(4.12)≥ cl = min
Rl1,R1,R2
{vE [r1 −R1]+ + vE [r2 −R2]+ + γ1(Rl1) + γ2(R1 +R2 −Rl1)}
(4.13)
with R1 +R2 = Rl1 +Rl2≥ cs = min
Rs1,R
s
2
{vE [r1 + r2 −Rs1 −Rs2]+ + γ1(Rs1) + γ2(Rs2)} (4.14)
This can also be shown graphically. Figure IV.4 shows the socio-
economic costs for each degree of cross-border cooperation. The increas-
ing lines are the marginal procurement costs to reach a certain reliability
level ρ.13 As a result, the area below such a line is the total procurement
cost to reach reliability level ρ (dark grey area) and interruption costs are
v(1 − ρ) (light grey area). In aggregate, a higher degree of cooperation
leads to lower procurement costs to reach a certain reliability level, i.e.
γa(ρ¯) > γe(ρ¯) > γs(ρ¯). Figures IV.4a and IV.4b show that moving from
autarky to exchange with regulated reserve levels leads to lower procure-
ment costs but leaves interruption costs unchanged, because the reliability
level is held fixed. Proceeding to exchange with locally optimal reserve lev-
els (Figure IV.4c) increases procurement costs but less than the decreases
of interruption costs. This analysis also shows that moving from autarky
to locally optimal exchange has an ambiguous effect on procurement costs
because the cost increase of a higher reliability level can exceed the cost
decrease of reserves exchange. The cost decrease depends on the cost asym-
metry between procurement costs in both TSO zones. Last, reserves sharing
13Reliability ρ ∈ [0,1] can be defined in multiple ways. For example, ρ = 1 − LOLP,
where the loss of load probability (LOLP) is the probability of being in a state of the
world where some load shedding is needed; or ρ = fraction of total demanded load [MWh]
that is supplied to consumers.
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(Figure IV.4d) leads to an even higher reliability level and thus interruption
costs decrease. As before, its effect on procurement costs is ambiguous and
depends on the correlation of reserve needs in TSO zones. The next section
presents a numerical illustration of the benefits of cross-border cooperation
and studies the comparative statics of the main parameters.
Figure IV.4: Degrees of cooperation: cost efficiency and reliability level.
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IV.3.6 Numerical illustration and comparative statics
The benefits of cross-border exchange and sharing of reserve capacity de-
pend on two parameters: the difference in procurement cost in both TSO
zones (c1 and c2) and the correlation of reserve needs between TSO zones
(ξ = corr(r1, r2)). Supply efficiency increases if procurement costs are more
asymmetric and dimensioning efficiency increases if reserve needs are less
correlated. Figure IV.5 plots the sum of interruption costs and procurement
costs with reserves exchange and sharing, relative to the costs in autarky,
and shows that the benefits of exchange increase with cost asymmetry (c1/c2)
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and that the benefits of sharing increase with decreasing reserve need cor-
relation ξ.14
Figure IV.5: Relative cost of reserves exchange and reserves sharing, as a function
of the cost asymmetry (c1/c2) and the reserve needs correlation (ξ).
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Figure IV.5 illustrates several issues. First, when the two TSO zones
have identical procurement costs, no cost arbitrage is possible and exchange
of reserve does not yield any cost reduction. However, reserves sharing leads
to a lower reserve need and thus a lower cost. Second, when the cost of re-
serve procurement differs between TSO zones, reserves exchange does yield a
cost reduction. For example, when the cost of reserve procurement is higher
in TSO zone 1, TSO 1 procures part of its reserve obligation with reserve
capacity providers in TSO zone 2. Third, the cost reduction decreases when
the reserve needs in the two TSO zones are more correlated. When the re-
serve needs are fully correlated, reserves sharing yields almost no additional
14The probability density functions of reserve needs are jointly normal with correlation
ξ, each with a mean of 0 MW and a variance of 100 MW: N(0,100). The cost of reserve
procurement in Zone i is γi(Ri) = ciR2i , with c1 = c2 = 1 at c1/c2 = 1. The VOLL is 10,000
e/MWh.
116
CHAPTER IV. EXCHANGE AND SHARING OF RESERVES
cost reduction compared to reserves exchange.
Figure IV.5 also illustrates that the cost reduction increases when re-
serve procurement costs become more asymmetric and reserve needs are less
correlated. With low cost asymmetry and low correlation, reserves sharing
yields the major part of the cost reduction, while with high cost asymme-
try and a high correlation, reserves exchange yields the major part of the
cost reduction. With symmetric costs and high correlation, cross-border
cooperation in reserves yields very little cost reduction.
Table IV.2 analyses in detail the reserves, total procurement costs and
total interruption costs for the values used in Figure IV.5, with c1 = 2 and
c2 = 1. The table shows that sharing reduces the total amount of procured re-
serves and decreases interruption costs (increases the reliability level). Note
that sharing with correlation ξ = 1 is equal to exchange with locally optimal
reserves.
Table IV.2: Reserves and costs in Zone 1 and 2: c1 = 2, c2 = 1 (PC = procurement
cost, IC = interruption cost).
R1 R2 R1+R2
Relative
reserves
PC IC Total
costs
Relative
costs
Autarky 23 26 49 100% 1763 479 2242 100%
Exchange 16 33 49 100% 1611 479 2090 93.2%
Sharing ξ = 1 17 33 50 100.8% 1638 429 2067 92.2%
Sharing ξ = 0.5 15 29 44 88.9% 1273 324 1597 71.2%
Sharing ξ = 0 12 24 36 74.4% 891 217 1108 49.4%
In addition to cost asymmetry and the reserve needs correlation, three
other parameters influence relative costs of reserves exchange and sharing:
VOLL (v), procurement costs, and the relative size of the TSO zones. Table
IV.3 compares the relative cost of the base case with a case with higher
VOLL, a case with higher procurement costs, and a case where countries
differ in size. First, the relative gains of cooperation increase with increasing
VOLL, since both the gains of decreased interruption costs and decreased
procurement costs are higher. Second, higher procurement costs decrease
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the relative gains of cooperation. Third, if the TSO zones differ in size15 the
relative gains of cooperation decrease.
Table IV.3: Sensitivity of relative costs [%].
BASE v = 10vb ci = 10ci,b σ2 = 6σb
Exchange 93.2 92 95.5 96.7
Sharing ξ = 1 92.2 91.2 94.0 96.1
Sharing ξ = 0.5 71.2 69.9 73.9 85.4
Sharing ξ = 0 49.4 48.0 52.4 74.6
IV.4 Estimation of the efficiency gain of cross-
border procurement
While the previous section presented a small numerical illustration to show
the effect of reserve needs correlation and asymmetry of procurement costs,
this section estimates the possible efficiency gain of cross-border procure-
ment of generation reserve capacity between Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Our estimation differs from earlier
studies (see the introduction), because it is not based on simulation but
based on actual market data. To our knowledge, the only exception is
(Vandezande et al., 2009) who estimate the decreased cost of a Belgium-
Netherlands cross-border balancing market in 2008. Our study, however,
estimates the decreased cost of cross-border exchange and sharing of gen-
eration reserve capacity for 2015-2016 in different subsets of Central West
Europe (CWE) and Iberia.
15The relationship between the size of a TSO zone and its reserve need standard devia-
tion σ is not linear because larger countries already internalize their imbalance variability.
If the correlation of reserve needs between regions of a TSO zone 1 is ξ1 and this zone
is 2n times larger than an adjacent TSO zone 2, then σ1 = (√2(1 + ξ))nσ2. If ξ1 = 0.65,
σ1 = 6σ2.
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IV.4.1 Data
We use price and quantity data of aFRR procurement in Belgium, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. These data are publicly
available on the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform16 since the end of 2014.
For each considered country i and for each time instant t, these consist of
a price pit [e/MWh] and procured capacity Rit [MW]. The granularity of
time instants goes from hourly (Portugal and Spain) to yearly (France).
In Belgium, France and the Netherlands, only the average price of reserve
procurement is reported, while Germany, Portugal and Spain report the
marginal price of the procurement auction. The price and quantity data
are complemented with imbalance data rit [MWh], which has a granularity
between 15 minutes and 1 hour. Table IV.4 summarizes the imbalance
and procurement data in the considered European countries. The complete
dataset consists of 731*6*24 values of r, p and R.
Table IV.4: Summary of available imbalance and procurement data in considered
European countries (Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform).
rt Rt Since Price
Belgium 15’ weekly 01.08.2016 average
monthly 01.01.2015 average
France 30’ yearly 01.01.2015 average
Germany 15’ weekly 27.06.2011 marginal
Netherlands 15’ monthly 01.01.2016 average
yearly 01.01.2015 average
Portugal 60’ hourly 13.12.2014 marginal
Spain 60’ hourly 12.12.2014 marginal
We only focus on data for procurement of positive reserves. As prices,
procured capacities and imbalances are similar for negative reserves, our
estimation of efficiency gains for positive reserves is in the same ballpark as
the efficiency gains for negative reserves.
Table IV.5 presents summary statistics of the procurement and imbal-
16German data comes from www.regelleistung.net, where marginal data are available.
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ance data. For both 2015 and 2016, this table reports the minimum, maxi-
mum and average price and quantity. For example, the first row shows that
in Belgium the marginal price of procurement17 is between 17.3 e/MWh and
34 e/MWh, with an average of 23.4 e/MWh. The procured aFRR capacity
is between 140 MW and 148 MW, with an average of 141 MW. Germany
procures by far the largest amount of aFRR capacity, while Belgium, the
Netherlands and Portugal procure the smallest amount of aFFR capacity.
Average prices are lowest in Germany and highest in the Netherlands (2015)
and Belgium (2016). The last column reports the positive imbalance value
r+ [MW] that is not surpassed in 99.5% of hours. In most countries, reg-
ulation requires that procured generation reserve capacity is sufficient to
cover the imbalance in 99% of the time.18 This column shows that Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands procure sufficient capacity in auctions, while
France, Portugal and Spain procure less than required. This does not mean
that the latter countries procure insufficient capacity in total (e.g. over the
counter). Section IV.4.2 explains how we deal we this in our estimation.
Table IV.5: Summary of aFRR procurement data in considered European coun-
tries (Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform).
[e/MW/h] and [MW] Year pmin pmax pav Rmin Rmax Rav r+99.5%
Belgium
2015 17.3 34 23.4 140 148 141 108
2016 15.4 87.7 26.8 140 150 142 114
France
2015 18.3 18.3 18.3 500 1177 647 1176
2016 18.4 18.4 18.4 500 1100 639 1359
Germany
2015 2.58 24.1 7.2 2026 2500 2070 1739
2016 1.88 24.1 5.6 1973 2500 2014 1541
Netherlands
2015 27.4 27.4 27.4 300 300 300 189
2016 21.3 14.1 17.8 170 170 170 108
Portugal
2015 5 61.4 20.5 66 322 171 1228
2016 4 80.1 16.6 56 333 173 1577
Spain
2015 2.1 121 19.6 467 913 685 3846
2016 0.76 200 15.6 399 927 682 2447
17See section IV.4.2 that deals with the calculation methodology.
18See (ENTSO-E, 2013, 46(h)).
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In addition to the summary statistics of Table IV.5, Figure IV.6 shows
the marginal prices of aFRR in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands
and Spain for all hours of 01.01.2015 to 31.12.2016. Portuguese prices are
not shown because they are close to the prices in Spain.19 As the hourly data
of Germany and Spain is volatile, we report their 24-hour moving average.
The prices in France are almost constant throughout the assessed period,
while the prices in the Netherlands are constant and above French prices in
2015 but decrease in 2016. This figure also shows that, except for Germany,
prices cross constantly. As a result, no single country is the most expensive
at all times. In Germany, prices are almost consistently lower than in the
other five countries.
Figure IV.6: Marginal price of aFRR in Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands and Spain (01.01.2015-31.12.2016)
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19Prices in Portugal and Spain have correlation coefficient of 0.7 for 2015-2016.
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Table IV.6 presents the correlation coefficients between imbalances in
the six considered countries. These values are statistically different from
zero at the 0.001% level, except for the correlation between Portugal and
Germany. However, none of these country-pairs has a high positive correla-
tion, so significant efficiency gains of reserves sharing are possible.
Table IV.6: Correlation coefficients between imbalances in the six considered
countries (aFRR).
France Netherlands Germany Portugal Spain Belgium
France 1
Netherlands -0.122 1
Germany 0.016 -0.035 1
Portugal -0.016 -0.054 0.005 1
Spain 0.034 -0.032 0.112 0.040 1
Belgium -0.038 0.060 -0.051 0.029 0.018 1
IV.4.2 Methodology
First of all, we need to make an assumption on the functional form of the
supply curves of generation reserves. Our only available information is the
price-quantity pair for each of the 17544 hours for each country. Figure IV.7
plots these points for Germany, Spain, Belgium and Portugal. These plots
clearly show that the supply curve is not constant throughout the period.
Therefore, as there is only one price-quantity pair for each hour, we assume
that the supply curve is a linear curve between the origin and (Rit, pit).
That is, for each considered country, the supply curve is different for each
hour. For each hour t, the slope of the linear supply curve of country i is:
bit = pit
Rit
(4.15)
Secondly, in our dataset some countries report the average price while
others the marginal price. As we assume supply to be linear, marginal prices
are assumed to be twice the average price.
Thirdly, as before, we do not focus on transmission capacity and assume
that it never constraints cross-border cooperation.
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Figure IV.7: Scatterplot of procurement price and quantity for Germany, Spain,
Belgium and Portugal (01.01.2015-31.12.2016).
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IV.4.2.1 Reserves exchange
The efficiency gains of exchange of reserve capacity can be calculated using
equation (4.6) in the case of two countries. Figure IV.8 shows their supply
curves and the efficiency gain is represented by the gray area. Generalizing
this to exchange of generation reserve capacity between n countries, the
common marginal price of procurement pnew for each hour t is:
pnew =
n∏
i=1 bi
n∑
i=1
n∏
j≠i bj
n∑
i=1Ri with bi = piRi (4.16)
Figure IV.8: The efficiency gain of reserves exchange between two countries
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As the supply slopes are assumed to be linear, the corresponding ef-
ficiency gain E from cross-border exchange of generation reserve capacity
is:
E = 0.5( n∑
i=1Ripi − pnew
n∑
i=1Ri) (4.17)
In addition, as ENTSO-E (2014b) imposes that minimally 50% of re-
quired aFRR should be in the own country (Baldursson et al., 2016b), we
also estimate the above efficiency gains with an additional constraint on
allowed exchanged capacity.
We estimate the above equations for each hour separately, which means
that the amount of exchanged capacities differs every hour. The total
amount of generation, however, is still constant.
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IV.4.2.2 Reserves sharing
The gains from sharing of generation reserve capacity between n countries
are calculated using the following expression:
vPr{ n∑
i=1 ri >
n∑
i=1Rsi} = pnew (4.18)
where pnew is calculated from (4.16). The cumulative distribution function
of aggregate imbalances in n countries is estimated based on the imbalance
data rit of 2015-2016. We see in the data that the probability distribution
function of imbalances is a symmetrical bell-shaped curve with mean slightly
above zero and fatter tails than the normal distribution.20
Again, we estimate the equation for each hour separately, which means
that the total procured reserve capacity differs every hour, depending on
pnew.21 The higher this price, the lower the procured reserve capacity.
As for reserves exchange, we assume the limits on reserves sharing
imposed by (ENTSO-E, 2014b). They state that the amount of procured
reserve capacity can not decrease more than 30%, compared to autarky.
The efficiency gain E from cross-border sharing of generation reserve
capacity is also calculated from equation (4.17).
As noted before, Table IV.5 showed that the procured aFRR capacity is
considerably below imbalances in France, Portugal and Spain, because part
of the aFRR capacity is procured outside of the auction. To take this into
account, the imbalance data is scaled down such that the margin between
r∗99.5% and Rav is the same as for Germany. In this way, we only estimate
the possible efficiency gains of the 2015-2016 procurement auctions.
IV.4.3 Results
To make easy comparison possible, the calculations are done separately for
2015 and 2016.
20In reality, obviously, it is estimated based on historical data, but since only little
imbalance data prior to 2015 is available on the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform, we use
2015-2016 data. This should not greatly influence our estimation results.
21To simplify the procurement auction in reality, TSOs might choose
n∑
i=1Rsi for a longer
period, which decreases the efficiency gain.
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IV.4.3.1 Efficiency gain for reserves exchange
Table IV.7 presents the efficiency gains [million e per year] of reserves
exchange between different sets of countries. The second and third col-
umn present results for 2015, while the last two columns present results
for 2016. This estimation of the efficiency gain is only for procurement
of positive aFRR, not activation. Results for the procurement of negative
aFRR are in the same ballpark. Also note that we only focus on the de-
creased cost of procurement. The change of interruption costs (see section
IV.3.6) is not assessed. Table IV.7 reports for 2015 efficiency gains of two-
country reserves exchange between less than e1 million (Belgium-France
and Belgium-Netherlands) and e19 million (France-Germany). Efficiency
gains are higher for 2016, except for Germany-Netherlands. Limits on re-
serves exchange only considerably alter the results for France-Germany and
Germany-Netherlands. The efficiency gains increase when more countries
are cooperating. Note that the gain of a set of countries is always higher
than the sum of all the two-country efficiency gains included in this set.
The yearly gains of reserves exchange between Belgium, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain exceed e60 million per year.
Table IV.7: Efficiency gains [Me] from exchange of aFRR for different sets of
countries.
[Me] 2015 2016
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Belgium-France 0.88 0.88 2.89 2.77
Belgium-Netherlands 0.70 0.70 2.73 2.69
Belgium-Germany 7.13 6.36 10.59 9.02
France-Germany 18.94 17.88 24.37 22.32
France-Spain 2.12 2.10 3.48 3.40
Germany-Netherlands 7.17 5.98 2.20 1.89
Portugal-Spain 1.61 1.60 1.88 1.85
France-Portugal-Spain 7.63 7.6 11.19 11.03
Belgium-France-Netherlands 3.58 3.58 3.24 3.11
Belgium-France-Germany-Netherlands 42.40 39.65 39.42 36.04
Belgium-France-Germany-...
Netherlands-Portugal-Spain
67.8 64.3 63.06 58.01
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IV.4.3.2 Efficiency gain for reserves sharing
Table IV.8 presents the efficiency gains [million e per year] of reserves shar-
ing between different sets of countries. As proven in section IV.3, these
are larger than the gains of exchange if the imbalance correlation is below
one. Table IV.8 shows that the efficiency gains of sharing are a multiple
of these of exchange, which could be explained by the fact that the im-
balance correlations are around zero. Table IV.8 reports yearly efficiency
gains of two-country reserves sharing between about e10 million (Portugal-
Spain) and e75 million (France-Germany). Limits on reserves exchange only
considerably alter the results for Belgium-Netherlands, France-Spain and
Portugal-Spain. The gains of reserves exchange between Belgium, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain exceed e175 million in 2015 and
e150 million in 2016. Note that this efficiency gain is estimated relative to
procurement costs in case of optimal reserves procurement in autarky, i.e.
according to equation (4.4). As the procured reserve capacity is not nec-
essarily optimal in our data, the change of procurement costs from sharing
will be different when compared to current procurement costs.
Table IV.8: Efficiency gains [Me] from sharing of aFRR for different sets of coun-
tries.
[Me] 2015 2016
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Belgium-France 17.23 17.12 21.12 21.10
Belgium-Netherlands 16.63 10.33 13.31 11.37
Belgium-Germany 14.39 14.39 15.05 15.05
France-Germany 60.71 60.71 75.40 75.33
France-Spain 54.61 53.98 61.85 59.37
Germany-Netherlands 24.21 24.21 11.80 11.80
Portugal-Spain 10.58 10.56 9.76 8.96
France-Portugal-Spain 66.12 64.17 71.92 67.52
Belgium-France-Netherlands 43.18 42.22 39.57 39.40
Belgium-France-Germany-Netherlands 98.80 98.46 101.04 100.69
Belgium-France-Germany-...
Netherlands-Portugal-Spain
175.70 173.93 150.68 137.93
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IV.5 Implementation of cross-border reserves pro-
curement
Whenever TSOs start exchanging and sharing reserves, there are gains and
distributional effects. This section first analyses how the benefits of coopera-
tion are distributed. Next, we study what institutions improve the incentive
for cooperation.
We consider first the autarkic TSO case. In this case, each TSO can
implement a market mechanism to minimize the procurement costs of the
reserves required. Next we discuss the distributional effects of reserves ex-
change via a uniform-price auction. These effects can be negative for one
of the parties so that compensation mechanisms need to be put in place to
guarantee cooperation. We develop a Nash bargaining game to study the
compensation necessary for TSOs to agree an exchange of reserves. This
game can be defined for regulated reliability levels as well as for optimized
reliability levels.
IV.5.1 Optimal autarkic TSO reserve provision
The analysis of the previous section is based on the premise that the TSO
(in lieu of a social planner) has direct control of the available reserves. In a
market-based system this is not the case and the reserves have to be procured
by some market mechanism. Here we assume a uniform-price auction with
the resulting price pi.22 The TSO now determines the level of reserves Ri
that minimizes the cost of procurement and the cost of interruptions:
min
Ri
{v∫ ∞
Ri
[ri −Ri] fi (ri)dri + paiRi} , (4.19)
This results in the first-order condition for the optimal level of reserves.
vPr{ri > Ri} = pai . (4.20)
Generation firms supply the reserves. We assume they do not exercise mar-
ket power and take prices as given, so generators will bid up to the point
22Some TSO zones use pay-as-bid clearing but this is considered to be less preferable
(Neuhoff and Richstein, 2016).
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where marginal procurement costs equal the reserves price, i.e. where
γ′i (Ri) = pai . (4.21)
The market equilibrium is determined by (4.20) and (4.21). Clearly, equa-
tion (4.4) follows from these two conditions so the market equilibrium coin-
cides with the first-best level of reserves in autarky. In a market implemen-
tation the resulting reserves price is pai .
IV.5.2 Reserves exchange
IV.5.2.1 Regulated reserves levels without inter-TSO compensa-
tion
Now suppose we are in a more realistic setting where, instead of a joint
minimization of costs, each TSO minimizes its own costs, subject to the
constraint that regulatory reserve levels must be met. As in the autarkic
setting, we assume reserves in each TSO zone are procured by a uniform-
price auction and, moreover, that these auctions are run simultaneously.
Since exchange is unfettered, prices and marginal procurement costs will be
equal in the two zones, i.e.
pe = γ′1(R1) = γ′2(R2), (4.22)
where pe denotes the price of reserves in exchange, common to the two
zones. Comparing (4.22) to (4.6), since each TSO will procure the level of
reserves required by regulation, it is clear that the market solution achieves
the cost-minimizing outcome.
IV.5.2.2 Inter-TSO transfers to guarantee cooperation
In a transition from autarky to exchange, the reserves price will rise in the
cheap zone where marginal procurement costs are lower in autarky than
in exchange, and fall in the expensive zone where these costs are higher.
Hence, the TSO in the cheap zone will not have an incentive to participate
in joint procurement auctions without compensation. Figure IV.9 shows this
situation, with Zone 1 being the cheaper and Zone 2 the more expensive.
The financial gain of TSO 2 corresponds to area C+D, whereas the loss of
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TSO 1 corresponds to area A. TSO 1 can compensate TSO 2 for his loss
and retain some surplus provided C +D > A.
Figure IV.9: Cost minimization under reserves exchange between two TSO zones.
Area A indicates the procurement cost increase of TSO 1; area C+D
indicates the procurement cost decrease of TSO 2.
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If the cross-border reserves procurement is organized via a uniform-
price auction, we need transfers between the TSOs to guarantee cooperation.
We will analyse the situation where there are lump-sum transfers.23 In
principle, there are infinitely many solutions to the bargaining game between
the two TSOs, as long as a bargaining solution is feasible. Here we use
the approach of the Nash bargaining game (Nash, 1953; Binmore et al.,
1986) and assume that the autarkic solution is the fallback for both TSOs.
Assuming consumers are compensated for interruptions, total costs for TSO
i in autarky are Cai = paiRai + Li, where Li = v ∫ ∞Ri [ri −Rai ] fi (ri)dri are
expected interruption costs.24 We denote the lump-sum side payment from
TSO 2 to TSO 1 by x. Similar to (Kolstad, 2005), the side payment can be
interpreted as a measure of difficulty to make an agreement.
With exchange the TSOs have the following costs:
Ce1 = peRa1 +L1 + x
23Another possibility is a distortionary tax on import or export.
24Since required reserve levels are the same as in autarky it is in fact irrelevant whether
consumers receive compensation. This is no longer the case when reserve levels are allowed
to adjust to changed marginal reserve procurement costs.
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Ce2 = peRa2 +L2 − x
Assuming equal bargaining power of the two TSOs the Nash product is given
by
N = [(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + x] [(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − x] (4.23)
and the first-order condition for maximum with respect to x turns out to be
x∗ = 1
2
[((pa2 − pe)Ra2 − (pa1 − pe)Ra1)] . (4.24)
That is, the transfer is 0.5(A + C +D). The drop in costs for TSO i,
going from autarky to exchange with bargaining and side payment is seen
to be
Cai −Cei = 12 [((pa2 − pe)Ra2 − (pe − pa1)Ra1)] (4.25)
The right-hand side of (4.25) is half the net financial surplus resulting from
reserves exchange (C + D - A). If one TSO has a stronger bargaining po-
sition than the other this result would not be reached. In this case the
stronger TSO would gain more of the surplus. The basic result that a pos-
itive financial surplus is necessary for a bargaining solution to be feasible
would, however, clearly still hold.
The analysis above assumes that a TSO only cares about its procure-
ment costs. In reality, however, a TSO is also concerned about social wel-
fare in its zone. In part because increased costs of reserves procurement are
charged to consumers through network tariffs, and therefore do not affect
TSO profits. Including this welfare concern into the TSO utility function
increases the willingness to cooperate. Suppose that a TSO has a preference
α ∈ [0,1] for social welfare (SW) and (1 − α) for a decrease of procurement
costs (PC). It favours cooperation if:
∆Ui = α∆SWi − (1 − α)∆PCi ≥ 0 (4.26)
With a lump sum transfer y the TSOs have the following changes of
utility:
∆U1 = α∆SW1 + (1 − α)(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + y (4.27)
∆U2 = α∆SW2 + (1 − α)(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − y (4.28)
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where ∆SW1 equals area B and ∆SW2 equals area C in Figure IV.9. As-
suming equal bargaining power of the two TSOs the Nash product is given
by
N = [α∆SW1 + (1 − α)(pa1 − pe)Ra1 + y] [α∆SW2 + (1 − α)(pa2 − pe)Ra2 − y]
(4.29)
and the first-order condition for maximum with respect to y turns out to be
y∗ = (1 − α)x∗ + α∆SW2 −∆SW1
2
(4.30)
That is, if a TSO also cares about social welfare in its zone, the lump sum
transfer is lower, which is an indication that voluntary cooperation is easier
(Kolstad, 2005).
Proposition 7. If a TSO, in addition to procurement costs, also cares about
social welfare in its zone, the lump sum transfer needed for cooperation is
lower: If α > 0, y∗ < x∗.
Proof. If α > 0, y∗ < x∗⇔ ∆SW2−∆SW12 < x∗, where ∆SW2−∆SW12 = 0.5(C−B)
and x∗ = 0.5 [((pa2 − pe)Ra2 − (pa1 − pe)Ra1)] = 0.5(D + C + A). Therefore
y∗ < x∗⇔ A +B +D > 0. Since areas A, B and D are positive, y∗ < x∗.
In Europe, the Electricity Balancing guideline obligates TSOs to co-
operate on balancing and reserves procurement. Therefore, TSOs will co-
operate even without an incentive to do so. However, in regions without
an obligation to cooperate, cost-reducing cross-border cooperation will only
materialize if all TSOs reap the benefits of cooperation. This can be ensured
with side payments, which can be both the explicit value of our analysis (as
in the inter-TSO compensation mechanism) or more implicitly (e.g. distor-
tionary import tariffs or transaction costs to join the cross-border coopera-
tion platform).
IV.5.2.3 Locally optimal reserves levels
In the case of locally optimal reserve levels, not only costs of reserves, but
also expected consumer interruption costs will change. Hence, the feasibility
of a bargaining solution and side payments will be affected. Basic insights,
however, remain the same as in the previous case.
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IV.5.3 Reserves sharing
As in the case of reserves exchange there are, in general, distributional con-
sequences of reserves sharing that may make one zone better off and the
other worse off, both as regards procurement costs and expected interrup-
tions.25 Similar to reserves exchange, for incentive compatibility of sharing
there will be a minimal side payment from the zone that gains the most to
the one that is worse off and a bargaining outcome can be predicted using
the Nash bargaining solution. If there is sufficiently low correlation in re-
serve needs between the two zones, it is, however, possible that the gains
from lower interruption costs due to integration outweigh any rise in reserves
procurement costs. An extreme example of this is when the two zones have
perfectly negatively correlated reserve needs. In this case reserve sharing
eliminates any needs for reserve procurement! This is, however, unlikely to
be the case in real situations.
IV.6 Conclusions
This paper compares three degrees of TSO cooperation in generation re-
serves provision: autarky, reserves exchange and reserves sharing. We derive
analytically the optimal procurement of reserves in each of the three cases
and show that costs decrease with cooperation. The benefits of reserves
exchange and reserves sharing depend on cost asymmetry and correlation
of real-time imbalance variability between cooperating TSO zones. That
is, when TSO zones have highly asymmetric reserve procurement costs but
highly correlated reserve needs, reserves exchange already yields a high cost
reduction. When TSO zones have fairly equal reserve procurement costs but
a low degree of reserve needs correlation, reserves sharing is needed to reap
the full benefits of TSO reserves cooperation.
25With reserves sharing, assigning procurement costs to TSOs is ambiguous since the
decrease depends on the correlation of reserve needs between the TSO zones. In addition,
expected interruption costs in each TSO zone depend on how interruptions are shared.
For example, if interruptions are shared in equal proportions, the distribution of expected
interruption cost is different than if the reserves-providing TSO has priority over the
reserves-receiving TSO.
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Based on actual 2015-2016 market data of reserves procurement of au-
tomatic frequency restoration reserves in Belgium, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, we estimate the efficiency gains of ex-
change and sharing for different subsets of these countries. Cross-border
cooperation in these six countries leads to around e60 million per year for
exchange and around e150 million per year for sharing.
Our model also shows that cross-border reserves cooperation has dis-
tributional effects on TSOs. Some TSOs may even experience an increase
of procurement costs, so that voluntary cross-border cooperation requires
transfers. We derive the side payments that are needed to induce cooper-
ation and show that cooperation is easier when TSOs care not only about
their own costs but also care about social welfare in their zone.
In this paper we focused on the changes of procurement and interrup-
tion costs generated by more efficient supply. The true benefits of cross-
border cooperation can be higher than presented in our model because of
improved market liquidity, internalisation of external effects, and increased
market access through standardization of rules and products. In addition,
TSOs that are first to cooperate can define the rules and standards of coop-
eration and have therefore lower transaction and compliance costs.
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Chapter V
How Detailed Value of Lost
Load Data Impact Power
System Reliability Decisions:
A Trade-off between
Efficiency and Equity
V.1 Introduction
Electricity is the backbone of modern society: we want electricity to be
available at all times. However, blackouts and interruptions of electricity
consumers occur, because of component outages and uncertainty of demand
and intermittent supply. Preventing this requires a more redundant, and
thus costly, power system. To keep costs under control, national regulators
and transmission system operators (TSOs) aim for an adequate level of
reliability (NERC, 2007). That is, a reliability level that balances the costs
of reaching a reliability level and the costs of electricity interruptions.
The cost of electricity interruptions is strongly determined by the inter-
ruption duration and the value of lost load (VOLL). VOLL is a parameter
representing the cost of unserved electricity and is generally expressed in
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monetary units per kWh or MWh. It is an essential parameter to determine
the optimal reliability level of a power system. VOLL is used in many appli-
cations such as load curtailment contracts (Joskow and Tirole, 2007), net-
work investment decisions (Electricity Authority, 2013), cost-benefit anal-
yses, quality incentive schemes of transmission and distribution networks1,
energy legislation, and reliability standards2 (Munasinghe and Gellerson,
1979). Most of these applications simplify the VOLL to a single, constant
value.
Precise knowledge of VOLL is paramount to make correct reliability
decisions. Various studies have estimated VOLL for different countries and
for different interruption characteristics, such as interruption duration, time
of interruption, interrupted consumer, location and advance notification.
Better-informed reliability decisions are possible by using these detailed
VOLL data. Because they provide more information about the benefits
of reliability management, they ensure a better balance between the costs
and benefits.
The most advanced use of detailed VOLL data to date is the Norwe-
gian cost of energy not supplied (CENS) regulation. In the CENS regulation,
TSO and DSO revenue caps depend on the interruption costs in their area.
Interruption costs are calculated for different consumer groups, and both
the time and duration of interruptions have an effect on interruption costs
(Kjolle et al., 2008). The CENS quality regulation is expected to give net-
work operators better incentives to achieve an optimal reliability level. For
example, to provide a higher level of reliability to high-VOLL consumers
or at high-VOLL moments – e.g. by taking more conservative operating
decisions or speeding up restoration times. In the Italian quality regulation
of distribution networks, VOLL of residential consumers is set at 10,800
e/MWh, while VOLL of non-residential consumers is set at 21,600 e/MWh
(Cambini et al., 2016). Interruptions of non-domestic consumers are thus
more costly and therefore network operators have an incentive to provide
1In such schemes, a network operator’s allowed revenue depends in part on its reliability
level. For TSOs, France uses a VOLL of 12,000 e/MWh and Italy a VOLL of 15,000
e/MWh (CEER, 2011).
2In Great Britain, a loss of load expectation (LOLE) of 3 hours per year corresponds
to a VOLL of 17,000 £/MWh (Newbery and Grubb, 2014).
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them a higher level of reliability. However, apart from being used in relia-
bility incentive schemes, available detailed VOLL data are not widely used
in reliability decision making.
This paper is the first to assess the impact of using different degrees
of VOLL detail in reliability management. We develop a theoretical model
that shows the efficiency gains – defined as the (relative) cost decrease –
of using a VOLL that differs over time and between consumers. Realizing
the full efficiency potential of consumer-differentiated VOLL depends on the
technological curtailment possibilities. We make a distinction between per-
fect curtailment (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976), random curtailment (Chao,
1983), and spatial curtailment – an intermediate option where a network
operator curtails load in regions depending on their VOLL. The theoretical
model is illustrated using a numerical example that focuses on expected to-
tal system cost of TSOs’ operational planning and system operation using
different levels of VOLL detail. In addition we study the impact of VOLL
differentiation on specific consumer groups, with a focus on equity and social
acceptance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section V.2 surveys the growing lit-
erature that estimates VOLL as a function of different interruption charac-
teristics for different countries. VOLL data of Norway, Great Britain and the
United States are discussed in more detail. Section V.3 studies analytically
the efficiency gains of using a VOLL that differs over time and between con-
sumers. Section V.4 expands this analysis to a five-node illustrative network
with realistic assumptions on network data, generation plants, intermittent
generation, failure probabilities, demand, and demand uncertainty. Section
V.5 discusses the results and policy implications. Section V.6 concludes.
V.2 Literature review of detailed VOLL data
VOLL depends on many factors (de Nooij et al., 2009):
• Interruption time: season, day of the week, time of the day;
• Interrupted consumers: residential, commercial, industrial, public;
• Interruption duration;
• Weather at the time of interruption;
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• Number of consumers affected;
• Current reliability level;
• Advance notification of the interruption;
• Mitigating measures.
Various empirical studies have estimated VOLL as a function of these dif-
ferent factors. In this section we survey these detailed VOLL studies. We
restrict ourselves to studies published since 2007 that estimate the effect on
VOLL of at least two interruption characteristics. Table V.1 lists 13 studies
and shows the level of VOLL detail for each study.
The table shows that almost all studies estimate VOLL for different
consumer types. Some estimate as much as 15 consumer types (Growitsch
et al., 2013; Reichl et al., 2013; Linares and Rey, 2013; Zachariadis and
Poullikkas, 2012), while others estimate only two or three (Sullivan et al.,
2009; Electricity Authority, 2013; London Economics, 2013). Many studies
also include the influence of the interruption time on VOLL. Most of them
distinguish between time of the day, day of the week and season. In addi-
tion, some studies estimate the influence of interruption duration, advance
notification and location.
As an illustration, Table V.2 to Table V.4 present detailed VOLL data
of Great Britain (London Economics, 2013), Norway (EnergiNorge, 2012),
and the United States (Sullivan et al., 2009). These data show VOLL for
different consumer groups as a function of season, day of the week, and
time of day. The Norwegian data consider four consumer types (residential,
industry, commercial, and public) and 36 interruption times (three times of
interruption, three days, and four seasons). The British data consider two
consumer types and eight interruption times. Finally, the United States’
data consider three consumer types and 16 interruption times. All data are
expressed in both the home currency and in 2015e/MWh.3
3Purchasing power parities (OECD, 2016) are used for conversion.
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Table V.1: Studies that estimate VOLL as a function of different interruption characteristics.
Country Consumer
type
Time Duration Advance
notification
Location Source
Australia x x (CRA International, 2008)
Austria x x x (Reichl et al., 2013)
Cyprus x x (Zachariadis and Poullikkas, 2012)
Germany x x (Growitsch et al., 2013)
Great Britain x x (London Economics, 2013)
Ireland x x x (Leahy and Tol, 2011)
Netherlands x x x (de Nooij et al., 2007)
New Zealand x x x x (Electricity Authority, 2013)
Norway x x x x (EnergiNorge, 2012)
Portugal x x (Castro et al., 2016)
Spain x x (Linares and Rey, 2013)
Sweden x x (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008)
United States x x x x x (Sullivan et al., 2009)
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All three studies use stated-preference methods to determine the VOLL
data.4 However, comparison of VOLL between countries should be done
with care (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) since all stated-preference methods
differ to some extent in terms of formulation of questions, cost normalisa-
tion factors, scenario designs and data formats and since countries differ
culturally.
The British and United States data show VOLL as a single value for
each time of interruption. The Norwegian data are displayed differently.
Table V.3 shows multipliers for the time of day, day of the week and season.
Norwegian VOLL for a particular time is found by multiplying the standard
VOLL with the corresponding multipliers:5
V (c, t(h, d, y)) = V (c)fh(c, h)fd(c, d)fy(c, y) (5.1)
V (c) corresponds to the base VOLL per consumer group c, while fh(c, h),
fd(c, d) and fy(c, y) are the multipliers to incorporate the effect of respec-
tively the time during the day h (e.g. day vs. night), the type of day d (e.g.
week vs. weekend) and the season y.6
Comparison of the three datasets shows that residential consumers have
a lower VOLL than industrial consumers. On weekdays, VOLL of indus-
trial consumers is between 5 (GB, not winter, not peak weekday) and 300
(US, winter weekday afternoon) times higher than for residential consumers.
During weekends, their VOLL is more similar. Residential VOLL in Great
Britain is higher and closer to industrial VOLL than in the United States
and in Norway. Industrial VOLL is the same order of magnitude in all
4Stated-preference methods involve asking consumers their willingness-to-accept
(WTA) payment for an outage and willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid an outage (contin-
gent valuation or choice experiments), or asking the cost of specific interruptions (direct
worth). Several cost estimation methods exist, each of them having its advantages and
disadvantages (de Nooij et al., 2007). Best-practice guidelines provide recommendations
for correct VOLL estimation (CEER, 2010; Hofmann et al., 2010; Sullivan and Keane,
1995).
5This assumes that the effect of time, day and season on VOLL is independent. For
example, the relative decrease of VOLL in summer for residential consumers is the same
irrespective of the time or day.
6The Norwegian data also include the effect of interruption duration on VOLL. In the
remainder of this paper we assume VOLL to be linear in duration, while in general VOLL
is concave in duration.
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three countries, except for small commercial and industrial consumers in
the United States, which have a substantially higher VOLL.7
The detailed VOLL data of Great Britain, Norway and the United
States are further used in the numerical illustration of section V.4, but the
level of detail is restricted to consumer type and time of interruption.
Table V.2: Great Britain VOLL as a function of time characteristics and con-
sumer groups (London Economics, 2013, Table 1 and Table 2). (a) is
expressed in [2011£/MWh], (b) in [2015e/MWh].
Not winter Winter
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
Peak Not peak Peak Not peak Peak Not peak Peak Not peak
(a)
Residential 9,550 6,957 9,257 11,145 10,982 9,100 10,289 11,820
SMEs 37,944 36,887 33,358 34,195 44,149 39,213 35,488 39,863
(b)
Residential 11,093 8,081 10,753 12,946 12,757 10,571 11,952 13,730
SMEs 44,077 42,849 38,749 39,722 51,284 45,551 41,224 46,306
V.3 Theoretical Analysis
Costs decrease if detailed VOLL data are used instead of one constant VOLL
at all times and in all regions. This efficiency gain is shown using a simple
model.
Suppose a cost C(ρ) is needed to supply 1 MWh of electricity at re-
liability level ρ. This reliability cost is constant throughout the year. It is
increasing convex in the reliability level and approaches infinity at ρ = 1.
Reliability ρ ∈ [0,1] is here defined as:
ρ = total demand - curtailed load
total demand
(5.2)
That is, ρ is the fraction of all demanded load [MWh] that is supplied to
consumers in a certain period.
7Note that VOLL of a consumer type is an average of individual consumers of this
type, in between which large differences are possible.
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Table V.3: Norwegian VOLL as a function of time characteristics and consumer
groups (EnergiNorge, 2012, Table A and Table B).
Residential Industry Commercial Public
VOLL [2010 NOK/MWh] 5,000 116,000 192,000 170,000
VOLL [2015 e/MWh] 469 10,926 17,984 15,888
Season fy(c, y)
Winter 1 1 1 1
Spring 0.57 0.87 1 0.67
Summer 0.44 0.86 1.02 0.51
Autumn 0.75 0.88 1.06 0.58
Day fd(c, d) Weekday 1 1 1 1Saturday 1.07 0.13 0.45 0.3
Sunday 1.07 0.14 0.11 0.29
Time fh(c, h) 2 AM 0.4 0.12 0.11 0.438 AM 0.69 1 1 1
6 PM 1 0.14 0.29 0.31
Table V.4: United States VOLL as a function of time characteristics and con-
sumer groups ((Sullivan et al., 2009, Table 3-10, Table 4-10 and Table
5-11)). (a) is expressed in [2009$/MWh], (b) in [2015e/MWh].
Summer
Weekday Weekend
Morning Afternoon Evening Night Morning Afternoon Evening Night
(a)
Residential 3,412 2,559 2,428 2,428 4,002 3,018 2,887 2,887
Small C&I 306,833 372,941 196,500 196,045 188,750 236,621 112,156 110,332
Large C&I 17,774 24,978 21,054 15,688 12,771 18,191 14,857 11,088
(b)
Residential 2,947 2,210 2,097 2,097 3,457 2,607 2,493 2,493
Small C&I 265,004 322,100 169,713 169,319 163,019 204,364 96,866 95,291
Large C&I 15,351 21,573 18,184 13,550 11,030 15,711 12,831 9,576
Winter
Weekday Weekend
Morning Afternoon Evening Night Morning Afternoon Evening Night
(a)
Residential 2,428 1,706 1,378 1,378 2,821 2,034 1,640 1,640
Small C&I 423,091 530,688 248,931 244,828 250,299 32,370 135,863 131,760
Large C&I 14,539 21,360 16,232 12,161 10,035 14,992 10,963 8,231
(b)
Residential 2,097 1,473 1,190 1,190 2,437 1,757 1,417 1,417
Small C&I 365,415 458,343 214,996 211,452 216,177 279,967 117,342 113,798
Large C&I 12,557 18,448 14,019 10,503 8,667 12,948 9,468 7,109
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The optimal reliability level ρ∗ is found by minimizing the sum of reli-
ability costs C(ρ) and interruption costs (1 − ρ)V :8
min
ρ
{C(ρ) + (1 − ρ)V } (5.3)
This is at the point where marginal reliability costs equal marginal inter-
ruption costs:
C ′(ρ∗) = V (5.4)
This first-order-condition shows that VOLL influences the optimal reliability
level. Since the reliability cost increases in ρ, a high VOLL calls for a high
reliability level and a low VOLL for a low reliability level. For example, if
VOLL is higher in winter than in summer (Vw > Vs), the reliability level
should also be higher in winter than in summer. If a TSO, however, bases
its reliability level on the yearly-average VOLL V¯ , it will aim for a constant
reliability level ρ¯ throughout the year.9 As a result, its network is too
reliable in summer and not sufficiently reliable in winter. This is shown
in Figure V.1, where the reliability levels are found at the intersection of
VOLL and marginal reliability cost, which is increasing in ρ. In this figure,
the reliability cost is the area below the marginal reliability cost C ′(ρ), up
to the reliability level ρ, while the interruption cost is the area below the
VOLL between ρ and 1.
The sum of reliability costs and interruption costs will be lower if the
TSO modifies the reliability level with changing VOLL (ρs < ρ¯ < ρw), instead
of aiming for a constant reliability level ρ¯. This efficiency gain is defined as:
[C(ρ) + (1 − ρ)V ] − [C(ρ∗) + (1 − ρ∗)V ] [e] (5.5)
Or
1 − C(ρ∗) + (1 − ρ∗)V
C(ρ) + (1 − ρ)V [%] (5.6)
8If the reliability cost C(ρ) includes all social costs of reaching a reliability level ρ,
the optimal reliability level is also the welfare optimum. If only private TSO costs are
included, the optimal TSO value differs from the welfare-optimal reliability level.
9Obviously, in reality the reliability cost is not constant throughout the year. For
example, if C(ρ) is higher in winter and VOLL is constant, it is optimal to have a lower
reliability level in winter than in summer. But for the sake of our argument we restrict
our focus here to the change of VOLL over time.
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Figure V.1: Efficiency gains if VOLL differs over time.
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Figure V.1 shows these efficiency gains as the dark grey triangle in summer
(ρ = ρ¯, ρ∗ = ρs) and the light grey triangle in winter (ρ = ρ¯, ρ∗ = ρw). In
summer, reliability costs are too high and interruption costs are too low; in
winter, reliability costs are too low and interruption costs are too high.
Next, suppose that VOLL is constant throughout the year but differs
between consumers. In this case, efficiency gains are achievable by pro-
viding low-VOLL consumers with a lower reliability level than high-VOLL
consumers. The highest efficiency gain is achieved if demand is curtailed
from lowest to highest VOLL (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976). Perfect curtail-
ment is only possible when the TSO has the technical capabilities to curtail
individual consumers. When this is not possible, efficiency gains are still
achievable when curtailment is performed first in low-VOLL regions. Spa-
tial curtailment leads to lower interruption costs than random curtailment.
Figure V.2 illustrates the efficiency gains of perfect, spatial, and ran-
dom curtailment. VOLL is assumed to be uniformly-distributed between
Vmin and Vmax. This is the downward-sloping line. Moving from random
curtailment (with average VOLL V¯ ) to spatial curtailment (with regional
VOLLs V1 and V2) leads to an efficiency gain equal to the light grey area.
This is the sum of lower reliability costs (A) and lower interruption costs (B).
The dark grey area is the additional efficiency gain of moving from spatial
to perfect curtailment. This is the sum of additional lower reliability costs
(C) and additional lower interruption costs (D). Interruption costs are lower
because low-VOLL consumers are curtailed first. For spatial curtailment
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these are consumers in the low-VOLL area 1; for perfect curtailment these
are the consumers with the lowest VOLL, in both region 1 and 2. Moving
from random curtailment to perfect curtailment, the decrease of reliability
costs is thus A+C+E and the net decrease of interruption costs is B+D-E.
Figure V.2: Efficiency gains and reliability level of random, spatial, and perfect
curtailment, if VOLL differs between regions.
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The regional VOLLs, represented by V1 and V2 in Figure V.2, depend
on the correlation of VOLL between regions. They differ more if low-VOLL
consumers are all concentrated in one region. In that case, the reliability
level ρs is closer to the optimal reliability level ρp and interruption costs of
spatial curtailment are lower.
The next section illustrates the theoretical concepts of the current sec-
tion in a numerical five-node case study.
V.4 Numerical illustration of short-term reliabil-
ity management
During operation of the electricity system TSOs face many challenges: line
outages and generation outages occur, unscheduled loop flows pass through
the network, and demand and intermittent supply differ from forecasts. As
a result, the TSO takes preventive and corrective actions – such as upward
and downward dispatch of generation, phase shifting, transformer tap chang-
ing, topological actions and demand curtailment – to ensure that demand
145
V.4. Numerical illustration of short-term reliability management
and supply are always balanced without overloading any transmission line.
Determining appropriate preventive, corrective and curtailment actions is
denoted as short-term reliability management.
V.4.1 Evaluation of short-term reliability management
Short term reliability management consists of two parts: real time operation
and operational planning. Both aim at minimizing total expected system
costs.
V.4.1.1 Real time operation
When disturbances occur in the power system, the TSO takes corrective
actions or curtails load to keep the system in balance. Possible correc-
tive actions aRTc during real time (RT) operation are generation redispatch,
phase shifting transformer tap changing and branch switching. The TSO
takes at each time instant t those actions that minimize the cost of cor-
rective actions and the cost of demand curtailment, subject to operational
constraints (Van Acker and Van Hertem, 2016).
min
aRTc ,P
RT
curt
CRT (v) = min
aRTc ,P
RT
curt
[Ccorr(artc ) + P rtcurt(c) ⋅ v] (5.7)
s.t. operational limits
Load curtailment costs are the product of curtailed load P rtcurt(c) and VOLL
v. The specification of v depends on the level of VOLL detail:
v ∈ Υ = {V,V (t), V (n, t), V (c, t)} (5.8)
That is, VOLL is constant (V ); VOLL differs over time t (V (t)); VOLL
is aggregated per node n and differs for all time instants t (V (n, t)); or
VOLL differs between consumer groups c and over time t (V (c, t)). Equation
(5.7) shows that different levels of detail in VOLL data change the trade-off
between corrective actions and load curtailment and affect which consumers
and which regions to curtail. The level of detail has an effect on the choice
of corrective actions artc and load curtailment P rtcurt, which, in turn, affects
total system cost.
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V.4.1.2 Operational planning
Real time operation is preceded by the operational planning stage. Opera-
tional planning (OP) is executed some time before real-time operation. For
example, in day-ahead for the 24 hours of the next day. During operational
planning the TSO determines the optimal dispatch of electricity generation,
taking into account uncertainties about future real-time states s of the sys-
tem. The difference between the unconstrained day-ahead market dispatch
and the dispatch after operational planning is the cost of preventive redis-
patch. The TSO determines the dispatch actions ap that minimizes the sum
of preventive redispatch costs Cprev(ap) and expected real-time costs in state
s, consisting of the cost of corrective actions Ccorr(asc) and load curtailment
P scurt(c) ⋅ v, subject to operational constraints:
min
ap,asc,P
s
curt
COP (v) = min [Cprev(ap)+
∑
s∈S pis (Ccorr(asc) + P scurt(c) ⋅ v)] (5.9)
s.t. operational limits ∀s ∈ S
where pis is the probability of occurrence of a possible future real-time state s.
The TSO takes into account a set of possible future real-time states S when
deciding on its preventive actions ap. The set S is the Cartesian product
of the most probable contingencies and real-time operating states.10 The
latter are conditional upon the forecast values of net demand. As a result,
VOLL does not only affect corrective actions and demand curtailment, but
also preventive actions of forward-looking TSOs.
Equation (5.3) of our theoretical analysis is a simplified version of equa-
tion (5.9). While in the theoretical analysis the TSO chooses the reliability
level ρ directly, in our case study it takes a number of preventive (ap) and
corrective (ac) actions, which lead to a certain reliability level. The reliabil-
10Contingencies are considered up to a cumulative probability of 99%, while the pos-
sible operating states are approximated by 7 real time realizations of a discrete normal
distribution with mean equal to the expected value of total demand at time instant t and
a coefficient of variation of 4%.
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ity cost C(ρ) of the theoretical analysis includes both the cost of preventive
and corrective actions.
V.4.1.3 Evaluation
Performance of short-term reliability management for various levels of VOLL
detail is evaluated in terms of expected total cost (ETC). ETC consists
of costs of preventive actions, costs of corrective actions and cost of load
curtailment.
ETC(v) =∑
t∈T[Cprev(ap(v, t)) + ∑rt∈RT pirt (Ccorr(artc (v, t))+P rtcurt(c, v, t) ⋅ V (c, t))] ∀t (5.10)
Preventive, corrective and curtailment actions[ap(v, t), artc (v, t), P rtcurt(c, v, t)] (5.11)
are taken by a TSO based on the available VOLL information, i.e. the level
of detail in the VOLL data, v ∈ {V,V (t), V (n, t), V (c, t)}. Load curtail-
ment costs are evaluated at the true VOLL of a consumer, V (c, t). ETC is
calculated as the expected total cost, averaged over a year.
To calculate the true ETC, the set RT should contain all possible
contingencies and all possible real-time operating states. Since this is not
feasible in practice, the set RT is bounded, but larger than set S of equation
(5.9), which is considered in decision making. The set RT consists of the
most probable contingencies up to a cumulative probability of occurrence of
99.6 % and 11 possible real-time realizations of a discrete normal distribu-
tion. As the set RT is larger than the set S, reliability management also
evaluated in system states that are not considered in advance.
Since more detailed VOLL data lead to better-informed TSO decisions,
it is expected that
ETC(V (c, t)) ≤ ETC(V (n, t)) ≤ ETC(V (t)) ≤ ETC(V )
In addition to ETC, two other important indicators are the overall reli-
ability level and equity between consumers. The reliability level is expressed
in terms of average interruption time (AIT) (Cepin, 2011):
AIT = (1 − ρ) ⋅ 8760 ⋅ 60 [min/year] (5.12)
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Equity of the reliability level between consumer groups and consumers at
different nodes is evaluated similarly to the Gini coefficient (Atkinson, 1970),
but based on the share of total demand that is supplied to the different
consumer groups and consumers:
G = ∣1 − (∑
k
(Xk −Xk−1) ⋅ (Yk + Yk−1)∣ (5.13)
with X the cumulative share of demand, Y the cumulative share of energy
not supplied and k an index counting over the groups under comparison,
i.e. consumer groups at nodes. The groups are ordered based on decreasing
reliability values. A Gini coefficient of 0 means that all consumer groups
in all regions have the same reliability level11. A Gini coefficient closer to
1 means that all interruptions are concentrated in one or a few consumer
groups or nodes. The equity coefficient G indicates how consumers perceive
the distribution of reliability between consumer groups in different nodes. It
is thus calculated at the aggregated level, not at the level of the individual
consumer.
V.4.2 Data
The numerical illustration uses a five-node test system and considers VOLL
data of three different countries (Great Britain, Norway and the United
States). The same analysis is repeated for each of the countries to determine
a range of potential improvements increases in short term power system
reliability management if more detailed VOLL data are used. All data are
equal for each of the three countries, except the VOLL data.
V.4.2.1 Network
Our illustrative five-node test system is based on the Roy Billinton reliability
test system (Billinton et al., 1989), as shown in Figure V.3. Generation is
located in node 1 and 2; demand is located in node 2 to 5. Table V.5
11Note that the Gini coefficient can not be calculated if reliability is 100% for all con-
sumer groups in all nodes. In that highly exceptional case Gini equals 0 by definition.
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shows the reactance (x)12, capacity and failure probability for the seven
transmission lines. All electricity interruptions are assumed to last for 1
hour, implying a linear relationship between VOLL and duration.
Figure V.3: Circuit diagram of the test system.
1 2
3 4
5
Table V.5: Line data.
From To x
[pu]
CapacityFailure
node node [MW] [MVA] probab.
1 2 0.48 71 0.0046
1 3 0.18 85 0.0017
1 3 0.18 85 0.0017
2 4 0.6 71 0.0057
3 4 0.12 71 0.0011
3 5 0.12 71 0.0011
4 5 0.12 71 0.0011
V.4.2.2 Generation
The generation park consists of coal-fired power plants with a high marginal
cost and wind power plants with a marginal cost near zero, but uncertain
availability. Table V.6 summarizes generators’ marginal costs and outage
probability data. Upward and downward redispatch costs depend on the
12The reactance of transmission lines determine the distribution of the power flow in the
network: the higher the reactance (compared to other lines), the lower the flow through
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Table V.6: Generation data.
NodeCapacityType Cmarg Failure
[MW] [e/MWh] probab.
1 40 coal 13.83 0.0062
1 40 coal 13.83 0.0062
1 10 coal 13.83 0.0062
1 20 wind 0.04 0.0062
2 40 coal 13.83 0.0062
2 20 coal 13.83 0.0062
2 20 wind 0.01 0.0062
2 20 wind 0.03 0.0062
2 20 wind 0.05 0.0062
2 5 coal 13.83 0.0062
2 5 coal 13.83 0.0062
marginal cost of the generator and differ between the preventive and correc-
tive stage, as shown in equation (5.14). Wind generators are not available
for positive redispatch.
c+prev = 1.5 ⋅Cmarg + 5
c−prev = −0.5 ⋅Cmarg + 5
c+corr = 5 ⋅C+prev
c−corr = −15 ⋅C+prev
(5.14)
V.4.2.3 Demand and VOLL
Total system demand is based on the hourly load profile defined for the
Roy Billinton Reliability system over a whole year (Billinton et al., 1989).
For simplification a year is represented by 6 x 3 x 4 = 72 time instants,
each with its probability of occurrence. That is, the set T is the Cartesian
product of 6 seasons (early spring, late spring, summer, early autumn, late
autumn and winter), 3 days (weekday, Saturday and Sunday), and 4 times
the line.
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of day (morning, noon, evening and night). Each temporal case its weighted
according to its occurrence. Total system demand at each of the 72 time
instants is calculated as the mean over all valid hours. Table V.7 gives the
reference share of total demand per node that is attributed to a particular
type of customer LSref(c) together with the share of the total demand
at that node. Table V.7 shows that most demand is located in node 3,
consisting mostly of residential and commercial demand. Node 4 contains
mostly industrial demand, while node 5 contains mostly residential demand.
Table V.7: Demand shares of different consumer groups at different nodes and of
demand shares of different nodes in total demand.
Node Residential Industry Commercial Public Total demand share
rT
LSref(c, n)
2 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.125
3 0.4 0 0.4 0.2 0.5
4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.25
5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0.125
This numerical illustration uses VOLL data from Great Britain (Table
V.2), Norway (Table V.3) and the United States (Table V.4). The three
datasets consider a different number of consumer types and temporal cases,
resulting in different levels of detail. The 72 typical time instants introduced
above constitute all temporal cases. In order to unify the data with respect
to consumer types, we split consumers into only two categories: residential
and non-residential customers. Non-residential customers correspond to the
aggregated share of all customers except the residential ones, i.e. large
and small C&I combined in the United States and industry, public and
commercial combined in Norway. By unifying the test set, we can compare
the results in Norway, GB and the US, although their VOLL data have
different levels of detail.
The share of residential and non-residential demand in total system
demand changes throughout the year. Table V.8 shows the multiplication
factors that take this effect into account. The demand share of consumer
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group c in total system demand at time t is calculated as:
LS(c, n, t) = LSref(c, n) ⋅ fH(c, h) ⋅ fD(c, d) ⋅ fY (c, y)∑c∈C LSref(c, n) ⋅ fH(c, h) ⋅ fD(c, d) ⋅ fY (c, y) (5.15)
with c ∈ {residential,non-residential} and t determined by the time of day
h, type of day d and time of the year y.
Table V.8: Time dependent multiplication factors for the demand share of differ-
ent consumer groups.
Residential Non-
residential
Time fH(c, h)
2 AM 0.7 1.3
8 AM 1.3 0.7
2 PM 0.8 1.2
6 PM 1.3 0.7
Day fD(c, d) Weekday 0.8 1.2Saturday 1.15 0.85
Sunday 1.3 0.7
Season fY (c, y)
Winter 1 1
Spring 0.9 1.1
Summer 1.1 0.9
Autumn 1 1
If more detailed VOLL data are used, three cases are distinguished.
On the one hand, different consumer groups are considered each with their
respective VOLL vc = V (c, t) and are considered to be curtailable at their
respective VOLL. VOLL is on the other hand aggregated per node using a
weighted average of the VOLL of the different customer types vn = V (n, t) =∑c∈C LS(c, n, t) ⋅ V (c, t). In the third case, VOLL is aggregated per time
instant using a weighted average of the VOLL at different nodes and the
share of total load at that node: vt = V (t) = ∑n∈N rT (n, t) ⋅ V (n, t).
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V.4.3 Results
Our numerical illustration is simulated using a model developed within the
GARPUR project 13 (Heylen et al., 2016) and is implemented in AMPL
(Fourer et al., 1987) using a MATLAB interface. Probabilistic reliability
management is simulated using a probabilistic security constrained DC op-
timal power flow (Van Acker and Van Hertem, 2016).
Table V.10 shows the relative change of expected total system costs
∆ETC for the 5 node test system, which is defined as
∆ETC = ETC(v) −ETC(V )
ETC(V ) (5.16)
where v equals VOLL differentiated per consumer group (vc = V (c, t)),
VOLL differentiated per node (vn = V (n, t)), or VOLL differentiated per
time instant (vt = V (t)), depending on the case under investigation. V rep-
resents a constant VOLL for all nodes and consumer groups in all temporal
cases.
Before discussing Table V.10, which shows the cost savings in Norway,
Great Britain and the United States for different degrees of VOLL differen-
tiation, take a look at Table V.9. This table gives summary statistics of the
detailed VOLL data used in our analysis, which will be useful in explaining
the results of our analysis. First, the average VOLL (µ) is significantly lower
in Norway than in GB and US. Second, when VOLL is constant throughout
the country but differing over time (vt), temporal variation, represented by
the coefficient of variation σµ , is high for Norway, average for US and low for
GB. The higher temporal variability in Norway is likely due to the larger
relative difference between cold winters and temperate summers. In Nor-
way, the minimum country-wide VOLL is only 255 e/MWh, while it is a
hundredfold in both GB and US. The country-wide maximum is between
9,423 and 116,560. This means that optimal reliability will differ substan-
tially over time in Norway, will differ a bit in US and will not change much
in GB. Third, when VOLL is allowed to change of time and differentiated
between nodes (vn), the minimum and maximum VOLL will diverge in all
three countries. Fourth, when in addition VOLL is differentiated between
13www.garpur-project.eu
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consumers (vc), minimum and maximum VOLL will diverge even more in
all three countries. As a result, the lower the minimum VOLL, the less
preventive actions will be taken, as a loss of load is not costly.
Table V.9: Summary statistics of detailed VOLL data in Norway, Great Britain
and United States.
Norway GB US
µ 2,095 31,632 57,312
vt
σ
µ 1.1898 0.088 0.4367
min 255 28,251 27,277
max 9,423 36,836 116,560
vn
min 108 15,035 4,832
max 12,338 51,284 370,364
vc
min 83 8,081 1,190
max 19,063 51,284 458,343
With Table V.9 in mind, we can explain the results of Table V.10.
First, as expected from the theoretical analysis, cost savings increase with a
higher degree of VOLL differentiation. The lower the minimum VOLL that
can be curtailed in case of contingencies, the less costly preventive actions
are needed. As the minimum and maximum VOLL diverge with a higher
degree of differentiation, their cost savings increase accordingly. Secondly,
cost savings are large in Norway because its minimum VOLL is close to
the cost of preventive and corrective actions. For temporal differentiation
(vt), cost savings are substantial in Norway, low in US, and negligible in
GB. The cost savings increase with the level of temporal variation, less with
the absolute level of the minimum VOLL, as GB and US have a similar
minimum VOLL but different temporal variability. Thirdly, also the cost
savings of GB and US increase with more differentiated VOLL data. In that
case, it is not the temporal variability but the level of the minimum VOLL
that leads to cost savings.
Figure V.4 takes a closer look at how the cost savings of Table V.10
depend on preventive, corrective and curtailment actions. Norway’s costs
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Table V.10: Relative expected total system cost savings for three countries using
VOLL data with different levels of detail.
∆ETC [%] vt vn vc
Norway -10.68 -20.27 -43.28
GB -0.01 -3.03 -9.37
US -0.95 -11.14 -29.52
decrease primarily because it takes less preventive actions, as its cost of
curtailing residential consumers is low. GB and US decrease their cost of
preventive actions and decrease their curtailment cost when shifting to spa-
tial (vn) and perfect curtailment (vc). The largest part of the cost decrease is
due to a better trade-off between preventive and corrective actions. Another
part is due to better-targeted, and thus lower, curtailment costs, especially
for vc.
Figure V.4: Evolution of cost terms in expected total system cost for different
levels of detail of VOLL.
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Another important aspect to consider in the discussion is equity of
the reliability level between different consumers. If more detailed VOLL
data are used and TSOs are able to curtail load based on VOLL, partic-
ular consumer groups might experience lower reliability levels. Table V.11
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shows the average interruption time per node and consumer group. The last
column shows the reliability Gini coefficient, as defined in equation (5.13).
Table V.11 shows first that spatial curtailment (vn) considerably decreases
equity. In all three countries, curtailment is almost completely limited to
node 5, where low-VOLL residential consumers are located. Second, per-
fect curtailment (vc) also decreases equity, but less than spatial curtailment.
Curtailment is almost completely limited to residential consumers, as they
have the lowest VOLL most of the time. Third, changing VOLL over time
(vt) does not decrease equity. In Norway and US, equity slightly increases;
in GB it is constant.
National AIT does not change if more detailed VOLL data are used,
except when Norway uses spatial and perfect curtailment based on vn and
vc respectively. In that case AIT increases because curtailing consumers
is cheaper than expensive preventive actions. This is because the absolute
level of VOLL is lower in Norway than in GB and US. Because in Norway
curtailed (residential) consumers have such a low VOLL, the cost of load
curtailment is negligible, as shown in Figure V.4.
V.5 Discussion
The trade-off between efficiency and equity of reliability is an important
aspect to consider when introducing more detailed VOLL data. Table V.12
summarizes the reduction of expected total cost (ETC) and the Gini coeffi-
cient (G) for the different levels of VOLL detail and for the three countries.
If VOLL is equal for all nodes but differs over time, total costs decrease,
without a significant effect on equity. In Norway and US equity increases,
but this seems to be by chance, as the TSO curtails nodes more randomly14.
Detailed VOLL data per node vn or per consumer group vc, however,
have a larger potential for cost savings, but at the expense of increasing
inequity. Interestingly, inequity is higher for spatial curtailment than for
perfect curtailment. This is because spatial curtailment focuses mostly on
the same node (node 5). Perfect curtailment, by contrast, focuses those
14Although not completely randomly, because the network topology and the cost of
preventive and corrective actions also affect curtailment decisions.
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Table V.11: Average interruption time [min/year] (per node and consumer group), consumption weighted average AIT and
equity measure (G) for different levels of VOLL detail and different countries.
Nodes
VOLL 2 3 4 5 AITavg
Country Detail Res Non res Res Non res Res Non res Res Non res [min/year] G
Norway V - 1.12 0.31 0.49 1.1 0.37 3.48 16.59 1.91 0.66
Norway vt - 1.04 0.42 0.76 0.66 0.57 3.91 13.59 1.91 0.58
Norway vn - 0.05 0 0 0.16 0.09 23.09 45.54 6.25 0.81
Norway vc - 0.06 14.16 0 127.8 0.03 109.16 0 27.86 0.75
GB V - 0.8 0.31 0.31 1.01 0.39 3.5 18.11 1.91 0.7
GB vt - 0.8 0.31 0.31 1.02 0.39 3.5 18.11 1.91 0.7
GB vn - 0 0.05 0.05 0 0 6.52 15.2 1.91 0.82
GB vc - 0.02 1.9 0.01 2.51 0 8.81 0.07 1.91 0.74
US V - 1.19 0.92 0.1 0.37 0.72 3.71 15.74 1.91 0.68
US vt - 1.19 0.3 0.49 1.06 0.51 3.94 14.78 1.91 0.64
US vn - 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 4.91 19.95 1.91 0.85
US vc - 0.02 2.45 0 1.87 0 8.48 0.13 1.91 0.73
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consumers with the lowest VOLL. Because they are different groups over
time, curtailment is more diversified and inequity is lower. This means
that if VOLL data is available but perfect curtailment is technologically
infeasible, a country should carefully assess if the efficiency gains of spatial
curtailment make up for the increased inequity.
Table V.12: Summary table presenting the trade-off between efficiency and equity
Norway GB US
V vt vn vc V vt vn vc V vt vn vc
∆ETC 0 -10.68 -20.27 -43.28 0 -0.01 -3.03 -9.37 0 -0.95 -11.14 -29.52
G 0.66 0.58 0.81 0.75 0.7 0.7 0.82 0.74 0.68 0.64 0.85 0.73
Increased inequity can also be dealt with by altering network tariffs. If
affected consumers have to pay lower tariffs, they would less likely oppose
decreased reliability levels. With the introduction of smart meters, reliabil-
ity levels can even be differentiated per consumer. Reliability contracts can
be offered to residential consumers to give them the choice between different
reliability levels with corresponding price. Larger consumers can even de-
termine their reliability level on a continuous basis and be paid accordingly.
In that case, interruption are not considered as unreliability, as consumers
choose the be interrupted in exchange for a payment.
Two issues merit more discussion. First, currently most TSOs do not
use even a constant VOLL in their short-term reliability management. Es-
pecially not one that is based on extensive VOLL studies. TSOs’ reliability
decisions are guided by the N-1 criterion. This criterion states that an un-
expected outage of a single system component may not result in a loss of
load. That is, when a single system component fails, the transmission sys-
tem should still be able to accommodate all flows without load curtailment.
The necessary detailed data (failure rates, forecast errors, wind and solar
data, detailed demand and generation data, and, of course, VOLL) are not
yet widely available. However, advances in communication and information
technologies facilitate gathering this data. With more data available, TSOs
can gradually introduce probabilistic methods and interruption costs into
reliability management.
Second, actual VOLL strongly depends on the currently perceived reli-
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ability level, which is high with currently used reliability management (Mu-
nasinghe, 1981). Therefore, VOLL values are in fact not absolute, but con-
ditional upon the perceived reliability level in the country at the moment of
the survey. If the reliability level is high, people do not take many actions
to prepare for an interruption. While a low reliability level encourages local
investments, e.g. in storage or local generation, to prepare for interrup-
tions. If spatial or perfect curtailment is implemented, the reliability level
would change for different consumer groups, which in turn changes their
VOLL. Due to its low VOLL values, Norway might be mostly impacted by
this effect, as people will experience lower reliability levels if exact VOLL
data are taken into account in reliability management. Taking into account
behavioural feedback effects of VOLL is important, but a lengthy learning
process.
V.6 Conclusions
Many empirical studies have estimated how VOLL depends on interruption
characteristics – especially consumer type and time of interruption. How-
ever, few applications actually use detailed VOLL data to improve power
system reliability. A theoretical analysis and a numerical illustration of
short-term reliability management both show that incorporating detailed
VOLL data leads to considerable efficiency gains. Our numerical illustra-
tion leads to potential gains between 3% and 20% when spatial curtailment
is used, and between 9% and 43% when perfect curtailment is used15.
Our analysis showed that this efficiency gain has a downside. Equity
of reliability, represented as a Gini coefficient, decreases when more cost
effective spatial and perfect curtailment are used. Striking the balance be-
tween these opposing objectives is the role of a regulator, based on society’s
preferences.
When only temporal aspects of VOLL are incorporated, efficiency gains
15A back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on 2015 consumption data (ENTSO-E) and
the 2015 annual reports of Elia, RTE, Statnett and Terna (only considering operating costs,
excluding system losses), leads to an average operating cost of 0.9 e/MWh. Since, total
electricity consumption in the ENTSO-E network was 3174 TWh in 2015, this amounts to
potential gains between 80 million and 1,200 million per year in the ENTSO-E network.
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are lower, but without a significant effect on equity. Therefore, the benefits
are clear for countries with much temporal variability of VOLL, like Norway
in our numerical illustration.
To reap the benefits of detailed VOLL data in short-term reliability
management, two conditions need to be met. First, TSOs need to move away
from the currently-used N-1 reliability criterion and move towards proba-
bilistic reliability management. Second, more VOLL studies are needed
to improve detailed VOLL data. A widespread roll-out of smart meters
have the potential to facilitate the determination of VOLL for different con-
sumer types and different interruption times. Smart meters combined with
price-contingent priority rationing contracts will also help to achieve perfect
curtailment (Chao and Wilson, 1987; Joskow and Tirole, 2007).
In this paper we focused on the efficiency gains in short-term reliability
management. However, considerable gains are also possible in the mid term
and long term. A better understanding of interruption costs will lead to
better maintenance and system expansion decisions.
Lastly, the increase of intermittent generation will require significant
expansions in transmission infrastructure (van der Weijde and Hobbs, 2012).
However, the high costs of transmission investments and the difficulties to
build new lines in both rural and urban areas could hinder this development
(Cohen et al., 2016). This will push power system operation closer to its
limits. In such a stressed power system, the use of detailed VOLL data will
yield even higher benefits.
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Chapter VI
An Inequality Indicator of
Power System Reliability
VI.1 Introduction
Many decisions of network operators and regulators have an effect on the
reliability level of power systems: building new lines, the installation of
power flow control equipment, increased penetration of intermittent genera-
tion (Heylen et al., 2016a), generation adequacy load-shedding plans (Elia,
2016), the application of new reliability criteria (Heylen et al., 2016b), asset
management and maintenance (Bertling et al., 2005), cross-border cooper-
ation on balancing (Baldursson et al., 2016a), etc. However, these decisions
do not affect all consumers equally. Some are more affected than others,
depending on their location and characteristics. If consumers feel that their
reliability level is unfairly low compared to other consumers, they could com-
plain and oppose those decisions that lower their reliability level. Therefore,
in addition to measuring the change in costs and the change of the overall
reliability level, this paper argues that power system decision makers should
also measure the distribution of unreliability among consumers.
To measure the inequality of power system reliability, this paper refor-
mulates the Gini coefficient in terms of energy not supplied. In this way, the
adapted Gini coefficient, which is normally used to measure income inequal-
ity (Dalton, 1920; Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1976; Shorrocks, 1980), measures
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inequality of power system reliability.1 The proposed inequality indicator
summarizes inequality as a value between zero and one. A value of zero
means that unreliability is distributed equally among all consumers. The
closer the inequality indicator is to one, the more unreliability is limited to a
few consumers. We argue that decision makers should not only focus on the
impact of their decisions on the aggregate reliability level but also on their
impact on the distribution of power system reliability between consumers.
A highly unequal or inequitable distribution may lead to public opposition.2
The use of the inequality indicator is illustrated in two case studies
where the reliability level of consumers is unequally affected. The first case
study investigates the inequality of the 2014-2015 load-shedding plan in Bel-
gium. Because of generation adequacy concerns, the Belgian transmission
system operator (TSO) ELIA proposed a load-shedding plan that allowed
to temporally curtail load in different regions in case of emergency. Public
opposition to this plan was strong. People felt that the burden of the load-
shedding was placed on a small group of (rural) consumers. The proposed
indicator makes it possible to quantify the inequality that results from the
load-shedding plan. The second case study illustrates how the inequality
indicator can be applied in the performance evaluation of short-term re-
liability management strategies. Moving towards an alternative reliability
management strategy typically involves a trade-off between multiple op-
posing objectives, of which efficiency and equality are two important ones
Ovaere et al. (2016). The inequality indicator allows the comparison of the
distribution of reliability among consumers or nodes if TSOs shift from the
currently used N-1 reliability criterion to a probabilistic reliability criterion
(Karangelos and Wehenkel, 2016b; Capitanescu et al., 2012; Wang and Mc-
Calley, 2013).
1 Throughout this paper we will use the terms ’equality’ and ’inequality indicator’,
but the inequality indicator can also be formulated to represent equity of power system
reliability (see section VI.2). Equity is defined as giving everyone what they need or
deserve, while equality is defined as treating everyone the same regardless of differences
in needs or desert (Konow, 2003).
2The inequality indicator based on energy not supplied was firstly applied in a study
by Ovaere et al. to analyze how detailed value of lost load data affect reliability decisions
taken in probabilistic reliability management and how this impacts the inequality between
consumers (Ovaere et al., 2016).
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This paper is organized as follows. Section VI.2 formulates the defi-
nition of equality, while section VI.3 describes the design of the inequality
indicator and discusses its strengths and weaknesses. A first case study
in section VI.4 evaluates the inequality resulting from the 2014-2015 load-
shedding plan in Belgium, while a second case study in section VI.5 focuses
on the comparison of the inequality resulting from short term reliability
management based on different reliability criteria. Section VI.6 introduces
possible measures to reduce inequality of power system reliability. Finally,
section VI.7 concludes.
VI.2 Inequality of power system reliability
First, define a vector d that contains the share of demand of each consumer3
i in the total electrical energy demand of n consumers:
di = DE,i∑nj=1DE,j (6.1)
with DE,i the electrical energy demand of consumer i. Next, define a vector
e that contains the share of energy not supplied (ENS) of each consumer i:
ei = ENSi∑nj=1ENSj (6.2)
with ENSi the energy not supplied of consumer i. Depending on whether
the indicator is used in an ex-ante or ex-post evaluation, resp. expected
energy not served (EENS) for a set of events or energy not served (ENS) for
a single event or a sequence of events is used.
The following conditions need to be satisfied for vectors d and e:
n∑
i=1di =
n∑
i=1 ei = 100% (6.3)
de = 0Ô⇒ ei = 0 (6.4)
The first condition (6.3) guarantees that all demand and all energy not sup-
plied is distributed over all consumers, while the second condition (6.4) states
that consumers without electricity demand cannot have load curtailment.
3In this paper, the inequality amongst consumers is used, but similar conclusions can
be drawn on substation or regional level.
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A distribution of unreliability is considered to be fair or equal if all
consumers contribute to the energy not supplied according to their share in
total demand:4
ri = 1,∀i = 1..n with ri = ei
di
= inequality ratio (6.5)
If the distribution is not perfectly equal, some consumers i are more (ri > 1)
or less affected (ri < 1).
Alternatively, the definition of inequality can be modified by using in-
terruption cost instead of ENS. Interruption costs are the product of a con-
sumer’s energy not suppliedENSi and his value of lost load (VOLL) V OLLi.
This formulation states that interruption costs are distributed fairly if the
share of each consumer in the interruption cost, either due to the direct con-
sequences of the interruption or due to part of an economical compensation
that has to be paid, equals its share in total demand. The inequality ratio
in this case equals:
qi = ENSi ⋅ V OLLi∑nj=1ENSj ⋅ V OLLj ⋅ ∑
n
j=1DE,j
DE,i
(6.6)
which is equal to 1 in the equality case.
This definition of the inequality indicator is closer to equity of relia-
bility, because VOLL is correlated with need and desert. However, VOLL
is not fully correlated with need and desert. For example, poor households
may be more in need of reliable electricity supply, but will typically have
a lower VOLL than rich households. On the other hand, it makes sense to
provide a higher reliability level to hospitals or high VOLL industry. Fair-
ness is a combination of equity and equality, so that both specifications of
the inequality indicator are complementary (Konow, 2003). Note that we
use the term ’inequality indicator’ for both specifications.
4In the case of prosumers, both DE,i and ENSi should be measured from the point of
view of the consumer. However, as this is practically not feasible, a formulation from the
point of view of the network is a good approximation for low correlation between DE,i
and ENSi. This means that DE,i is defined as the electricity offtake of consumer i, not
its net demand, while ENSi is the energy not supplied by the network.
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VI.3 An inequality indicator for power system re-
liability
Many different inequality indicators have been proposed in the economic
literature. These indicators are used to compare income distributions be-
tween countries or to verify the impact of certain decisions, such as the
introduction of a tax on the distribution of income within a certain country.
These indicators have been applied to insurance (Promislow, 1987), edu-
cation (Vinod et al., 2001), biodiversity (Wittebolle et al., 2009), but not
yet to power systems. Based on the definition of inequality provided in the
previous section, this section develops an inequality indicator UENS , which
enables the quantification of inequality of power system reliability in a single
value.5
VI.3.1 Inequality indicators
Various inequality indicators are reported in the literature: the variance,
the coefficient of variation, the relative mean deviation (Dalton, 1920), the
standard deviation of logarithms, the 20:20 ratio, the Palma ratio, Theil’s
index (Theil, 1967), the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970), the Schutz or
Hoover index (Schutz, 1951) and the Gini index (Allison, 1978).
The strengths and weaknesses of each of these indicators have been
studied extensively in the economic literature. For example, the variance
is not scale invariant6 and the relative mean deviation fails to satisfy the
principle of transfers.7 In addition, the inequality indicators differ in their
sensitivity to transfers: the Palma ratio and the 20:20 ratio particularly
focus on the extremes of the distribution, while the Gini indicator focuses
on the middle of the distribution (Allison, 1978; Hasenheit, 2014).
5The remainder of the paper mainly discusses the inequality indicator in terms of the
inequality ratio defined in (6.5). However, the inequality ratio defined in (6.6) can similarly
be applied.
6Scale invariance ensures that if everyone’s ENS or demand is multiplied by a constant
value, the degree of inequality remains unchanged (Allison, 1978).
7The principle of transfers states that a transfer in the share of ENS s from a consumer
i to a consumer j should decrease the value of the inequality indicator if ri > rj and
ei−s
di
≥ ej+s
dj
(Dalton, 1920).
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Figure VI.1: Lorenz curve in terms of energy not served. The line of equality is
dotted.
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Since the perfect inequality indicator does not exist, we propose to use
the Gini indicator, because it is the most widely used. One of the reasons
for its popularity is that it is easy to understand how to compute the Gini
index based on Lorenz curves.
VI.3.2 Lorenz curves
The distribution of reliability between consumers can be represented in a
Lorenz curve. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of demand Dk
with respect to the cumulative share of energy not supplied Ek (Fig. VI.1),
with all consumers ranked according to an increasing inequality ratio. The
inequality ratio represents the slope of the different pieces of the piecewise
linear Lorenz curve.
If the distribution of reliability is completely fair (i.e. when ri = 1 ∀i =
1..n), the Lorenz curve is a straight line with coefficient of direction equal
to 1, as illustrated by the dotted line in Fig. VI.1. If the distribution of
reliability is not completely fair, the Lorenz curve will be below the equality
line, as illustrated by the bold line in Fig. VI.1. The closer the Lorenz curve
is to the equality line, the more equal the distribution of reliability.
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VI.3.3 The proposed Gini-based inequality indicator
The proposed Gini-based inequality indicator UENS of power system reliabil-
ity is defined as the ratio of the surface area between the line of equality and
the Lorenz curve (A) over the total surface area under the line of equality
(A+B):
UENS = A
A +B (6.7)
Surface area B can be calculated using the surface areas of the trapezoids
under each of the pieces of the piecewise linear Lorenz curve. This leads to
the following formula for UENS :
UENS = 1 − n∑
k=1(Dk −Dk−1)(Ek +Ek−1) (6.8)
with Dk the cumulative proportion of relative demand (Dk = ∑ki=1 di ∀k =
1..n, D0 = 0 and Dn = 1) and Ek the cumulative proportion of relative ENS
(Ek = ∑ki=1 ei ∀k = 1..n, E0 = 0 and En = 1). The consumers i are ranked
such that ri ≤ ri+1.
VI.3.4 Caveats of the proposed inequality indicator
The main strength of an inequality indicator is that the extent of inequality
is summarized as a single value between zero and one. This allows for a
simple assessment of the perceived fairness of particular power system deci-
sions. However, this is also the main weakness of the inequality indicator.
Aggregating the distribution of reliability into a single value reduces the
informational content. For example, the indicator does not capture where
the inequality actually occurs in the distribution.8 Two very different dis-
tributions of unreliability can have the same indicator value. Moreover, it
is difficult to attribute a practical meaning to a particular value of the indi-
cator, but it is useful in comparison with a well-known reference case or to
compare the performance of different power system decisions.
8Although the position of each consumer with respect to the equality situation cannot
be directly derived from the inequality indicator, it can be obtained based on the inequality
ratios ri calculated per consumer i.
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VI.4 Case study I: Controlled load-shedding plans
TSOs with insufficient generation or transmission capacity have the capa-
bility and authority to carry out controlled load shedding to prevent un-
controlled failures and blackouts. For example, NERC requires American
balancing authorities and transmission operators to have automatic under-
frequency load shedding plans (NERC, 2011a) and manual load shedding
plans (NERC, 2011b), while ENTSO-E requires European TSOs to have
automatic under-frequency control schemes (ENTSO-E, 2016a). TSOs are
free to choose which loads to shed in case of emergency, except for high
priority significant grid users who should never be shed. However, TSOs
generally choose a subset of consumers, which creates public concerns, be-
cause people might feel unequally treated.
This case study examines the load-shedding plan that was proposed by
the Belgian TSO for the winter 2014-2015.9 Public opposition to this plan
was large, because people felt that the burden of the load-shedding fell on
a subset of consumers, while at the same time the benefits accrued to all
consumers. To quantify the perceived fairness, this section calculates the
inequality indicator of the load-shedding plan.
VI.4.1 Data and assumptions
The Belgian load-shedding plan for the winter of 2014-2015 divided Belgium
in 5 zones and each zone was further divided into 6 slices.10 Each slice
corresponded to 520 MW of sheddable power, resulting in a total foreseen
sheddable load of 3120 MW, as summarized in Fig. VI.2. During load
shedding, one of these slices of 520 MW is disconnected according to a
rotation system. Slices within a particular zone are determined based on
their geographical location, in order to guarantee geographical spreading,
and on their value of lost load (VOLL), as rural areas with lower population
density and less critical electrical equipment are preferred above urban areas.
9At that time, Belgian system adequacy was low due to retirement and mothballing of
conventional power plants, supplemented by the unforeseen closure of three large nuclear
units as a result of indications of micro-cracks in the reactor vessels.
10A recent update of the load-shedding plan uses 8 slices each corresponding to 500 MW
up to 750 MW instead of 6 slices of 520 MW Elia (2016).
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Figure VI.2: The division of Belgium into zones and slices for the load shedding
plan in the winter of 2014-2015 (Data: ELIA).
Slices NW NE CE SW SE TOTAL
1 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
2 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
3 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
4 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
5 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
6 130 130 130 65 65 520 MW
7’ 8000 MW
7” 2000 MW
TOTAL 13120 MW
Total system load is considered to be 13120 MW, which means that
10 GW of load is never affected. These consumers are assumed to be in
slices 7’ and 7”. Slice 7’ represents densely populated areas with 8 GW of
low-VOLL consumers, while slice 7” represents 2 GW of critical high-VOLL
consumers.11
VI.4.2 Results
Table VI.1 gives the inequality indicator UENS between the slices of the
controlled load-shedding plan after 1 up to 6 geographical rotations. That
is, e6 is calculated based on the aggregated ENS after 6 rotations, assuming
that each time a different slice is affected.12 From table VI.1, it is clear
that, under the given assumptions, inequality decreases if load shedding
is applied more often. Rotation between the different slices implies that
those consumers who have been treated very unfairly with the first action
receive a favorable treatment in the next one. However, because a large
11These assumptions are a simplification of the real situation in order to obtain an
illustrative case study. In reality, consumers in different slices are more diversified and
more subgroups can be considered in the different slices, especially in the unaffected slice
7.
12Power demand and load curtailment are assumed to last for a fixed time period ∆t,
i.e. DE,i = PD,i ⋅∆t with PD,i the power demand of consumer i [MW] and ENSi = LCi ⋅∆t
with LCi the load curtailment of consumer i [MW].
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share of demand remains unaffected (slices 7), inequality is still high even
after shedding each of the 6 slices once.13
Table VI.1: UENS after 1 up to 6 rotations of the controlled load-shedding plan
proposed in Fig. VI.2.
Slice i d e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
1 0.04 1 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17
2 0.04 0 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17
3 0.04 0 0 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17
4 0.04 0 0 0 0.25 0.2 0.17
5 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.17
6 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0.17
7 0.76 0 0 0 0 0 0
UENS 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.76
The main concern of consumers might be their inequality compared to
consumers with the same characteristics. The inequality indicator for this
case is shown in table VI.2 and can be obtained by repeating the calculation
in table VI.1, omitting the critical high-VOLL consumers of slice 7”. The
inequality has been reduced compared to the results in table VI.1, but only
slightly due to the large share of unaffected consumers in slice 7’ with similar
characteristics as the ones in the affected slices 1 to 6.
Although it is difficult to obtain equality of reliability between con-
sumers in the practical application of load-shedding plans, it is possible
to distribute the economic consequences of the activation of load-shedding
plans more equally over all consumers in the system. A practical mea-
sure might be to compensate affected consumers. If (part of) the economic
burden is shared by all consumers, consequences of an interruption will be
distributed more equally. However, the exact interruption cost per con-
13It should be noted that the effect on the inequality in the case studies can be considered
as a marginal effect. Depending on the initial distribution of reliability, some decisions
might make the overall distribution of reliability more equal. In a practical setting, the
effect of decisions on the existing distribution of unreliability should be assessed. The
initial distribution of reliability among consumers in the case studies in this paper is
assumed to be equal.
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Table VI.2: UENS after 1 up to 6 rotations of the controlled load-shedding plan
proposed in Fig. VI.2 only considering consumers with similar char-
acteristics.
Slice
i d e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
1 0.047 1 0.5 0.333 0.25 0.2 0.167
2 0.047 0 0.5 0.333 0.25 0.2 0.167
3 0.047 0 0 0.333 0.25 0.2 0.167
4 0.047 0 0 0 0.25 0.2 0.167
5 0.047 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.167
6 0.047 0 0 0 0 0 0.167
7’ 0.719 0 0 0 0 0 0
UENS 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.72
sumer is hard to determine, and the use of a fixed price might result in
over- or undercompensation, depending on the consumer and the level of
compensation.
Table VI.3 shows the impact of compensating affected consumers based
on the amount of energy not supplied. The inequality indicator is calculated
based on the inequality ratios defined in (6.6). The compensation per MWh
equals a percentage of the weighted average VOLL of the affected consumers,
ranging from no compensation up to a compensation equal to 100% of the
weighted average VOLL. The economic burden of the compensation is shared
between all consumers and is divided according to their demand share, for
example through energy-based transmission tariffs.
In this illustrative case, the VOLL of the affected consumers is assumed
to be equal. The inequality can significantly be reduced if a compensation
scheme is put in place, even in the case of partial compensation. 100% com-
pensation results in complete equality under these assumptions. However, if
VOLL differs between consumers in the affected slices and interruptions are
compensated at average VOLL, some consumers will be over-compensated,
while others will be under-compensated, resulting in a remaining level of
inequality between the consumers.
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Table VI.3: Evolution of inequality as a function of the number of rotations and
the relative amount of compensation.
Rotations
Compensation 1 2 3 4 5 6
0% 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.76
30% 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.53
50% 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38
80% 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15
100% 0 0 0 0 0 0
VOLL is assumed to be equal for all consumers in the affected
slices.
VI.5 Case study II: Comparison of short term re-
liability management strategies
Due to evolutions in power systems there is a continuous search for alter-
native security criteria that perform better than currently used determinis-
tic approaches. However, the currently used deterministic N-1 criterion is
transparent, easy to use and has led to acceptable results in the last decades,
so that power system stakeholders are not eager to change their reliability
management. Evaluating performance of different reliability management
approaches and criteria and comparing with the N-1 approach is crucial in
order to convince power system stakeholders to move towards alternative
reliability management strategies that might be more cost-effective.
Up till now, performance evaluation of reliability management was
mainly based on socio-economic indicators, such as total system cost, sys-
tem related indicators, such as line overloading or voltage violations, and
reliability indicators, such as ENS (McCalley et al., 2004; Heylen et al.,
2016b; Kirschen and Jayaweera, 2007). Next to these traditional indicators,
the practical applicability of alternative reliability management strategies
is also determined by their social acceptance. A fair distribution of unre-
liability among consumers is one of the aspects that determines the social
acceptability of an alternative reliability management strategy.
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VI.5.1 Data and assumptions
This case study illustrates the use of the inequality indicator UENS in a com-
parative study of two different short term reliability management strategies:
(a) the state-of-the-art, deterministic N-1 criterion and (b) a probabilistic
criterion aiming at the minimization of expected total system cost. The N-1
approach considers constant and equal VOLL for all consumers, while the
probabilistic approach takes into account that VOLL differs between con-
sumer groups and over time(Ovaere et al., 2016). VOLL data for Norway
are used (EnergiNorge, 2012) and two consumer groups (residential and non-
residential) are distinguished. A 5 node network, based on the Roy Billinton
Reliability test system (Billinton et al., 1989), is used.14 Detailed data about
the test system and the VOLL data can be found in (Ovaere et al., 2016).
Performance evaluation of the two reliability management strategies
is executed using an analytical non-sequential state enumeration technique.
Two decision stages are considered in short term reliability management: day
ahead operational planning and real time operation. Operational planning
is simulated for both reliability management strategies under analysis. The
N-1 criterion aims at securing all single branch and generator outages and
the N-0 state given the forecast of net demand. All states are considered
as equally probable and equally severe. The probabilistic approach on the
other hand aims at minimizing the expected total system cost taking into
account the most probable contingencies up to a cumulative probability of
99% and 7 possible realizations of net total demand. Operational planning
is simulated for a set of time instances for which forecast values of net total
demand are given.
In a second step, corrective control is simulated for a set of real-time
realizations. This set is the Cartesian product of the most probable contin-
gencies up to a cumulative probability of 99.6% and 11 possible real time
realizations of net total demand derived from a normal distribution with
mean equal to the forecast value of net total demand at the corresponding
time instant and a standard deviation of 4%. The simulation of preventive
and corrective control is executed using a DC security constrained opti-
14In order to serve the illustrative purpose of this case study, a 5 node test system is
used. The indicator can similarly be applied to larger systems.
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mal power flow (SCOPF) in which generation redispatch, branch switching,
phase shifting transformer tap changing and load curtailment are considered
as available actions (Van Acker and Van Hertem, 2016). The simulations
are executed using a MATLAB implementation (Heylen et al., 2016b) inter-
facing with the DC SCOPF, which is implemented in AMPL (Fourer et al.,
1987).
For simplification, the set of time instances consists of 6 × 3 × 4 = 72
time instances, representing 6 periods in the year (winter, early spring, late
spring, summer, early autumn and late autumn), 3 types of days (weekday,
Saturday and Sunday) and 4 times during the day (night, morning, noon
and evening). By weighting the outcomes of the different time instances by
their probability of occurrence, we approximate the evaluation over a year
(Ovaere et al., 2016).
VI.5.2 Results
TSOs and policy makers are typically interested in potential overall efficiency
gains or total system cost savings when changing their reliability manage-
ment. However, social acceptance is crucial in order to practically deploy
alternative reliability management. Therefore, part of the selection of an
alternative reliability management strategy is making a trade-off between
efficiency and inequality between consumers (Ovaere et al., 2016).
Fig. VI.3 shows the Lorenz curves of inequality between consumers at
different nodes (UENS,node) for both reliability management strategies. This
figure clearly shows that inequality is higher with a probabilistic reliability
criterion (UprobENS,node = 0.57) than with a deterministic N-1 reliability crite-
rion (UN−1ENS,node = 0.11). This is because the probabilistic approach exploits
the differences in VOLL between consumer groups and over time, while
the N-1 does not. As a result the probabilistic approach leads not only to
a higher level of inequality of reliability, but also to lower socio-economic
costs (64% lower in this case study).
Part of the efficiency gains can be used to decrease public opposition
to the higher inequality of reliability. Fig. VI.4 identifies the most unfairly
treated nodes by plotting the inequality ratios ri. This figure shows that
consumers from nodes 4 and 5 have a disproportionately low reliability level
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Figure VI.3: Lorenz curves for inequality between nodes in terms of expected en-
ergy not served for the two reliability management strategies com-
pared to the line of equality.
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Figure VI.4: Inequality ratios per node for probabilistic reliability management
and reliability management based on the N-1 criterion.
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with the probabilistic approach, which means that they should be remuner-
ated or safeguarded against other reliability-decreasing decisions.
On top of the inequality between nodes (UENS,node), the indicator
can also be calculated for inequality between different consumer groups
(UENS,cg) or between individual consumers (UENS). Calculating inequal-
ity between individual consumers is hard in practice, because exact energy
not served and demand per consumer are not available to TSOs. They only
have estimations or nodal values. However, by grouping consumers per node
(UENS,node) or per consumer group (UENS,cg), the Lorenz curve is an ap-
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proximation of the Lorenz curve that considers all consumers individually.15
This is graphically illustrated in Fig. VI.5. Table VI.4 shows that this
approximation of the Lorenz curve results in lower values of the inequal-
ity indicators UENS,node and UENS,cg, quantifying the inequality between
nodes and between consumer groups respectively, compared to UENS , which
considers different consumer groups at different nodes. Individual inequality
is always understated if aggregation is used. Nevertheless, the conclusion
remains unaffected that probabilistic approaches lead to higher inequality
than deterministic approaches in this case study, whatever the compared
groups.
Figure VI.5: Impact of grouping consumers per node (UENS,node) or per con-
sumer group (UENS,cgr) on the Lorenz curves
Lastly, even if data is available at the level of individual consumers,
it makes sense to calculate the inequality between nodes or between con-
sumer groups. Consumers’ perception of their peers influences which groups
15Inequality ratios rg per group g, i.e. per node for UENS,node or per consumer group
for UENS,cg, equal rg = ∑i∈Ig ENSi∑nj=1ENSj ⋅ ∑nj=1DE,j∑i∈Ig DE,i , with Ig the set of consumers belonging to
group g.
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Table VI.4: Inequality between nodes UENS,node, between consumer groups
UENS,cg and between individual consumers UENS for the two types
of reliability management.
Probabilistic N-1
UENS,node 0.57 0.11
UENS,cg 0.61 0.05
UENS 0.75 0.35
need to be considered in the calculation of the inequality indicator. For
example, Table VI.5 shows the equality indicator within groups (residential
and non-residential). This table shows that for the presented case study
the inequality between residential consumers does not increase much when
moving from the N-1 criterion to a probabilistic criterion, while it increases
more between non-residential consumers.
Table VI.5: Inequality UENS between consumers in the two considered consumer
groups for the two reliability management strategies
Consumer groups
Residential Non-residential
Prob. 0.38 0.66
N-1 0.32 0.30
VI.6 Reducing inequality
If the inequality indicator shows that the distribution of unreliability among
consumers is highly unequal, measures can be taken to reduce this inequality.
This is possible based on the principle of transfers (Dalton, 1920). This
principle states that a transfer s of the share of ENS from a consumer i to
a consumer j decreases the value of the inequality indicator if ri > rj and
ei−s
di
≥ ej+sdj . This requires a more detailed study to see which consumers are
mostly affected in a positive and negative way. Based on this study, the TSO
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can decide to safeguard the most affected consumers if load curtailment is
required in the future.
From a socio-economic perspective it might be better to have a certain
level of inequality, e.g. in systems with remote and sparsely populated load
points. In this case it is not economically viable to have the same level of
redundancy for these remote load points as for a densely populated area.
This decision might result in a higher share of energy not supplied in these
remote load points. A cost-effective way to reduce the level of inequality in
this case might be to invest in small, local generation units, possibly (partly)
subsidized. Alternatively, transmission tariffs might be influenced by the
local reliability level resulting in lower tariffs for consumers with a lower
than average reliability level and a higher tariff for consumers with a higher
than average reliability level. Other options are a market for reliability
or end-consumer contracts where the price depends on the reliability level.
Bi-lateral interruptible load contracts between TSOs and large industrial
consumers with flexible processes are already in place nowadays, but they
might be extended to include smaller consumers as well, e.g. in case of a
roll-out of smart meters. These kinds of economic compensations result in a
more equal distribution of the cost of unreliability, although the inequality
of reliability itself is not changed. In order to obtain satisfactory results,
the design of these measures should be done with care, which requires a
multi-faceted analysis.
The exact determination of the interruption costs is a challenge in the
compensation of affected consumers. Not only are energy not served and
demand per consumer hard to obtain, also exact values of lost load per node
or per consumer are rarely available in practice. However, the fourth energy
package of the European Commission prescribes that all member states have
to establish at least a single estimate of VOLL for their territory and can
establish a VOLL per bidding zone, if they have several ones. In many other
regions such obligation does not yet exist, but more and more studies are
estimating VOLL with a higher level of detail, taking into account differen-
tiation in terms of type of consumers, time and duration. An overview of
these studies can be found in (Ovaere et al., 2016).
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VI.7 Conclusion
Quantifying inequality of power system reliability in a single value allows
stakeholders to compare the level of inequality between different entities and
for different decisions, such as adequacy or security measures. An equal and
fair distribution of power system unreliability is crucial to reduce public op-
position and is one of the aspects to ensure social acceptance. A definition
of equality based on energy not supplied is proposed. The usefulness of
the indicator is illustrated in the context of load-shedding plans and in the
evaluation of alternative short term reliability management strategies. In
addition, measures are discussed to directly reduce inequality of reliability,
such as alternating the affected customers over time, or to do so indirectly
by redistributing the consequences, such as through compensation schemes,
adapted transmission tariffs, markets for reliability or end-consumer con-
tracts. Future work has to focus on the careful design of measures to reduce
inequality in a cost effective way. The proposed indicator can be usefully
applied in order to evaluate the impact of such measures.
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